CHARACTERISTICS, ANALYSIS AND TACKLING OF TERRORISM IN UGANDA

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NTEGE Edward, Masters information security, National Research Nuclear University (MEPHI) Russian Federation, 115522, Moscow, Kashirskoe Hwy., 31, e-mail: ntege33@gmail.com

Abstract. The article analyzes characteristics of terrorists, in particular how they exploit vulnerabilities in Uganda’s security systems. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the risks posed by terrorist, of detecting and analyzing suspicious and dangerous behaviors and reflects on the methods of tackling terrorism. Special attention on what should be closely monitored and managed in terms of features of security in the practice of financial monitoring in the field of AML / CFT.

Keywords: Politics, Religion, Characteristics, Analysis, Tackling, Terrorism, Security

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Terrorism cannot be easily defined because it is context specific. Over 100 definitions attempt to explain what terrorism is. It is important to note that Kurd, Lebanese, Palestinian, Somali, and Kashmir communities view their fighters as freedom fighters, not terrorists. The political nature of terrorism and the challenges of defining it are further exemplified in the case of Hezbollah. With the exception of Lebanon and Iran, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declared the Lebanese movement leading to the foundation of Hezbollah a ‘terrorist’ group’. The US, Canada, and Australia also listed Hezbollah as a ‘terrorist’ group. More importantly, the EU even blacklisted its military wing. In contrast, the Lebanese desire the Hezbollah group to survive. This is because to them the enemy is clear, their history is intertwined, and the purpose is well defined. Hezbollah views its conflict with Israel and the Jewish people as religiously motivated. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that terrorism is the threat or the act of politically motivated violence directed primarily against civilians. Irrespective of legitimacy, perpetrator, location, and time of attack, terrorism is a means to an end. This is explicit in the activities of groups such as Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda, to mention but a few. Furthermore, terrorists disregard the law of armed conflict. They utilize the scheme of targeting civilians as a means of causing and spreading terror. As employed by non-state actors, terrorism is a revolutionary strategy that seeks to influence and disrupt political systems and to overthrow governments [1, p. 30]. EA is regarded as the region with extremely high incidents of terrorism. This is mainly as a result of Al-Shabaab activities. Nearly all countries in EA have been victims of terrorist acts. North Africa follows due to the influx of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. However, the Global Terrorism Index released in 2017 shows that Nigeria accounted for the majority of deaths due to terrorist attacks [2]. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that terrorism has had a
chilling effect, especially in regions where terrorist activities happen, no matter the classifications.

Al-Shabab which is an extremist group is to blame for the major cause of depredation in EA. Examples include: The 1980 terrorist attacks on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya, the August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, on another Paradise Hotel and on an Israel-bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombasa International Airport, Kenya; the December 2010 bombing of a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi [4]. The July 2010 Kampala attacks were suicide bombings carried out against crowds watching a screening of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Final match at two locations in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, on 11 July 2010. The attacks left 74 dead and 71 injured. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist militia based in Somalia that has ties to Al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the blasts as retaliation for Ugandan support for African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While fierce arguments and counterarguments have been made concerning why people join terrorist groups, there is no doubt that poverty ranks as a huge factor, especially in the Third World countries. For example, in Uganda the most noteworthy part is that most of the young men who join terrorist groups come from the poorest neighborhoods of the outskirts or suburbs of major cities, where unemployment and low levels of education are very common.

The report relies on an extensive literature review of open-source material, reports issued by governments or international organizations and risk assessments undertaken by relevant jurisdictions. This research is also library-based where the available literature on the subject has been made use of hard copy sources and electronic sources accessed from the Internet. For instance (1) Data Collection Methodology: GTD which was developed to be a comprehensive, methodologically robust set of longitudinal data on incidents of domestic and international terrorism. Its primary purpose is to enable researchers and analysts to increase understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. The GTD is specifically designed to be amenable to the latest quantitative analytic techniques used in the social and computational sciences; (2) Literature on the which has been made use of hard copy sources and electronic sources accessed from the Internet through information search/retrieval on characteristics of terrorists as well as how perpetrators are able to infiltrate and bypass security to bring about havoc to civilians and nation at large. Uganda is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the East African region experience: Significant weaknesses of regional governments, extensive and uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons, religious ideology and radicalization of vulnerable groups, inadequate financial control measures to effectively scrutinize mobile transactions. Uganda was stated from United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism Released July 2017 as being inconsistent in responding to counterterrorism threats. This report further pointed out that the Government of Uganda too lacked resources, had capacity limitations with inadequate controls to fight corruption at all levels of government. For instance, the Government of Uganda and members of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) at times labeled domestic political opposition as “terrorism” and individuals challenging government or party interests as “security threats,” potentially diverting attention and resources from pursuing core counterterrorism goals [6].

These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism.

The overwhelming majority of terrorism occurs in countries that fall into two categories;
• countries involved in an armed conflict, or
• countries with high levels of political terror.

In 2016, 99 per cent of all deaths from terrorism and 96 per cent of all attacks globally occurred in countries in these two categories. Here we examine in more detail terrorism that occurs in a conflict setting. We analyze the link between political terror and terrorism in exploring the characteristics of terrorist actors and terrorist groups. Political terror refers to the
levels of state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment in a society. To analyze the link between levels of political terror and terrorism carried out by non-state actors, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is correlated against the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS is measured using a scale from 1–5 with one being no political imprisonment and five being unrestrained political terror waged against the whole of population. Terrorism strongly correlates with the PTS at \( r= 0.57 \). High levels of political terror are defined here as a PTS score of three, four or five, which indicates that there are widespread human rights abuses or wholesale population abuse. Globally, countries with low levels of political terror or which are not involved in an armed conflict have very low levels of terrorism. Hence from the above below are the most significant characteristics of terrorists;

1. The drivers of terrorist recruitment
   Terrorist recruitment can be based on;
   (a) Identity, ideology and cluster formation concerned in coercion of that there are multiple ways to radicalization.
   (b) Relative deprivation, difference and also the expectation – achievement gap.
   (c) Recruitment hubs where by individuals have distinctive ways to radicalization, there are broader factors that cause alienation like perceived discrimination.
   (d) Prison radicalization are often the by-product of additional typical jail behavior such as ‘religion seeking, defiance, and also they would like for protection’.

2. Lone actor terrorism
   Radicalization often takes place within a group setting. However, there are increasing issues concerning the chance of lone actor terrorism, that is generally harder to disrupt and prevent [7].

   Terrorism potentially has adverse impacts on economic growth, investment, and tourism. Terrorism incidents worldwide typically lead to huge destruction with injuries and casualties. For example, for security reasons, visa requirements and the control of illegal immigration have started to be tightened in advanced countries. This has the potential to lower the number of developing country staff utilized abroad, affecting the level of remittances. The very fact that a disproportionate share of these emigrants works in the tourism industry (hotels especially) ought to additionally have an effect on transfers. Emigrants’ remittances are a crucial supply of financial gain for many. Though the precise level of transfers is tough to see, since a part of them transit through unofficial channels, emigrants’ remittances are higher than exports for many countries. For example: Stella Rugunda, the proprietor Stebar Safaris said in an interview in the run up to the grisly September 21 terror attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi. “We had up to 180 bookings however currently we have a tendency to predict 80 tourists, following the terror attack in Kenya. Several tourists canceled their bookings fearing for his or her safety. Such is that the horrific effect/impact that terrorism can have to the Uganda’s economy and that of the region in and of itself.

   Travel and Tourism continues to be one among the world’s largest industries, with tourism contributing US$1.5b to Uganda’s Gross domestic product (GDP) and in Kenya about Ksh 167.6bn (5.7% of GDP) in 2011 while Tanzania was expecting to rake in US$ 1.7b (about TSh2.7 trillion) in revenue in 2011 from the business that that supports 27,000 jobs. This primarily reflects the economic activity generated by industries like hotels, travel agents, airlines and other passenger transportation services (excluding commuter services) but also includes, for example, the activities of the restaurant and leisure industries directly supported by tourists. Flow Direct Inflows (FDI’s) to East Africa region continued to grow within the previous years, rising by 50 percent in 2012 to US $4 billion (about Shs10 trillion) compared with $3 billion (about Shs7.7 trillion) in 2011, with Uganda topping the region, in line with the United UNCTAD World Investment Report. With regards to the UIA statement, FDI inflows to Uganda alone rose for the third year running by 92 percent, hitting a record high of
$1.72 billion (about Ush 4 trillion). The growing role of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations (MNCs) in developing countries within the age of globalization cannot be disputed. However these profound figures, which might spur economic growth for Uganda and alternative countries within the region, is reversed with a single terror attack or attacks, the more reason for vigilance to stem any such occurrence [8]. Most terrorist groups have the tendency to physically destroy productive assets as well as redirect resources away from productive uses. Businesses associated with the location of the event usually suffer setbacks.

Using the “Terrorism Information Base” with more than 20,000 terrorism incidents from various sources, researchers have created many empirical estimates based on cross-sectional and period fixed effects, and generally found that there is a negative correlation between terrorism and real gross domestic product (GDP) – the higher the number of terrorist incidents, the lower the GDP. Deaths from terrorism accounted for 81 per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. Indirect GDP losses, the second largest category at 15 per cent of the total, is only calculated for countries with more than 1,000 deaths. Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. However, property value estimates are missing for an outsized range of incidents. Finally, the economic impact of injuries from terrorism was one per cent of the overall economic impact of terrorism. Figure below shows the breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism. The economic impact of terrorism is smaller than the several alternative styles of violence, accounting for about one per cent of the global cost of violence in 2016. This was calculable at $14.3 trillion or 12.6 per cent of global GDP. However, this estimate of the price of terrorism is conservative because the indirect effects of terrorism are solely calculated for countries that suffer from higher levels of conflict.

![Figure 1. Breakdown of The Economic Impact of Terrorism, 2016.](image)

Source: The Institute for Economics & Peace [7].

For developing countries like Uganda, it makes the investment setting unfriendly as investors keep away because of compromised safety and weak national security, which affects economic growth. The potential threat to investors’ confidence within the economy can deter investment, as most investors are risk averse, posing a fear of not been able to remove their investment. The economic value in Africa is far beyond the direct outlay, because terrorist incidents can deter future investment in affected countries, cut back foreign direct investment
(FDI), and deter economic growth as seen above (figure 1). Though terrorism having adverse effects in general, a key finding was that terrorist events in not solely Uganda but Africa have triggered media coverage that was related to presidential policy initiatives resulting in vital inflows of foreign aid in Africa. Thus, to the extent that foreign aid is beneficial for Africa (Juselius and Moller 2013), and its elasticity with regard to growth is larger than its elasticity with respect to terrorist events. As an example, The EU is providing over €4 million to finance projects to fight terrorism [9]. The pot of money is part of a renewed effort to tackle violent extremism in slums found in Uganda. "Our project is first to rebuild the trust between the police and the local community and create hope," said Schmidt, the EU's ambassador to Uganda.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Uganda on July 11, Ugandans are inevitably asking why their national troops are in Somalia. After three years of sacrifice made by the peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, peace in Somalia still doesn’t appear to be in reach. Further, the African Union Summit Resolution of 2007–to send peacekeepers to Somalia under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)–has been effectively unheeded by all other African nations except for East African countries; Uganda and Burundi. The Ugandan Parliament agreed to send troops to Somalia in 2008 in fulfillment of the commitment made by the African Union Summit. It’s been argued that terrorist activities involve religious, political and ideological motivations. Former President Bush recognized this when he stated hopelessness causes terrorism. Similarly, in an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation on July 13, former President Obama acknowledged two major causes of terrorism: poverty and an ideological element. Terrorists thrive by raising funds through criminal activities—a case in point is hard drug (heroin) production in Afghanistan, and the piracy off the Somalia coast—with which they form an amorphous and stateless band of killers. They tend to flourish in poor, Muslim-dominated economies where they are able to use material support to impose fundamentalist principles upon their societies. The funds are used to recruit potential terrorists from a poor, desperate and angry youth with little to lose. This method has worked in many countries such as Albania, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistani, Afghanistan and several break-away Soviet states such as Uzbekistan.

The terrorist bombings in Uganda are probably more political and ideological than religious. Al Shabab and Al Qaeda see Uganda as a close ally of the West, whose presence in Somalia would curtail their free movement and growth among the region. This has nothing to do with religion, although the killers use religious sentiments as a scapegoat. Their philosophical stance is intricate and needs not solely Uganda, Burundi and the African Union however also the complete international community to curb Al Shabab and Al Qaeda from more proliferation. The intervention in Somalia should be viewed along with the history of a very long and intractable conflict among the Somali individuals since their independence from colonial rule in 1960. Once the intensity and duration of Somalia’s conflicts are viewed in their historical perspective, there’s cause for concern over how peace and security can be sustained in Somalia. However, it appears unlikely that Uganda and Burundi alone can enforce peace in Somalia in the face of a determined onslaught by the varied Somali factions. A recent Brookings article warned of the upcoming danger that the instability in Somalia might spill over to different countries in the region. What is now imperative is broad-based multilateral action by the African Union and the United Nations to prevent a humiliating defeat by the Al Shabab.

Currently the Government of Uganda does not have a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) National Action Plan, as recommended by the UN Secretary General’s Preventing Violent Extremism Plan of Action. As of November, a small team consisting of counterterrorism security personnel (military and police) was drafting a CVE strategy for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. No civilian government agencies were known to be involved in the drafting process. Muslim religious leaders and civil society groups presented their research and views on drivers of violent extremism to the drafting team. Civilian Government of Uganda representatives attended regional CVE meetings organized under the auspices of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), an eight-country trade bloc in Africa that includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes and attended U.S. government CVE summits and programs. This is only possible if the other members of the African Union fulfill the promises they made and are supported by assistance from the rest of the world [10].

Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. While Uganda remained under review by the FATF in 2016 owing to its strategic anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies, it continued to make progress towards criminalizing terrorist financing and implementing United Nations (UN) sanctions in line with international standards. This included the 2016 enactment of amendments to its regulation implementing UNSC resolution 1373 and the UNSC ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime. Uganda though is still under review by the FATF due to gaps in its AML/CFT infrastructure. Specifically, the list of action items relates to the criminalization of terrorist financing, the implementation of procedures for freezing terrorist assets, provisions that financial institutions are subject to adequate record-keeping requirements, and ensuring adequate supervision and enforcement of compliance with AML/CFT requirements. A significant portion of financial transactions in Uganda are in the form of “mobile money” payments and transfers, which can be abused by individuals for a multitude of crimes, including terrorism. While Uganda’s Anti-Money Laundering Act requires financial institutions to conduct comprehensive customer due diligence, it does not put the same requirements on mobile money transfers. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2017 INCSR, Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [11]

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International actors such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and regional actors such as the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have comparative advantages in contributing towards counter-terrorism in EA.

• They have at their disposal knowledge and expertise of local issues that makes them well suited to develop approaches that take into account cultural and other contextual issues and undertake region- or sub-region-specific initiatives that complement and build upon global counterterrorism objectives.
• They can facilitate the exchange of expertise and information among governmental and non-governmental experts, as well as the sharing of good national practices and lessons learned from national implementation among the countries of the region.

This paper examines the efforts of regional and external actors to support counterterrorism activities in EA. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the examination of the susceptibility of the region to terrorist activities and the responses to the countering terrorism.
Firstly, understanding the vulnerabilities as well as the root causes of terrorism in the EA region is crucial for ensuring a more proactive approach to enhancing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Secondly, external actors have a major role to help in raising the capacities of countries and organizations in the region. For instance (Financial institutions engage in currency transactions related to international narcotics trafficking, involving significant amounts of U.S. currency, which is derived from illegal sales in the United States as well as in Uganda. Under the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA) and other banking regulations, Ugandan financial institutions and entities reporting to the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), Uganda's FIU, are subject to KYC and STR rules and have enhanced due diligence procedures in place for PEPs.) It is recognized that the use of military measures in countering terrorism can be counterproductive. This was clearly illustrated by US and Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in 2006. The reliance on conventional military tactics in an unconventional "conflict" will only lead to massive casualties. This approach creates low morale towards the US and its allies. It undermines the strategic objective of effectively dealing with the immediate threat by creating sympathy for the terrorists. This local sympathy can easily be converted into an environment conducive for terrorism for terrorist activities, either in the form of the provision of safe havens for terrorist groups, actual support (money, weaponry, and knowledge) and direct involvement of local populations through recruitment.

The international actors that is; UN and EU’s whose security approach is imperative because it drives to address the larger social and political conditions favorable for the spread of terrorist activities. The programs highlight issues which include; deficiencies of rule of law, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalization and poor governance, and enhancing dialogue, supporting peace-building and human rights protection in the region. Lastly but not least, it’s imperative to encourage cooperation and division of labor between the external actors for example the UN, EU, and US along with the regional and sub-regional organizations for instance: IGAD, EAC and the national governments in the HOA. Though this will help in avoiding duplication of efforts by actors in the region, it will also ensure maximum use of each actor's strengths and comparative advantage such as financial as well as technical expertise and knowledge in enhancing the capacities of countries and organizations in the region to prevent and counter terrorism.

References
ТЕРРОРИЗМ В УГАНДЕ: ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ И АНАЛИЗ, БОРЬБА

© Нтеге Эдвард

НТЕГЕ Эдвард, магистр информационной безопасности, Национальный исследовательский ядерный университет (МИФИ). Российская Федерация, 115522, Москва, Каширское ш., д. 31, e-mail: ntege33@gmail.com

Annotация. Автором использована Глобальная бaza данных по терроризму (ГТД), разработанная для всеобъемлющего анализа бытового и международного терроризма. В статье дают обобщенную концепцию терроризма, характеристики террористов, уязвимости в системах безопасности Уганды, которые они используют. Показано неблагоприятное влияние терроризма на экономический рост, инвестиции и туризм. Приведены сведения о террористах, их поведении. Рассмотрены факторы, которые могут повышать эффективность мер безопасности и борьбы с терроризмом. Указываются риски, связанные с терроризмами, подозрительные и опасные схемы. Понимание уязвимости, а также коренных причин терроризма в восточноафриканском регионе имеет решающее значение для повышения эффективности усилий по борьбе с ним в регионе. Внешние субъекты должны способствовать укреплению потенциала стран и организаций в регионе. Необходимо поощрение координации и разделения труда между внешними субъектами, например ООН, ЕС и США, а также региональными и субрегиональными организациями. Это должно не только помочь избежать дублирования усилий, но и обеспечить максимальное использование сильных сторон преимуществ каждого участника.

Ключевые слова: Уганда, терроризм, уязвимости системы безопасности, противодействие терроризму

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