COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE: 
RESTARTING THE CONCEPT IN THE SAHEL 
IN THE CONTEXT OF A MULTIPOLARIZING WORLD ORDER

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Abstract. This article is devoted to restarting the concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” (CSR) taking into account the emergence of a multipolar world. Particular attention is paid to the attempts of African countries to get out of the center-periphery model of dependent development through the implementation of this concept. The theoretical foundations of the CSR concept, enshrined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Arusha Program for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations of 1979, and in a number of documents of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU), are presented. The attitude towards CSR is shown in the works of Western experts, scholars from the USSR and Russia, as well as contemporary researchers from the former republics of Yugoslavia. Interpretations of the concept are given, based on the works of Johan Galtung, Samir Amin, and German experts. The practice of applying the concept in Burkina Faso and the neighboring countries, as well as in Tanzania, is shown. A critical analysis of the results of the implementation of the concept and the possibilities of its implementation in the modern realities of global capitalism was carried out. Particular attention is paid to the levels of implementation of the concept as well as the theory and practice of delinking – a temporary decoupling of economic ties with the countries of the “collective West”. It is concluded that, in the 2020s, multi-level implementation of the CSR concept (local, country level, Alliance of Sahel States level, “World Majority” level) seems even more realistic than at the time of its development. This is facilitated by the dominance of non-Western economies in the global framework, macrohistorical processes of decoupling, as well as the key role of the “World Majority” countries in the current economic ties of the Sahel countries. A limiting factor in this is the large-scale flow of Western aid to the region.

Keywords: Africa, Alliance of Sahel States, peripheral development, Non-Aligned Movement, sovereignty, Self-Reliance, international aid, delinking, World Majority

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The rise to power of a new generation of African leaders and the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASG) are renewing the debate on the prospects for sovereign
economic development [Gadha et al 2022; Fituni 2021] and give hope for a revision of the center-periphery model of dependent development on the continent, which became irreversibly dominant in the 1980s after the Structural Adjustment Programs implemented by the Bretton Woods institutions [Riddell 1992; Mkandawire, Soludo 2003]. The above re-actualizes the concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” (CSR) developed several decades ago, which is the subject of this article.

CENTER-PERIPHERY REVISION?

The end of the prolonged “postcolonial pause” (substitution of the struggle for economic sovereignty by the postmodern discourse of cultural emancipation) [Degterev 2023a] and the renaissance of anti-colonial discourse [Africa: unpaid debt... 2023; Sirotkina, Alpidowska 2020] are conditioned by macrohistorical shifts [Abramova, Fituni 2022: 838], including shifts in the context of “power transit” (from the US to the PRC, or, more broadly, from the Western world to the non-Western world) [Degterev, Ramich, Zvyk 2021]. The latter led to the emergence on the African continent of modernities alternative to the Western one [Degterev 2021a], and quite solid modernities (Chinese, Russian, Turkish, etc.) [Vasiliev, Degterev, Shaw 2021: 12–14], based on the transfer of some elements of their own development models to Africa. At the same time, the potential of the European Union as a global macro-actor projecting its influence on Africa in the context of a special military operation (SMO) continues to steadily decline.

And if in the context of building a multipolar world, such non-Western poles as the Chinese or the Russian have already been formed¹, the formation of a sovereign African pole is still in its preliminary stage. Though the normative foundations of the theory of a multipolar world in general are widely known [Dugin 2015], the development of its economic component is still at a very early stage [Degterev 2021b]. The Russian Federation positions itself as a provider of comprehensive security for countries on the continent (military, food, energy, IT)². However, even for such a large country as the PRC, achieving the status of comprehensive economic sovereignty is a non-trivial task, which has been solved in recent years, including within the framework of the concept of “dual circulation” [Lomanov 2021], as well as in the context of Belt and Road initiative.

For most African countries, including the Sahel states (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), achieving true national sovereignty on their own is still a harder task³, especially given their economic potential, which collectively amounts to a total of $168 billion (PPP) for a population of 69 million (see Table 1).

Recognizing this, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger created the Alliance of Sahel States on September 17, 2023, and withdrew from the “conventional” ECOWAS on January 28,
2024. Although the priority of the new mini-lateral grouping is collective defense, in the long term it is about the joint development of strategic infrastructure

Table 1. Sahel countries potential in 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Alliance of Sahel States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, mln</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area, thousand km²</td>
<td>1241</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>2782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP), bln $</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author

Since the emergence of CSR, the scope of “conventional” economics in the context of mainstream liberalism has narrowed considerably, and concepts such as rational choice, marginal utility, etc. have started to dominate. Accordingly, “unconventional” approaches, including those presented in this paper, have come to be classified as unorthodox (heterodox) economics [Oliveira, Kvangraven 2023: 1690–1691], or even as international political economy (IPE). On the other hand, to paraphrase S. Strange, the founder of IPE, in the modern era of global transformations, the importance of IPE has grown so much that it is time to talk about the world economy as a separate sub-branch of IPE, rather than vice versa [Strange 1994: 218].

This article is not an impartial study – its author is sympathetic to those features that characterize, for example, the works of the prominent African economist S. Amin [Oliveira, Kvangraven 2023: 1692]: structural thinking (analysis through the prism of center-periphery development), macro-historicism (large time horizon), politicization (the applied value of theoretical research, allowing to accelerate the transition from rhetoric to practical steps [Maslov, Sviridov 2023]), and creativity (formation of new approaches and meanings). To what extent he succeeded, the reader will have to judge himself.

CONCEPT IN THEORY

The concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” gained widespread popularity in the 1960s and 1980s in the context of national development strategies of several countries (primarily the Arusha Declaration of 1967 by J. Nyerere, 70% of the text of which is taken up by the section “Self-Reliance”, presented in the format of worldly wisdom⁵), as well as in documents of international organizations: the 1979 Arusha (Arusha again!) Program for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations adopted within UNCTAD at the 4th Ministerial Meeting of the G-77⁶, the 1970 Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress adopted by the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)⁷, and the Economic

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Declaration adopted by the 5th NAM Conference in Colombo. The 1980 OAU Lagos Plan of Action is literally imbued with the spirit of the concept (more than 20 references). In the 21st century, the African Union also calls for Self-Reliance in its official statements, including in the framework of the “African solutions to African problems” approach.

In addition to objective differences in levels of Self-Reliance (see the section “Levels of Self-Reliance” for details), some conceptual divergences have also emerged, primarily related to attitudes towards foreign aid [Fischer 2016] and, more broadly, to the possibilities of a real revision of center-periphery relations [Matthies 1979: 77]. While the 1967 Arusha Declaration observed a reserved and negative attitude towards the institution of aid due to its conditionality [Brown 2013], as the discourse evolved at the global level, transforming it into the agenda of the New International Economic Order, perceptions changed. In the 1980s, it was stated that developed countries should provide aid to developing countries, which, of course, the former could not agree to.

It was no longer a question of a complete delinking (see the section “Delinking the World Majority?”), but rather of a more moderate convergence with the countries of the center... on the terms of the periphery. This was a utopia also because of the lack of institutional cohesion of the periphery, although a number of experts suggested the creation of a “Third World Secretariat” or even a “Third World OECD” [Matthies 1979: 78]. The institutionalization of South–South cooperation [Gosovic 2018], including the creation of the Southern Commission (1987–1990) and the Secretariat of the South (1991–present) at the end of the “bipolar world”, even under the leadership of J. Nyerere himself, was not enough.

The concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” was not welcomed in the West, because it posed a direct challenge to global capitalism, the expansion of Western transnational corporations (TNCs), and trade liberalization [Galtung 1976: 6; Lemper 1977: 118–119]. Thus, an article in the “conventional” Western journal International Organization eloquently begins: “Self-Reliance is the logical prescription from writers of Latin American dependency and many other contemporary critics of the international economic and political order” [Biersteker 1980: 229]. Thus, in the spirit of cultural imperialism, a whole galaxy of prominent non-Western economists – representatives of Latin American structuralism as well as proponents of world-system theory [Degterev 2021a] – were marginalized and labeled as non-academic “writers and critics.”

Moreover, the USSR also treated the CSR with some caution, since it emerged within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose main initiator was the “revisionist”

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11 This proposal was traditionally made by a prominent Sri Lankan intellectual, the founder of the Marga Institute, Godfrey Gunathilak. For more information, see: https://thuppahis.com/2020/04/29/godfrey-gunatilleke-a-gentleman-for-all-seasons/ (accessed: 11.06.2024)

12 Among the countries that belong to the Alliance of Sahel States, Mali is a member of the Southern Secretariat. Niger has also financed the activities of the Southern Commission.

of the Soviet model of socialism, I.B. Tito. USSR economists preferred to speak of “world socialism as a factor of independent development of the Third World” [Avakov, Maydanik 1974: 74–78], although they remained ideologically and politically close to the NAM. At the same time, the analysis of the CSR strategy, first of all the Lagos Plan of Action (1980–2000), which later served as a conceptual basis for the development of the “Agenda-2063” strategy [Abramova, Morozenskaya 2016: 408–411], was one of the main research topics of the Institute for African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the 1980s [Gromyko 1980; Goncharov 1988; Matsenko 1990].

An insufficient coverage of the concept under study can be observed in current Russian studies. For example, the MGIMO monograph on the development of economic independence of the countries of the “Global South” tends to consider international aid in the South-South context mainly through the prism of the OECD-DAC approaches [Zakharov, Bulatov 2019: 21–35]. In the publication of the leading Russian unit for the analysis of center-periphery relations in the world economy (the Center for Problems of Development and Modernization of IMEMO, RAS), the principle of “Self-Reliance” is mentioned only a few times, mainly in connection with the Chinese development model [Khoros, Malysheva 2013: 19, 216–217, 227].

At the same time, various aspects of the NAM’s activities have become a subject of nostalgia and pride in the post-Yugoslav republics, which years later are perceiving this phenomenon as the heyday of Yugoslav diplomacy. It is worth to note that the first president of Mali, Modibo Keita, took part in the founding meeting of the NAM in Belgrade on September 1, 1961. In this regard, it is no coincidence that a whole series of works have appeared devoted to CSR in relation to Croatia [Pierzynska, 2012], Slovenia [Fischer 2016], and Northern Macedonia [Spaskovska 2018].

In recent years, attitudes toward the NAM have also changed in Russia. In 2021, the Russian Federation was granted Observer status. In addition, conceptual proposals are being put forward about Russia as the leader of the “New Non-Aligned Movement”. Indeed, as the US-China global competition intensifies [Degterev, Ramich, and Zvyk 2021], the role of the Russian Federation as a balancer is growing, as is that of India, which in the 1980s, after the death of I.B. Tito, largely assumed the role of informal leader of the NAM. The Muslim world also plays an important role in the modern NAM. In 2019–2024, Azerbaijan chaired the organization; in 2027, after Uganda, Uzbekistan is expected to take over the chairmanship. In this context, the relevance of the CSR will only increase.

15 Karin Fischer teaches at the University of Linz (Austria), but her paper was presented at a conference organized by the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia). It may also be noted that it was in Ljubljana that the International Center for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries (now the International Center for Promotion of Enterprises, ICPE, which still publishes the journal “Public Enterprise”) was established in 1974. For more information, see: https://icpe.int/ (accessed: 11.06.2024)
16 Ljubica Spaskovska currently teaches at Exeter University in the UK, but has previously studied in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. For more information, see: https://arch-history.exeter.ac.uk/history/profile/index.php?web_id=spaskovska#biography (accessed: 11.06.2024)
In general, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, a number of review papers were published on the experience of applying the concept of (Collective) Self-Reliance in the DPRK [Bon-Hak 1992], in the Arab region [Sayigh 1991], and in the Caribbean islands [Axline 1986]. Interestingly enough, it is the experience of CARICOM\(^{19}\), in terms of a number of parameters (including total GDP), that may be partially relevant to the Alliance of Sahel States. The monograph by the Nigerian Professor O. Olaniyan [Olaniyan 1996], which is directly devoted to the problem of Self-Reliance in West Africa, is particularly relevant in the context of the research problem.

Theoretical provisions of CSR are most thoroughly developed in the works of the critical researcher J. Galtung [Galtung 1976] and the economist S. Amin (CODESRIA, Senegal). In fact, the entire scientific activity of S. Amin is more or less devoted to justifying the withdrawal of African countries from dependency (dozens of publications!) [Kvangraven 2020], but we will cite only a few directly related to the problems of the article [Amin 1987; 1990]. An important role in the popularization of the concept was played by analytical articles published in the German journal *Intereconomics* [Bauer 1977], some of which were neutral [Matthies 1979] or even moderately positive [Lemper 1977]. Taking into account the contribution of the Norwegian neo-Marxist J. Galtung and the leading role of the Nordic countries in funding CODESRIA [Kvangraven 2020: 635], this suggests an important role of European social democrats in promoting the concept\(^{20}\).

Separate works by other experts have also been devoted to CSR [Patel 1975]. The substantive aspects of COSS will be examined below as part of the analysis of the mechanisms of its practical implementation, including at the present stage.

**CONCEPT IN PRACTICE**

The most serious attempt to implement the concept in Africa was made by one of the members of the Alliance of Sahel States (Burkina Faso) in the late 1980s. This is probably no coincidence, because it was not even a matter of overcoming “center-periphery” relations but rather of “center-periphery-periphery” relations, since the Burkinabé economy functioned as a periphery of the Ivorian economy, mainly supplying it with labor. The Ivorian economy, in turn, was embedded in the global economy as a “reliable supplier” of an important exchange commodity – cocoa. In such a situation, “conventional” recipes were definitely not enough!

Despite the scale of the planned (and largely realized in just four years) socio-economic transformations, T. Sankara preferred to implement them by relying primarily on his own efforts, on the mobilization of the population and on “emotional developmentalism” rather than on large-scale external assistance [Murrey 2020: 194–199]. The critical researcher J. Galtung emphasizes the important role of the psychological component for the sovereign development and “independent formation of tastes”, the rejection of “tastes coming from the center and satisfied only by the goods of the center”. He believed that the transition to such models “lies more in the field of psychopolitics than in the field of economics” [Galtung 1976: 3]. Indeed, the sovereignty of values also directly affects the socio-economic well-being of the country, including by increasing the consumption of domestic goods, which are beginning to be recognized as fashionable [Degterev 2022: 357–359].

\(^{19}\) Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a trade and economic union of countries in Central and northeastern South America.

\(^{20}\) Apparently, this is what P. Baeur wrote about, noting with irritation that “much of the hostility to the market system and to the West... has its origins in the West” [Bauer 1977: 125].
And T. Sankara, who consulted many of the leading intellectuals of the time\(^{21}\), was generally successful in implementing the “psycho-politics” of decolonization because, even before taking over the country, he had been Secretary of State for Information since September 1981. The slogan of that era, “Consume what you produce and produce what you consume!” is still remembered by the people of Burkina Faso, who proudly wear clothes made of Faso Dan Fani fabrics produced in the country. Modern Burkina Faso continues to use the ideological legacy of that era, which is still alive among the masses. The country’s leader since 2022, I. Traoré, has positioned himself as a kind of “reincarnation” of T. Sankara. In neighboring Mali, “psycho-politics” is formed by the country’s Prime Minister, Sh. Maiga, successfully acting as the main ideologist of the new course [Maiga 2020].

According to J. Galtung, the implementation of these approaches requires “a certain fearlessness”, understood as a special form of attitude, as well as an appropriate structure of defense [Galtung 1976: 3]. This is especially relevant for setting less favorable conditions for the extraction of natural resources in the country for the world’s largest MNCs, for example, in the field of gold mining\(^{22}\). It is often more profitable for the latter to change political regimes that have come to power by force than to “tolerate” a reduction in profits.

It is no coincidence that the leaders of all three member states of the Alliance of Sahel States are now military men – A. Goïta, I. Traoré and A. Tchiani – who have had to personally participate in military operations and face death more than once. The defense structures of the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States are currently being strengthened, including with the support of Russia, and are designed at the first stage to withstand the onslaught of French sub-imperial neocolonialism [Davidchuk, Degterev, Sidibe 2022], and at the second stage – already on the part of more serious opponents – those behind jihadist movements [Abramova, Fituni 2014]. Many researchers of the concept note that there is also a need for mass mobilization of supporters of the authorities to defend their achievements “from below” [Biersteker 1980: 234], which is currently taking place primarily in Mali\(^{23}\), but also in Burkina Faso and Niger.

J. Galtung also notes the key role of creativity and the ability to offer one’s own innovative solutions, even by “closing oneself off from some of the innovations and advice coming from global and domestic centers.” In his view, along with foreign technology comes the psychology of “the learner, the pupil” and dependence on the West, as well as the need for faith and pride in one’s own culture and achievements, “confidence in own ability to innovate” [Galtung 1976: 10]. Indeed, for Self-Reliance, countries need to partially abandon foreign expertise [Biersteker 1980: 231–232] and make maximum use of local natural resources, which is possible if the appropriate competencies are available.

Thus, in 1983, Nigeria established the Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC), which still exists today, to study optimal ways of processing the


\(^{23}\) A mass rally was held in Mali in support of leaving ECOWAS. African Initiative. 02.02.2024. (In Russ.). https://afrinz.ru/2024/02/reportazh-s-mitinga-v-bamako-v-podderzhku-vyhoda-alyansa-gosudarstv-sahelyain-ekovas/ (accessed: 11.06.2024)
agricultural and mineral raw materials available in the country. This is a kind of analogy to the Commission for the Study of Natural Productive Forces of Russia that existed in the Russian Empire and the early USSR and was transformed later, also in the USSR, into the Council for the Study of Productive Forces. Nigerian industrialists placed great emphasis on the use of local raw materials in existing production lines. For example, flour mills were converted and adapted to handle maize, and the local breweries started using sorghum malt in their beer production. Local production of cassava processing equipment and other local innovations were of great importance for self-reliance promotion [Olaniyan 1996: 112–113].

In Mali, the USSR played a key role in the formation of production and scientific-technical potential, with the support of which a number of industries (!) of the economy were formed, agriculture was mechanized, irrigation systems (Office du Niger) and new educational institutions were created [Davidchuk, Degterev, Korendyasov 2022]. At the same time, the main emphasis seemed to be on improving the socio-economic situation of the country. Unfortunately, the tasks that were crucial for strengthening the real sovereignty of the country were not solved and are still relevant today – breaking the transport blockade (construction of the railway to Conakry) and ensuring financial sovereignty.

Most of the above-mentioned developments came to nothing by the end of the 1980s, when the continent was essentially recolonized by faceless managers from the IMF and the World Bank as part of Structural Adjustment Programs [Degterev 2023a: 23–25; Riddell 1992; Williams 2003: 13–20]. Thus, West African exports, which had reached USD 33.5 billion in 1980, fell to USD 2.1 billion in 1990 [Olaniyan 1996: 118]. Under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions, a number of promising infrastructure projects in Burkina Faso were abandoned, including those related to the development of the Tambao manganese deposits [Murrey 2020: 196]. At the global level, the influence of UNCTAD and the approaches promoted by this organization were significantly reduced in the 1990s [Kuznetsov 2019: 32], and the WTO began to dominate as a global trade regulator.

J. Nyerere’s approaches were much less radical (so-called Ujamaa socialism) [Onditi, Amuhaya 2023], which is why he managed to stay at the head of Tanzania for more than 20 years – from 1964 to 1985. An analysis of the section on Self-Reliance (Part 3) of the Arusha Declaration shows that J. Nyerere was rather focused on ensuring social justice and preventing the exploitation of certain categories of the population (for example, rural women).

J. Nyerere nationalized (with compensation) eight foreign export-import companies to ensure a monopoly of foreign trade under the State Trading Corporation (STC). Overall, he succeeded in triggering endogenous growth and reducing the country’s dependence on foreign trade – the export quota fell from 23.7% in 1964 to 16.0% in 1977, with significant GDP growth. Similarly, imports of luxury goods, including automobiles, were reduced somewhat: their share in the country’s imports fell from 3.1% in 1964 to 0.3% in 1976. At the same time, imports of high-quality textiles into the country remained high, while lower-quality imported textiles were successfully replaced by local production. Food sovereignty was not achieved in Tanzania. On the other hand,

25 The “Office du Niger” is a semi-autonomous government agency in Mali that manages a large irrigation system in the Ségou region. Water from the Niger River is diverted into a canal system at the Markala Dam, 35 km downstream of Ségou. The water is used to irrigate nearly 100,000 hectares of flat alluvial plains north and northeast of Markala, which are part of the Delta Mort.
the country managed to reduce the share of the UK as the main market for its goods from 30.6% in 1964 to 14.3% in 1976 [Biersteker 1980: 239–248].

He built the Self-Reliance Model as long as external circumstances allowed. In the mid-1980s, after the advent of the TINA era (*There is no alternative*) he was forced to resign to avoid destroying the carefully crafted Self-Reliance Model and switched (in Geneva) to implementing the concept at the level of the entire Global South, becoming increasingly dependent on Western donors. And although Tanzania itself still has strong traditions of Self-Reliance [Bondarenko, Nkyabonaki, Mkunde 2013], in neighboring Kenya the similar Harambe concept [Mbithi, Rasmusson 1977] was finally emasculated, discredited (equated with corruption) and finally… officially banned in the “timeless” era of the 1990s and 2000s, following a study conducted by the British company Risk Advisory Group.

NOT SOCIALISM, BUT SOVEREIGN DEVELOPMENT

It seems wrong to associate CSR exclusively with socialism and therefore to declare it obsolete. On the contrary, it is quite relevant in current conditions, for example, within the model of state capitalism, and implies, first of all, a departure from the center-periphery. The German researcher A. Lemper notes that the CSR is not a dogma or a single clearly defined policy, but rather a “dynamic space” for decision-making in response to constant challenges, while the “corridor of responsible policy” is rather narrow. It lies between “intolerable foreign dominance and harmful isolation, between implantation of an alien socio-economic structure and perseverance in ‘sterile autarky’” [Lemper 1977: 115].

It is noteworthy that even contemporaries of J. Nyerere noted the autochthony of CSR model, its rootedness in African traditions, and its inconsistency with the canons not only of “scientific socialism”, but also of “African socialism”, “privatized” by the “conciliatory” concepts of L. Senghor and T. Mboya [Rodney 1972]. In essence, J. Nyerere took advantage of the normative framework that had already been formed at the time, which generally allowed him to address the challenges facing his country. In the Arusha Declaration, only two (!) pages of text are devoted directly to socialism (Part 2), although among them there is the most important paragraph listing the means of production to be nationalized:

“(b) Major means of production to be under the control of peasants and workers. (...) These major means of production are: the land; forests; mineral resources; water; oil and electricity, communications; transport; banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale business; the steel, machine-tool, arms, motor-car cement, and fertilizer factories; the textile industry; and any other big industry upon which a large section of the population depend for their living, or which provides essential components for other industries; large plantations, especially those which produce essential raw materials.”

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The Arusha Declaration on this provision caused a stir among economic operators in Tanzania after its adoption, and a few weeks later Annex I “On State Property in Tanzania” was published under the direct authorship of President J. Nyerere (rather than the “collective party” authority), in which he clarified the principles of the separation of the private and public sectors. By the end of the 1970s, the instruments of state regulation of foreign trade had become more nuanced: a number of competencies of the State Trading Corporation were transferred to the Bank of Tanzania as part of the improvement of the exchange control system [Biersteker 1980: 242–243].

In 1985, in the last year of his presidency, J. Nyerere was interviewed by Western journalists who wanted him to recognize the fallacy of Tanzania’s socio-economic model in general and of the economic policies he was pursuing. However, he noted only some excesses in the nationalization policy, in particular, the lack of the need to nationalize sisal growing enterprises (there were not enough people to manage this industry) and cooperatives (excessive centralization in this area did not contribute to efficiency; the cost of error was very high).

In the realities of the 21st century, the role of the public sector in the economy has certainly diminished. For example, we are no longer talking about monopolization of foreign trade or state control over wholesale trade. There are more flexible, smart mechanisms of state regulation and management of predominantly private sectors of the economy. However, the experience of non-Western models of economic development (Chinese, Vietnamese, Russian, etc.), which have successfully overcome the center-periphery model, shows the key role of state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy.

In a broader sense, mechanisms for forming and strengthening the position of national capital are important, including through the financial system of banks and development corporations with state participation. The participation of comprador or foreign capital in a number of key sectors of the economy, which determine the parameters of integration into the world system, is inadmissible. Thus, in the Russian Federation, this aspect is regulated by the Law on Foreign Investment in Industries of Strategic Importance, adopted in 2008 and repeatedly improved since then. At the moment, 50 types of activities (see Article 6 of the Law) are classified as such industries (compare with the list of industries in the Arusha Declaration).

But in the 1990s, Russia, like African countries, also took loans (and prescriptions for “economic recovery”) from the IMF and fitted into the center-periphery hierarchy prepared for it. In the early 2000s, Russia stopped taking new loans and fully repaid its debt to the Fund by January 31, 2005. However, the successful experience of socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation and other non-Western economies, including East Asian countries, is rarely presented as a model in popular economics textbooks. Think tanks, such as the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) or the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for the former British colonies and the Institute of Development Studies (Institut de recherche pour le développement, IRD) for the former

French colonies, retain an important role in developing “imported” national development strategies in Africa. Since colonial times, they have been forming the very “matrix of pseudo-development”, which sets priorities that only reinforce dependency but are further budgeted within the framework of Western aid programs.

In general, five main priorities for implementing the Self-Reliance Policy at the country level can be identified, taking into account African specifics, which are still relevant today [Olaniyan 1996: 97–127]: development of agriculture, industry, technology, energy balance, and foreign trade. Agriculture employs the bulk of the population in the countries of the region, and it is no coincidence that in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 there appeared such sections as: “We have put too much emphasis on industries”, as well as “Let us be concerned about the peasant farmer”, “The people and agriculture”, “Agriculture is the basis of development”34. Mechanization of production, the use of modern agro-technologies and fertilizers are necessary. There is also the issue of the balance between food crops (necessary to ensure food security) and cash crops (necessary to ensure foreign exchange earnings). It appears that as African mineral exports increase, the relative importance of cash crops will decline.

In any case, the CSR is impossible without industrialization and the development of appropriate technologies, which is particularly emphasized by West German researchers [Lemper 1977: 116–118]. Energy security, along with food security, is the possibility of avoiding pressure from external actors while providing for the basic needs of the population and the economy of the country [Biersteker 1980: 231]. Finally, the balance in foreign trade between autochthonous development and involvement in world economic relations is important. On the one hand, foreign trade is a source of currency for the realization of national development priorities. On the other hand, in the case of asymmetric dependence on trading partners (for more details, see the section “Delinking the ‘World Majority?’”) – it is a ‘lever’ of external influence on the country.

LEVELS OF SELF-RELIANCE

J. Galtung distinguished several levels of implementation of the concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” – local, national and regional (subregional, regional, the level of the entire Third World) [Galtung 1976: 7]. If sovereignty cannot be ensured at the lower levels, then, according to the matryoshka doll principle, it is ensured by moving to a higher level.

An important role in the Alliance of Sahel States is played by the local level, the level of individual communes. During the rule of T. Sankara, Burkina Faso tested the model of “model communes”, which performed a number of important social functions (education, health care, etc.) at the grassroots level. This experience was later adopted by Rwanda. A partial revival of this experience is on the agenda, which is particularly relevant in view of the withdrawal of the state as such from a number of insecure regions of the members of the ASS35. It is at the grassroots level that the most talented and proactive leaders are identified and then promoted to the national level.

The next level is the national level, the level of the strong state, which in many ways acts as the antithesis of global capitalism [Blaney 1996]. It is at this level that the most ambitious programs of industrialization and social development are carried out. In the

1970s and 1980s, the importance of this level was largely leveled out by shifting attention to the development of the individual rather than to the “development of things” [Degterev 2023a: 27]. But this transition has a downside. From now on, citizens were no longer obliged to link their own development with the development of their country. In fact, the following formula was proposed: “Forget about your homeland, integrate into the beautiful Western world, and (personally) for you – everything will be fine.” This accelerated the brain drain and the hope for a better future for the Global South. Effective development requires a rethinking of this imperative. The long-term successful development of Africans can only be linked to national development!

As noted above, the size of national economies, especially for the members of the Sahel Alliance, is not sufficient to implement sovereign policies in a wide range of sectors, so the national level of development cannot be made absolute. Let us illustrate this with the specific example of oil production and refining – the basis of energy security (see the previous section). Today, commercial oil production in the ASS countries takes place only in Niger, in blocks operated by China’s CNPC. This oil is then refined at the 20,000 bpd Zinder refinery, and the remainder is exported via a pipeline, also operated by CNPC, through the Beninese port of Seme (see Figure 1).

In neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, gasoline is the largest import item, accounting for 32.3% and 22.6% of total imports, respectively (see Table 3). Most of the gasoline comes through Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, the most French-loyal states in the region. Undoubtedly, Niger, as the licensing country, and CNPC, as the producer, are interested in maximizing the commercialization of the oil produced. On the other hand, it is in the interest of the Sahel Alliance (and the long-term interest of Niger) to use this oil to ensure the energy security (strengthening of sovereignty) of the entire ASS. In principle, Niger’s leader considers it a priority to further localize oil refining[36]. In general, however, the ability to deeply understand not only national interests but also regional ones is a rare gift, which was possessed, for example, by J. Nyerere. In the interest of East African integration, he was even willing to postpone Tanganyika’s declaration of independence in order to synchronize it with the independence of Kenya and Uganda.

It is noteworthy that it is the Alliance of Sahel States and not ECOWAS that functions as the sub-regional level of the Collective Self-Reliance (according to J. Galtung), and this is not only due to sanctions against the ASS member states and the threat of intervention. The fact is that regional integration groupings in Africa in their current form destroy the national industrial policy because they are designed to ensure the formation of a free trade zone for the goods of mainly extra-regional actors (the level of intra-regional trade in ECOWAS does not exceed 10%).

The Community lacks a consolidated regional industrial policy and is dominated by the imperatives of liberalism. The West African Common Industrial Policy 2015–2020 was rather declarative, and regional industrial integration (e.g., the numerous ventures of the Nigerian businessman and industrialist Aliko Dangote) was ensured more through his personal ties [Odijie 2023]. An important indicator of the problems of “conventional” regional integration in Africa was the permanent closure of borders, which Nigeria resorted to in 2019[37].

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As a result, a paradoxical situation has emerged that can be described as “African pseudo-solidarity”. Regional integration groupings call for the opening of borders “for the sake of Pan-Africanism”, but this automatically “kills” any hope of the emergence of African industrial production. The vicious circle of false goal-setting leads to the formation of a self-sustaining mechanism of regional deindustrialization. Within the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States, there is hope for a different approach to regional industrial cooperation. Taking into account the landlocked status of all ASS members, it is a question of a sufficiently high level of local processing needed to reach the break-even point for most industries. Only high value-added goods should be transported outside the ASS.

At this stage, there is moderate pessimism about the African Union as the second regional level of the CSR (according to J. Galtung). Undoubtedly, much progress has been made in the implementation of Agenda 2063, but the problem of African agency remains. In the existing political configuration, the African Union has a number of serious structural constraints that prevent it from taking the lead in the implementation of the CSR. To take just one case, the main African development institution is the African Development Bank (AfDB), which is essentially part of the Bretton Woods system of regional institutions.

The executive directors of the AfDB’s extra-regional members, which account for 41.27% of the votes, are from Canada, Denmark, Belgium, the USA, Germany, Italy, and Argentina. All but the last of these countries are NATO members, and Argentina has followed an ultra-liberal course since J. Milei came to power. The US itself recognizes the AfDB (along with the World Bank and the IMF) as the multilateral institutions through which it pursues its interests on the continent. It explicitly states that “the U.S. plays a role in approving investments and projects of these institutions.”

Accordingly, the highest level of support for the CSR in modern realities is the non-Western world, or the “World Majority”, including both Russia and China, a much more powerful actor than the Third World of the 1970s and 1980s! In this regard, the geography of the travels of Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine in January 2024 – Moscow, Tehran, Istanbul, and the capital of the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade – is revealing!

DE-LINKING ‘WORLD MAJORITY’?

There are three key time phases in the implementation of the CSR strategy. In the first, the state partially limits its contacts with the industrialized countries (“de-linking”, “decoupling”, “selective disengagement”), which “cements” unequal, center-periphery relations [Biersteker 1980: 231]. The modern reading is that of de-linking with the “Collective West”. It is noteworthy that back in the 1970s, a number of Western scholars already wrote about de-linking of Third World not from the North, but precisely from the

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West, in response to which, in their opinion, the West should give a “decisive answer” [Bauer 1977: 125]. At the same time, there is no significant decline in international trade as the country simultaneously strengthens ties with other peripheral countries [Galtung 1977: 7] and South-South cooperation develops [Smith 2019].

This could include limiting economic cooperation (stopping supplies) as well as political and institutional cooperation, including membership in a number of international organizations [Biersteker 1980: 232, 236]. For example, Mali, followed by Burkina Faso and Niger in 2022–2024, limited the influence of the French media in the country (which were forming an unfavorable values agenda) and broke a number of agreements (including military cooperation) with France.

In the second phase, both international and domestic economic relations will be restructured. A new network of international contacts is formed, and memberships in new international organizations or new institutions are created (an illustrative case is the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023). In current conditions, we are talking about the structures that institutionalize the structural power of the non-West in the international arena [Strange 1988] – first and foremost the BRICS as well as the SCO. The reorientation of international contacts is complex and affects a wide range of political, economic and academic circles. In 2022–2023, this reorientation in Russia was called the “turn to the East” [Torkunov, Strel’tsov 2023].

The comprador elites within the country are being marginalized, and the position of national capital is being strengthened. The values agenda is being restructured. This process involves the main institutions affecting human consciousness: education and social sciences, culture, art, media, etc. [Degterev 2022: 357]. Thus, in the Russian Federation in 2022, a presidential decree was adopted aimed at preserving traditional spiritual and moral values.

Finally, at the third stage, the country feels so adapted to the unfavorable impact of the world economy that, on the contrary, it seeks reunification, “relinking” in relations with the developed countries, but already on different, more equitable terms. The latter stage is not an illusion; it can best be illustrated by the case of the PRC. At the initial stage, the country was forced to pursue a policy of isolation, later moving to economic (1978–2008) and then political integration (2009 – present) into the world-system [Graham-Chisholm, Xu 2022].

In the realities of the 2020s, the process of delinking from the countries of the “Collective West” appears to be much easier than it was when the concept was created in the 1970s, due to the changing global balance of power. Accordingly, the probability of success of the CSR implementation increases significantly.

First, non-Western economies already dominate the global base, gradually turning Western countries into the periphery [Abramova, Fituni 2022: 838]. For several years, the biggest trading superpower has been China, which is the main trading partner of more than 130 countries. Paradoxically, it is China that is currently the main defender of free trade and WTO rules, and not the US, which fears that China is getting stronger from globalization than the United States. Accordingly, the threat of failed delinking in such realities for the “World Majority” countries looks patently ridiculous. Rather, we are talking about the marginalization of the West.

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### Table 2. Exports from the Sahel states in 2022, in % (“Macrometrics”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Niger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD 7,56 bln</td>
<td>USD 8,2 bln</td>
<td>USD 3,24 bln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold 96</td>
<td>UAE 76,8</td>
<td>Gold 82,2</td>
<td>Gold 72,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland 17,4</td>
<td>Switzerland 87,9</td>
<td>UAE 7,92</td>
<td>China 98,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 5,56</td>
<td>Cotton 6,12</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 29,3</td>
<td>Radioactive chemicals 4,62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 27,8</td>
<td>UAE 8,82</td>
<td>Mali 53</td>
<td>France 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana 8,58</td>
<td>Republic of Korea 4,92</td>
<td>Nigeria 24,9</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 17,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia 3,24</td>
<td>Uranium and thorium ore 4,17</td>
<td>France 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map

The “Collective West” maintains its levers of control mainly through the global superstructure [Abramova, Fituni 2022: 838] – various elements of structural power at the global [Strange 1988], as well as regional and national levels. These include, for example, the Western-centric payment system (*SWIFT*), maritime insurance (*Lloyds*), mechanisms of control over the port infrastructure of African countries (the French *Bolloré* in tropical Africa was replaced by the Swiss *MSC* in 2022), the presence of the French auditing company *Mazars*. The immediate neighbors of the Alliance of Sahel States are Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, countries with which France maintains traditionally loyal relations. After withdrawing their troops from the ASS countries, France and the United States will redeploy them to the Gulf of Guinea countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo)\(^{43}\), with the latter joining the Commonwealth of Nations in 2022.

Secondly, in the context of the formation of a “new bipolarity” [Degterev, Ramich, Zvyk, 2021], the decoupling between Western and non-Western economies in the sphere of trade and investment is accelerating\(^{44}\). This means that the delinking is objective and has a more global and macro-historical nature. Peripheral countries can use these changes to their advantage and strengthen their position in the world system.

Thirdly, the main trading partners of the ASS countries, both in terms of exports and imports, are already non-Western countries (see Tables 2 and 3).

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Table 3. **Imports to Sahel states in 2022, in % (“Macrometrics”)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>USD 6,08 bln</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>USD 5,28 bln</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>USD 3,5 bln</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petrol</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 57,9</td>
<td>Petrol 22,6</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 29,3</td>
<td>Arms and military equipment 9,71</td>
<td>France 99,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal 36,2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia 27,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>UAE 8,82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger 3,75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines 3</td>
<td>France 46,4</td>
<td>Ghana 8,58</td>
<td>Rice 7,94</td>
<td>Thailand 44,8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 23,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Korea 4,92</td>
<td></td>
<td>India 26,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India 16,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia 3,24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar 9,84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightweight pure cotton 3,53</td>
<td>Austria 75,8</td>
<td>Medicines 3,1</td>
<td>India 43,9</td>
<td>China 8,91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India 7,46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 8,06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic 8,63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 3,57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication equipment 3,47</td>
<td>Hong Kong 34,3</td>
<td>Electricity 3,14</td>
<td>Toro 59,5</td>
<td>Rolled tobacco 3,75</td>
<td>UAE 53,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China 27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 25,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria 39,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UAE 24,1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana 15,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso 5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 3,41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map

A macrometric approach has been used to compile the tables, i.e., all major exports and imports of ASS members that account for at least 3% of the total volume are listed. Similarly, for each commodity group, all geographical partners accounting for at least 3% of the turnover are listed. The cells with the “Collective West” countries and their allies are darkened. The list of countries unfriendly to the Russian Federation is used as a basis. It is a fact that in African countries, as a rule, decoupling starts in the security sphere, and not in the technological sphere, as in developed countries [Vasiliev, Degterev, Shaw 2023: 6–8]. At the same time, it is the Russian Federation that acts as a major security provider.

As can be seen from the tables, Switzerland remains a major buyer of gold (in Burkina Faso, less so in Mali) and cotton (in Burkina Faso), and France is the leading

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buyer of uranium in Niger. All these are in high demand on the world market, and there are no particular problems with the replacement of their buyers. A more difficult situation remains with the dependence on imports of medicines from France (in Burkina Faso). The replacement of suppliers of arms and military equipment also does not seem to be a serious problem for Niger either.

From the point of view of the CSR values agenda, it is deeply demotivating to import the most expensive cotton fabrics from Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany for the Malian elite, despite the fact that the country is one of the largest producers of cotton! Import substitution and value reorientation in the spirit of *Faso Dan Fani* are needed as soon as possible.

Table 4. **Official development assistance from Western countries to members of the Sahel States Alliance in 2015, 2020 (in mlns of US dollars, in constant 2021 prices)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official donors,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including OECD</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members</td>
<td>994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD members</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>166</td>
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<td></td>
<td>251</td>
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<td>540</td>
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<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Recipient</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official donors,</td>
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<tr>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>297</td>
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<td></td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, the only significant element of foreign economic relations that still allows the “Collective West” to exert a serious influence on the Alliance of Sahel States is the foreign aid, the annual volume of which reaches USD 1–2 billion for each of the member states (see Table 4).

Large-scale assistance from Western donors creates dependence and leverage on the economic and foreign policy of the ASS [Biersteker 1980: 231]. Coordinated technical assistance from non-Western states, including China, is on the agenda [Deych 2018] to localize technology and ultimately to successfully implement the concept of “Collective Self-Reliance” in the Alliance member states.

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In recent years, the processes of the formation of a multipolar world and the elaboration of the normative component of individual centers of power have become increasingly relevant. At the same time, the political economy of multipolarity leaves much to be elaborated on yet. In this context, the concept of “Collective Self-Reliance”, developed several decades ago but still relevant today, can play an important role in African countries, adjusted for current realities. The multilevel implementation of this concept in the member countries of the Alliance of Sahel States seems even more realistic in the 2020s than when it was developed.
REFERENCES


**«КОЛЛЕКТИВНАЯ ОПОРА НА СОБСТВЕННЫЕ СИЛЫ»: НОВОЕ ПРОЧТЕНИЕ КОНЦЕПЦИИ В САХЕЛЕ В КОНТЕКСТЕ СТАНОВЛЕНИЯ МНОГОПОЛЯРНОГО МИРА**

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**Аннотация.** Данная статья посвящена актуализации концепции «коллективной опоры на собственные силы» (КОСС) с учетом становления многополярного мира. Особое внимание уделяется попыткам стран Африки выйти из центр-периферийной модели зависимого
развития посредством реализации данной концепции. Приводятся теоретические основания концепции КОСС, закрепленные в Арушкий декларации 1967 г., Арушканой программе коллективной опоры на собственные силы и переговорных рамках 1979 г., в ряде документов Организации африканского единства (ОАЕ) и Афросоюза (АС). Показано отношение к КОСС в работах западных экспертов, ученых из СССР и России, а также современных исследователей из бывших республик Югославии. Приведены трактовки концепции на основе трудов Й. Галтурга, С. Амина, немецких экспертов. Показана практика применения концепции в Буркина-Фасо, соседних странах, а также в Танзании. Проведен критический анализ итогов реализации концепции, возможностей ее имплементации в современных реалиях глобального капитализма. Особое внимание удленено уровням реализации концепции, а также теории и практики делинкинга — временного сокращения экономических связей со странами «коллективного Запада». Сделан вывод о том, что в 2020-е гг. многоуровневая имплементация концепции КОСС (локальный, страновой, уровень Альянса государств Сахеля, уровень «Мирового большинства») представляется даже более реалистичной, нежели в момент ее разработки. Этому способствует доминирование незападных экономик в глобальном базисе, макроисторические процессы декаплинга (формирования отдельных блоков), а также ключевая роль стран «Мирового большинства» в текущих экономических связях стран Сахеля. Показан сдерживающий фактор в виде сохранения масштабных потоков западной помощи региону.

Ключевые слова: Африка, Альянс государств Сахеля, периферийное развитие, Движение неприсоединения, суверенитет, опора на собственные силы, международная помощь, делинкинг, Мировое большинство

DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2024-67-2-60-81

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