

CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN TANZANIA ACHIEVE THEIR GLORY?

© 2017 Jason Nkyabonaki

Abstract: Reforms are processes which aim to meet organizational breakdown in order to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness. Public sector reforms in in developing countries such as Tanzania have had the mission of transforming the public sector to provide quality services to the citizenry. At the lower level of local communities, local government reforms are at the pilot's seat to ensure, participatory, responsive, accountable and transparent governance elements are in place. The 1998 LGRP under Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) is anchored on realizing the empowerment of local communities through ownership of the processes for decision-making and implementation of those decisions for poverty alleviation under the broad National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) in Kiswahili.

However, these reforms have not yielded the harvests expected. Services have not been of quality as hitherto claimed, governance at local levels has not significantly reached on the altar of celebrity for participation, accountability and improved living conditions. Many reasons have been advanced to explaining why reforms have not reached the altar of glory as expected. These include a debate on whether it's the designing of these reforms or it is amalgamation of other factors that entail lack of resources and political commitment by national governments. We argue that, the intriguing factors for the failure of LGRP1 and the prospect for LGRP 11 2008-2013 entail the designing which is a legal framework, political commitment due to power politics (statism) and lack of resources and more importantly the capacity of the demand side (citizens). Therefore, through the scroll of literatures, we put it with certainty that there are many cross sectioning factors for the failures of public sector reforms and local government in particular to achieve the vision of reforms; where political commitment is crucial for reforms successes. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the reforms have not achieved any tangible results.

Keywords: Reforms, Decentralization, Government

Introduction

This paper presents and discusses the factors for the failure of public sector reforms in general and local government reforms from a historical perspective. Using the Tanzanian experience as a case study, it highlights some of the reasons attributed with the fall short of local government reforms in Tanzania.

This paper is dedicated on the debate whether a flaw of design is a cause of the failure of the reforms or it's due to lack of resources and political commitment of the national government. While there are various factors which may contribute to failure of reforms, a special attention is given to key reform areas. These key areas entail, human resources, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, central– local relations, administrative decentralization and service delivery function decentralization and an examination of the extent to how flaws

design or lack of resources and political commitment on the side of national government and lack of capacity of demand side (citizens) lead to short falls of local government reform agenda, Kabagire (2006).

The paper is divided into five sections in which the first part deals with a historical development of local government reforms in Tanzania and the objectives of the Decentralization by Devolution policy of 1998; the second part sheds some light on the ideal local governance features as a gauge for reforms. The third part of this paper focuses on five key areas of reform and examines whether, flaws of design in terms of legal aspects, resources (human and fiscal) and as well as political commitment on the national government are the factors for the short falls of reforms in Tanzania. Central local relations in a devolved system of governance and its implication are concentrated on the fourth part of this paper. The last part poses concluding remarks and a way forward. The paper's central argument is that, for effective local government reforms, a comprehensive approach of mitigating obstacles must be dealt with simultaneously as they reinforce each other towards reform short falls. However, prior to an analysis of these factors that lead to short falls of local government reforms in Tanzania, the next subsection provides a conceptualization of various concepts as employed in this paper.

This paper takes decentralisation as per Jütting (2004) who defines it as "... a transfer of public functions from higher tiers to lower tiers of governance. It can be administrative, fiscal, political or a mixture of these" and Governance as per UNDP (1997) means „the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, exercise legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences." In turn, good governance as per BMZ (2002) includes five criteria, such as (1) respect for human rights, (2) popular participation in political decision-making, (3) rule of law and certainty of the law, (4) a market friendly and social economic order, and (5) development oriented state action aimed at sustainable development, fight against corruption and efficient public administration.

Historical developemnt of local Government in Tanzania

Indigenous local governments

In the advent of colonialism Tanzania had been divided into different kingdoms and chiefdoms for the purpose of political rulership. According to Illife (1979) the families were extended and most outstanding fellows were annoited to political leadership as kings and chiefs. people had their bond to the chief and it was tightly tied through the social expectations and and as well the economic and spiritual relations. In Bukoba among the Kyamutwara people, their king was known as "Omukama" who was the chief executive of the kyamutwara area and amongst his duties was to ensure security of the people in his kingdom and presence of food in all villages through encouraging hard work and praising gods through annual kingdom sacrifices along lake Victoria for the fortunes of the kingdom and its people*. According to Max (1991) local chiefs were fused with all powers of the executive but

* These narrations were told to Jason Nkyabonaki by the elders in Katoma village –kagera region when discussing the historical development of my village in July 2009. Thanks to these generous old men who shared this useful information.

having an inherent decentralization of functions through the council of elders who were nominated from the local people themselves. However, with the coming of colonialism these ties were made to disintegrate and local governments bond with local people started grow weak and weaker, Dryden (1968).

Local governments under the rule of Germans (1885-1918)

Every imperial power had to establish local government to fulfill its mission of coming into that particular community. Illife (1979) argues that Germans used military rule when they appeared on the surface of Tanganyika by then and civilian governments followed by then. According to Kessy (2008) under the German rule chiefs transformed into a link between the colonial government and the local people. It goes without quering that local governments turned to be tools for the colonial government with no accountability and responsiveness at the local level) Egli and Zürcher (2007)*. According to Samoff (1989) local governments by then were to collect tax, coerce and labour, settle local disputes and pass messages to local people. Invariably, this move by the Germans led to the destruction of local governments bonds with the local people.

Local government under the rule of Britons (1919-1960)

The British used indirect rule approach in Tanganyika. In 1926 there was the enactment of the Native Authorities Ordinance Cap.72 which by defacto recognized the local chiefs. However, the agenda was not to serve the local people but to fill the gap of shortage of administrative staff and as well reduction of running costs on the side of British government, Crowder (1964). The developments of local government under divide and rule by the British came to have a land mark in 1953 through the enactment of Native Authority Ordinance Cap.333 which replaced Cap.72 of 1926. This new Cap.333 granted a minister responsible to establish districts, town and county councils under the approval of the National Assembly, Warioba (1999). The legislation obviously resulted to top-down structure of native administration where local people were victims of power imposed. Local authorities were to collect tax and maintain law and order under the remote control of the minister responsible for local government.

Post-independence local governments 1961 to date

Decentralisation efforts in Tanzania date back to the 1960s. The decentralisation efforts during the 1970s are somewhat inconclusive. On one side the central government promoted the *ujamaa* village concept without considering feasibility and costs. It included forced resettlements of several million people (though at the late stage). On the other side it abolished local governments in 1972 expanding central control further with generous support by the donors. By the early 1980s, a team of party officials controlled the state and the economy almost entirely (Heyden 2005). Thus, under the rhetoric of decentralisation the local government systems got increasingly centralised during that era.

In the early 1980s the economic crisis deepened and shortages of basic commodities frustrated many people. The effects of the self-reliance strategy became obvious to millions of people and "the perforation of the state machinery by personal and informal initiatives had

* Walter Egli and Dieter Zürcher June 2007: The role of civil society in decentralisation and alleviating poverty :An exploratory case study from Tanzania.

begun in earnest” (Heyden, 2005). In 1982 the local governments and district authorities were reinstated after realizing that the top down (de)centralization process had failed. These decentralisation efforts were coined by heavy-handed officials managing decision-making at region and district level but local authorities were under-resourced and staff with local governance experience was lacking.

The last years of the 1980s saw an era of gradual but progressive liberalisation of the economy and the political sphere with slight improvement of rights and freedom. The introduction of the multiparty system as a conditionality by donors – in 1992 has increased the political competitiveness, but the CCM party remained the ruling party till now.

Decentralisation received a major push in 1996 when the Government of Tanzania published a local government reform agenda. The subsequent policy paper in 1998 defined far reaching decentralisation aims by promoting the famous D-by-D principle: decentralisation by devolution. This approach aims at the devolution of real power and authority to elected sub-national governments and not only at a deconcentration of central agencies. This far reaching reform wants to fundamentally change the role of the central and local authorities: the central ministries are expected to switch from direct implementation to a role of support and monitoring of local authorities under the slogan “hands off, eyes on” Chaligha (2008).

The formal decentralisation reform started when the Government of Tanzania and several donors committed their support in form of basket funding for the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which officially began in January 2000*. The programme is now in its third phase (2005-2008) and was evaluated several times. The main aims of this programme are:

Devolution of power to locally elected councils and committees (political decentralisation)

Collection of taxes and budgeting based on local priorities (financial decentralisation)

De-linking local authority staff from the respective line ministries making them accountable to the local government (administrative decentralisation)

Changing the role of line ministries from control to that of policy making, regulating, support and monitoring to ensure quality of services and national standards.

Decentralisation in the Mkukuta Strategy

This ambitious change agenda was supposed to be closely coordinated with the other three main reform agendas that were (and still are) implemented within the Mkukuta strategy, which is the National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty: the Public Service Reform (increased effectiveness of the state), Public Financial Management Reform (more efficient and effective resource mobilisation and management, i.e. budgeting, etc.) and the Legal Reform. Naturally, these are complex change processes where various stakeholders follow their specific and often self-interests and potential losers resist change. The coordination efforts and cross-effects of these reforms have proven to be more difficult, and progress is more slowly than anticipated. Civil society has become a partner with its own voice that has been increasingly consulted for the design and implementation of these policies.

* In 2006 the following bilateral donors are supporting the LGRP: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, (has the lead from donor side), Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The following multilaterals finance the programme: EU, UNDP/UNCDF and the World Bank.

The importance of decentralisation and good governance as principles of policy reforms has been duly reflected within the Mkukuta strategy (2005). The following table illustrates their importance: **Mkukuta Strategy (2005/6 – 2009/10)**

Principles	Clusters
National ownership Political commitment to democratisation and human rights Maintenance of macro-economic and structural reforms Building on sector strategies and cross-sectoral collaboration Building local partnerships for citizens to engage in policy dialogue Harmonisation of aid Equity and sharing of benefits Sustainable development Strengthening of macro-micro links and decentralisation Mainstreaming cross cutting issues	<u>Cluster I.</u> Growth and reduction of poverty: sustained and equitable broad based growth of at least 6-8 % by scaling up investment in the agriculture and off-farm sectors and in infrastructure. <u>Cluster II.</u> Quality of life and social well being: reduction of vulnerabilities and ensuring equitable access to quality services in order to improve quality of life and well-being with a focus on the poorest. <u>Cluster III.</u> Governance and accountability: this aims at four outcomes a) good governance, b) rule of law, c) sustaining peace and political stability, and d) war against corruption

Source: URT (2005).

The next section considers the key areas for reforms and assess whether they can be realized amidst the given paper problems of design, lack of resources and political commitment.

Key areas for the Local Government Reform Program

Many countries around the world have embarked on decentralisation programmes. The reasons for this include political, economic and governance considerations. In many developing countries, the reasons centre on the need to establish working local governments which can deliver quality services to the people in a participative, effective and transparent way, where local authorities are directly accountable to the local people. The Government of Tanzania is determined to reform the culture of centralized bureaucracy which has failed to deliver good quality services to the poor, and which has stifled local enterprise. It is determined to build a public service which is lean, transparent, accountable, and above all effective, economic and efficient. The PO-PSM, through the Public Service Reform Programme, is charged with effecting these reforms at national level, and the PMO-RALG, through the Local Government Reform Programme, is charged with effecting reform of the local government system.

The Government has set out a clear policy, has passed enabling legislation, and has embarked on the decentralisation journey. It has adopted, inter alia, the principle of subsidiarity*, which means that public service responsibilities must be exercised by the lowest level of government unless a cogent and convincing case can be made for higher level assignment. It has

* *‘The principle of subsidiarity involves a decentralisation of public service provision linked to a devolution of political powers to lower levels as far as possible and feasible. This principle is to let local councils have discretionary powers when it comes to planning, budgeting, administration and organisation of service delivery’.* Policy Paper on Local Government Reform, Government of Tanzania , 1998.

taken a holistic approach to decentralisation, covering political, administrative and fiscal aspects, as well as service delivery aspects. Its approach involves radical changes in central – local relations.

Reform of local government involves five main areas:

Political decentralization: Involving the strengthening of the local democratic institutions, enhancing public participation; and bringing control over many important aspects of people's daily lives nearer to the people themselves;

Fiscal decentralization: Involving decentralization of local government finances by introducing equitable and transparent revenue and capital development grants from central government to local government authorities; it also involves giving local government authorities financial powers and powers to raise appropriate local revenues;

Administrative decentralization: A decentralization of personnel, integrating them into LGA administration and away from ministry subordination; and restructuring of local government organisations;

Service function decentralization: Involving a decentralization of public services to bring service management and provision of services closer to the end user and to increase the quality and quantity of these services; and

Changed central-local relations: Involving the changing of the role of central government vis a vis local government authorities, with the central government having the over-riding powers within the framework of the Constitution and the legal framework; and with the local government having devolved powers and responsibilities in law. Central and line ministries will change their roles and functions to become:

Policy making bodies;

Supportive and capacity building bodies;

Monitoring and quality assurance bodies; and

Control bodies (legal controls and audits).

The following section discusses why reforms cannot be realized in the given flaw of design, lack of resources, lack of political commitment and weak demand side for accountability.

Failure for Local Government Reforms: flaw design or other factors?

In this paper, it is argued that there is no single factor that can be solely attributed to the failure of public sector reforms in general and local governments in particular. Some factors that include flaw of design, lack of resources, lack of political commitment and weak demand side for accountability and quality services are discussed in details.

The flaw design of local government Reforms

Two Articles under Chapter eight of the Constitution provides for the establishment of Local Government Authorities and their purpose. These two articles are important and because we will discuss the Constitutional provisions below, it is advisable here to present the contents of the Articles in full:

Article 145.-(1) There shall be established local government authorities in each region, district; urban area and village in the United Republic, which shall be of the type and designation prescribed by law to be enacted by Parliament or by the House of Representatives. (2) Parliament or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall enact a law providing

for the establishment of local government authorities, their structure and composition, sources of revenue and procedure for the conduct of their business.

Article 146.-(1) The purpose of having local government authorities is to transfer authority to the people. Local government authorities shall have the right and power to participate, and to involve the people, in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective areas and generally throughout the country. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub article (1), of this Article, a local government authority in conformity with the provisions of the law establishing it, shall have the following functions: (a) to perform the functions of local government within its area; (b) to ensure the enforcement of law and public safety of the people; and (c) to consolidate democracy within its area and to apply it to accelerate the development of the people (URT, 1977).

The status of local government to have been enshrined in constitution would be interpreted as as a yardstick for their autonomous operation within their administrative jurisdictions. However, they have not lived to see this as there are drawbacks within the establishing and operative legislations from the historical context. The logic of decenarization at any time memorial informs the kind and nature of legislations to establish local goveremnts. Therefore, there is a gap and the enshrinment of local governemmts in the constitution doesnt guarantee their autonomous functioning. This is evidenced by, Tidemand et. al (2007; URT (2004) who argue that LGAs have suffered from many and varied problems in the said areas. These problems are not in paucity weakening LGAs autonomy but also cascading down to their ability to perform effectively and efficiently.

It can be epitomized that there are inherent and behavioural general problems that hinder local government reforms to be effective. These have been cited to include the following:

Finance, accountancy and other technical work force are not in full supply in local governments and the problem radiates across the entire council functioning. Moreover, inadequacy of funds is a major problem to almost all local governments as they have to depend on what the central gives them as grants. According to Mtei (1992) under funding is a major problem which cuts across all sectors of government services, it is more pronounced in the local government system and has resulted in serious malfunctions of the social and economic services earmarked to be rendered by that system thus affecting their proper functioning. Another pronounced problem is scarcity of technical equipment and materials. This problem was endemic in all sectors and professions. Councils lacked vehicles for operational duties in the field, there were no safes in council offices for storage of money, there were no computers to accumulate and analyze financial and other data, and no means of communicating that data to users. (Mushi, 2001).

These problems have persisted amidst the reforms but as some academics present, devolution of powers as stipulated in the policy document cannot yield expected results due to power politics as the centre considers losing powers as being losing control. This is the reason why Mushi and Baregu (1990) argue that the need for the central leadership to widen its political space for effective control of national activities and the need to also widen the political space of local communities for purposes of empowerment and participation makes it difficult to have effective and efficient local governments.

Implementation of the key policy statements has been problematic to the extant that realization of the vision on local government is seriously threatened. The central government as-

sumes unlimited warrant to interfere into local government affairs and rather than guiding, and mostly, through directives sometimes disregards the local priorities and capacities. In order to iron out these incongruence's, legislation to give effect to the reforms was enacted by the Local Government Act No. 6 of 1999, and legal instruments necessary for implementation of the reform have been issued. Regulations to support the reforms have been passed. However, in order to fully implement the reforms, it is essential that all relevant legislations are harmonized with the decentralisation policy. Incomplete legal harmonization across sectors, LGAs revenue assignments and persistent governing by directives from the central government were persistent under reform 1. It can therefore be concluded that the strategy to institutionalize D by D in the government was not adequately embedded across MDAs and LGAs due to a number of reasons including lack of knowledge on vision, reluctance and fear of devolution and policy and legislative bottlenecks (URT, 2008).

Flaw of design transcends to all other areas of local authorities territory. The constitution provides for the establishment of the local government authorities without defining them as autonomous and therefore they keep on dancing the tunes of central government/national government, as they have been to have a subordinate position through being dependent on central government for finance to manage local affairs. The practice has been for the central government to direct and mostly to show to the public that the problems of local governments are generic to local government themselves. However, according to Kabagire (2008) the lack of tangible results is not due to lack of political commitment alone and effort on the part of PMO-RLG, but is due in part to the sheer scale and complexity of the undertaking. It must be said that it is also due in part to the reluctance, or at least the lack of enthusiasm in central government and the sectors for harmonisation and the changes that involve. We argue that, political commitment is an underlying factor that cannot be overemphasized for the success of the local government reforms.

Lack of resources and its relationship with the failure of the reforms in LGAs' fiscal decentralisation

Major steps forward have been taken in the area of fiscal decentralisation through which Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are allocated grants in a transparent and equitable manner thus rectifying the historical imbalance in the allocation of resources between LGAs. The LGAs, in an effort to concretize fiscal decentralisation, will also be given greater flexibility in the use of those resources in line with the vision of autonomous local government authorities set in the policy URT (1998).

The Government approved a formula based intergovernmental system for the allocation of resources between LGAs and this has been implemented from 2004/2005 onwards. Eligibility criteria have been developed to identify those LGAs that have demonstrated adequate capacity that justifies them being given greater autonomy over the use of grant resources. The principle of LGAs earning the right to greater autonomy was extended in 2005 to development grants, where the government, through the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) system, provides discretionary capital development grants to LGAs on a formula basis, but only where they have met some governance-related minimum conditions, and certain performance criteria.

It should be pointed out that these positive developments were only made possible by the close cooperation and collaboration between the Ministry of Finance and PMO-RALG. The joint approach meant that the concerns of PMO-RLG in implementing decentralisation re-

forms, and the concerns of MoF in overseeing public expenditure were both met. The principle of LGAs earning the right to greater autonomy or additional development funds through performance provides an incentive to LGAs to improve their financial performance, and this brings us to the issue of LGA's financial management capacity*.

For the reforms to be credible and sustainable it is essential that all stakeholders are assured that the LGAs are able to manage funds effectively. The performance of LGAs in this area has been historically poor and great efforts are being made to assist them to improve in this area, largely working through the LGRP Zonal Reform Teams in mentoring and supporting the LGAs. In addition the PMO-RALG is gradually introducing the national financial management system, again in close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance.

The final pillar of the financial reforms is Local Revenue Sources. To have a fully devolved system of local government it is essential that the LGAs have robust revenue sources that will finance improved local service delivery as well as encourage accountability to the local taxpayers. Failure to ensure such revenue sources for local government means that LGAs rely solely on central government grant transfers, and this effectively de-links local leaders from their electorate, weakens accountability and concern for cost-effectiveness**. Such robust sources have not been available hitherto and there has been built up a set of bad and nuisance taxes that have been regressive, uneconomical to collect, or a hindrance to local economic activity. Hence, LGAs still lack sustainable local sources of revenue and qualified staff in the area of accounting, auditing and general financial management. The central government persists in controlling and managing LGAs human resources, resulting in the recurrent grant system being distorted (Liviga and Uusihakala, 2008).

Human resource decentralisation

Autonomy for local government authorities over human resources is considered an essential element of the decentralisation process. Indeed the literature on decentralisation internationally often considers the lack of such autonomy as the 'Achilles' heel' of devolution, as centrally controlled and transferred civil servants have no personal stake in the success of devolution. Yet central governments are often reluctant to let go of the power and patronage potential of centrally appointing and managing all key public service staff in the country.

The Government of Tanzania policy on local government reform in this area is clear and unambiguous, and is worth re-stating here. Government policy on administrative decentralisation involves "de-linking local authority staff from their respective ministries". It goes on to state that LGAs "will be fully responsible for planning, recruiting, rewarding, promoting, disciplining, development and firing of their personnel. The councils will be the appointing authorities and employers for all local government personnel (including teachers, health staff, agricultural staff etc.)". LGAs will "employ the Council Director, the department heads and will adopt staffing plans and budgets."***

Implementation of government policy in this area saw some early success with the signing of the Local Government Service Regulations, 2000, whereby LGAs were given a framework for the hiring, managing and firing of its own staff. However, the passing of the Public Ser-

* In 2006 the following bilateral donors are supporting the LGRP: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, (has the lead from donor side), Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The following multilaterals finance the programme: EU, UNDP/UNCDF and the World Bank

** Ibid.

*** Policy Paper on Local Government Reform, Government of Tanzania, 1998.

vice Act No. 8 of 2002, and the Public Service Regulations of 2003 effectively curtailed progress in this regard, and indeed, in some respects, reversed it as under LGRP I, PO-PSM still retains authority to approve LGAs recruitment process and the Treasury retains the power to approve LGAs new personnel based on availability of funds to pay for their salaries. Additionally, there are dual personnel at the local level whereby district directors and heads of departments are employees of the central government. Therefore, the local politicians cannot hold them accountable as they are agents of central government. Given this status, LGRP cannot see lights at the end of the tunnel.

Political decentralization commitment under D by D

LGRP II regards political decentralization as an area to focus on due to three major factors:

- the vision is not yet owned by all stakeholders
- LGAs have no financial autonomy, and that most remittances are controlled by Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA) and PMO-RALG and are tied, and
- Central ministries and agencies govern by directives, which means non-adherence by central government to D by D.

In the same vein, LGRP II suggests three solutions to address the said problems. These solutions entail the following:

- Institute mechanisms to ensure vision is shared by all stakeholders and that they are committed to it,
- Restructure LGCDG system and other CG/sector budgetary allocations to give LGAs more resources and financial autonomy, and
- Central ministries and agencies to devolve functions and roles (as well as resources) to LGAs, stop governing by directives which curtail LGA autonomy.

According to Liviga (2009), these problems are real and the solutions may work but the document does not state the real causes of non-compliance by central government to D by D. It may therefore mean that the LGRP II strategy will be addressing the wrong issues. He goes on saying that the fundamental problem for non-compliance by central ministries and agencies to the vision of LGRP lies in the two contradictory values Tanzania pursues in relation to decentralization. These values entail the need for the central leadership to widen its political space for effective control of national activities and, the need to also widen the political space of local communities for purposes of empowerment and participation (Mushi and Baregu, 1990)

When a close examination of these two values is made, one appreciates that there is a will to allow participatory governance but at the same time, there is an inherent need to strengthen the central control. This lukewarmness portrays a conflictual relationship between political pronouncements, policies and strategies clearly stressing community empowerment and decentralization of power and resources while behavioural wise central government encroaches the powers in practice. This is what Robert Michels calls an iron law of oligarchy to the original goal*. According to Liviga (2009) Ministries and central government agencies have also been hiding behind the fact that LGAs do not have capacity to handle increased resources and functions/roles. This is equal to blaming the victim instead of the perpetrator,

* Robert Michels (2001) *Political parties: A Sociological Study of the oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies*, Kitchener: Batoche Books

(Kessy, 2008). Lack of capacity in LGAs is the result of Central Government own actions such as top down changes which create uncertainty and unknowns to the actors in local and central government. Therefore, LGRs and PSRPs cannot achieve the goals, as some actors are afraid of changes.

Demand side capacity to foster D by D

Decentralisation by devolution implies changes in two dimensions. On one hand, it aims at re-defining the power relationship between central and local government by devolving power and responsibility from the central state to local government authorities. On the other, it also redefines the relationship between government authorities (at local level) and the citizens. The local government reform is therefore a governance reform. This implies that principles of good governance not only apply to central but also to local government. "Medium Term Plan and Budget, July 2005 - June 2008" of the Local Government Reform Programme defines good governance by the following elements: democratically elected leaders, rule of law, equity, public participation, accountability, integrity and transparency. For this period 2005 to 2008 the programme is focussing on the following priorities and has formulated these objectives: Increased accountability of politicians and public servants to service users, Increased powers and responsibilities decentralised to lower level local government, Gender issues mainstreamed in local government, Increased civic awareness and involvement in local government processes.

The evidence available indicates that progress towards these objectives seem to depend to a considerable extent on personal inclinations of individual District Commissioners. Whether or not to invite local Civil Society Organizations to stakeholder meetings, or whether or not to make figures on budgets and expenditure available to the citizens seems to be subject to personal decisions of local officials or politicians. However, democratic values such as accountability and public participation should not be favours granted by will that is politicians or officials, but rights to which citizens living under a democratic regime are entitled. Therefore, citizens through their organisations must demand these rights and exercise pressure if these are not granted*.

According to the study done in 2007** at national, regional and local level there was found evidence of numerous initiatives aiming at strengthening the capacity of the people to exercise their rights as citizens. Some CSOs such as REPOA and others are directly engaged in training and capacity building activities within the institutional context of decentralisation. Other CSO initiatives are focused on building regional and local capacities for participation and lobbying. In general the participatory approach of CSO projects and programmes such as those visited in the Kongwa District (LVIA) or in the Bukoba and the Muleba Districts (Swissaid and FOGOTA), which aim at empowering villagers by building up and supporting their self-help organisations, are laying an important groundwork for participatory and transparent local government***.

The analysis of these issues within the broader context of local government reform suggests that Decentralisation by devolution can only succeed if simultaneously local government authorities and civil society organisations at local and regional level are

* PEFAR (2007): Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review. Aide Memoire (draft).

** Walter Egli and Dieter Zürcher June 2007: The role of civil society in decentralisation and alleviating poverty :An exploratory case study from Tanzania.

*** Ibid.

strengthened in their capacity to act as partners in planning and implementation and to demand transparency and accountability.

Conclusions

The Government of Tanzania has decided to pursue a policy of decentralisation by devolution. Decentralisation is a journey rather than a destination, and we have embarked on that journey. In general it can be said that the change process involved in implementation is difficult and complex. This was expected, and is the case internationally. However, it should also be noted that momentum for change is gathering, and more importantly, government support at the highest level for the process is unwavering. His Excellency President Kikwete, like his predecessor, President Mkapa, has made it clear that there is no turning back from this decentralisation journey. This shows a political will to D by D but as a rule its easy to talk the talk but difficult to walk the talk.

The national government has to be committed to embark on D by D. The cardinal goal is to promote and support decentralisation in order to improve the quality of life among the local government authorities. Therefore, Tanzania is left with charting out a course for decentralisation. This is the challenge facing the central local relations. PMO-RLG is seen as the champion of the decentralisation policy, and has, until recently, largely been left to try to implement it. PMO-RLG on its own cannot implement this policy, and this is now recognised by government as a weakness for the past Local government reform one. Decentralisation by devolution has now become the business of all of government, and is championed by the Chief Secretary, who, with his team of Permanent Secretaries, is driving the remaining reforms forward.

Local government reform can contribute to significant reduction of the proportion of the people who are living in poverty in Tanzania. The reforms can help LGAs to significantly improve their performance, to stimulate local economic development, and to deliver better quality services, especially in the pro-poor areas like health and education. Therefore, the goal which is to contribute to the national drive towards the reduction of the proportion of Tanzanians living in poverty and allied purposes of Political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities devolved from central to local government, underpinned by good governance, to enabling Local Government Authorities to provide more equitable, quality services to Tanzanians is limited by flaws in design, lack of resources and political commitment by national government. When these factors mingle, they leave the Local Government Authorities impotent and helpless to promote the goal and purpose for reforms.

If the central – local relations embedded in various legislations guiding the conduct and practice of central government and local authorities are not addressed amidst political commitment to ensure fiscal and human resources as well as demand side capacity to call for accountability and quality services; reforms will never yield any substantial results in terms of improving local governance.

Therefore, national Government commitment and leadership to decentralization as a crosscutting issue is essential as change would require central government to realize and work with local authorities as counterparts rather than the present form in which they operate under superior-subordinate relations. Let the new constitution hoped for 2014 be a path towards the kingdom of glory for local government authorities being given a provision that ascends them to the equal throne as that of central government, which may promote local government performance in their jurisdictions.

REFERENCES

- Crowder, M. (1964) Indirect rule: French and British Style. *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp.197-205.
- Illife, J. (1979) A modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kessy A.T. (2008) Local Government Reform Programme(LGRP) and the Challenges of local governance in Tanzania: Local Autonomy, Participation, Accountability and Transparency. A Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester
- Liviga A. (2009) Local Government Reforms in Tanzania. Paper presented at 17th State of Politics in Tanzania, organized by Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) 5th-6th October, Nkrumah Hall, University of Dar es salaam
- Max, M.A.O (1991) The Development of Local Government in Tanzania, Dar es salaam: Dar es salaam Education Publishers and Distributors
- Mushi, S. (2001) Development and Democratization in Tanzania: A Study of rural grassroots politics, Fountain Publishers Ltd: Kampala
- Mwaikusa, J. (1996) Local Government Policies in Tanzania, The political Guinea Pig. In Rothchild, R. (Ed.) *Strengthening African Local Initiatives: Local Self Governance, Decentralization and Accountability*. Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs
- Pratt, C. (1976) The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Semboja, J. and Therkildsen, O. (1991) A handbook on District level Administration in Tanzania. Dar es salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors.
- Shivji, I.G. (2009) Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa. Cape Town: Fahamu Books
- URT (1977) Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania: Dar es salaam: Government Printer
- URT (1998) Policy Paper on Local Government Reform. Dar es salaam: Government Printer
- URT (2008) Local Government Reform Programme II (Decentralization by Devolution) Vision, Goals and Strategy, July 2008 - June 2013
- Warioba, M.M.D. (1999). Local Governments in Tanzania: Some Historical Insights and Trends. IDM-Mzumbe

НАСТУПИТ ЛИ ТОРЖЕСТВО РЕФОРМ МЕСТНОГО САМОУПРАВЛЕНИЯ В ТАНЗАНИИ?

© 2017 Джейсон Нкьябонаки

Аннотация: Реформы – это процессы, направленные на преодоление сбоев в организационной структуре. Их задача – обеспечить работоспособность, эффективность, подотчетность и обратную связь. Реформы государственного сектора в развивающихся странах, таких как Танзания, призваны трансформировать государственный сектор для предоставления качественных услуг гражданам. На более низком уровне местных общин реформа местных органов власти призваны стать механизмом, обеспечивающим вовлеченность, участие, реагирование, подотчетность и прозрачность политики местных властей. Однако в Танзании эти реформы не дали ожидаемых плодов. Предлагаемые в их рамках услуги оказались недостаточно качественными. В статье рассматриваются причины, объясняющие их провальный исход и меры по их оживлению.

Ключевые слова: реформы, децентрализация, правительство.

ЦИТИРУЕМЫЕ ИСТОЧНИКИ

- Crowder, M. (1964) Indirect rule: French and British Style. *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp.197-205.
- Illife, J. (1979) A modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kessy A.T. (2008) Local Government Reform Programme(LGRP) and the Challenges of local governance in Tanzania: Local Autonomy, Participation, Accountability and Transparency. A Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester
- Liviga A. (2009) Local Government Reforms in Tanzania. Paper presented at 17th State of Politics in Tanzania, organized by Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) 5th-6th October, Nkrumah Hall, University of Dar es salaam
- Max, M.A.O (1991) The Development of Local Government in Tanzania, Dar es salaam: Dar es salaam Education Publishers and Distributors
- Mushi, S. (2001) Development and Democratization in Tanzania: A Study of rural grassroots politics, Fountain Publishers Ltd: Kampala
- Mwaikusa, J. (1996) Local Government Policies in Tanzania.; The political Guinea Pig. In Rothchild, R. (Ed.) *Strengthening African Local Initiatives: Local Self Governance, Decentralization and Accountability*. Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs
- Pratt, C. (1976) The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Semboja, J. and Therkildsen, O. (1991) A handbook on District level Administration in Tanzania. Dar es salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors.
- Shivji, I.G. (2009) Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa. Cape Town: Fahamu Books
- URT (1977) Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania: Dar es salaam: Government Printer
- URT (1998) Policy Paper on Local Government Reform. Dar es salaam: Government Printer
- URT (2008) Local Government Reform Programme II (Decentralization by Devolution) Vision, Goals and Strategy, July 2008-June 2013
- Warioba, M.M.D. (1999). Local Governments in Tanzania: Some Historical Insights and Trends. IDM-Mzumbe