

## **RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF DAC OECD FOREIGN AID TO DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA**

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**Abstract.** When the concept of the human right to development was articulated in Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea was not to ask for development aid but to assert the right to self-determination, or even the right to genuine liberation from continued external domination, in order to assume sovereign control and determine the continent's own developmental destiny. However, in the course of evolution, the idea of the right to development has been distorted to some extent and has been thwarted in order to imply recourse for its realization. Developed countries were required to provide 0.7% of their annual gross domestic product as foreign aid to assist developing countries, including African countries, in their efforts to achieve comprehensive development. Over more than six decades, from 1960 to 2022, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC OECD) donor countries provided a total of USD 1.23 trillion in development assistance to 48 recipient countries in Africa. This paper examines the extent to which the foreign aid allocations have contributed to development of recipient countries in Africa. The findings illustrate that despite the continued shipment of foreign aid to Africa, impoverishment and underdevelopment have worsened across the continent, raising the question of why Africa should remain trapped in the DAC OECD “dead aid” conundrum when alternative, mutually beneficial development cooperation mechanisms could be explored.

**Keywords:** Right to development, foreign aid, development assistance, development cooperation, DAC OECD, development justice, alternative cooperation frameworks, Africa

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### INTRODUCTION

The author conducts an analysis of the role of foreign aid in Africa's development from the perspective of the right to development. The analysis succeeds in demonstrating that more than six decades of continuous foreign aid to Africa has rather exacerbated impoverishment and underdevelopment throughout the continent.

Official development assistance (ODA), is defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic develop-

ment and welfare of developing countries”<sup>1</sup>. It should be noted that the DAC adopted ODA as the “gold standard” for foreign aid, which has been the main source of development finance in developing countries since the 1960s [OECD 2024]. Although there are several sources of foreign aid, the analysis in this article focuses on the DAC OECD mechanism because it is the main source of aid to Africa. The DAC OECD definition of development assistance indicates that it is aimed at achieving economic development and welfare in developing countries.

If DAC OECD development assistance promises to enable developing countries to achieve economic development and welfare, it ought to lead to the eradication of poverty and other socio-economic and cultural challenges faced by the people of Africa on a daily basis, thereby contributing to improving the standard of living and quality of life on the continent. On the contrary, not only is economic development in Africa regressing or in some cases stagnating, but living conditions in recipient countries continue to deteriorate, characterized by, as Phiri argues, “chronic problems of poverty, low living standards and weak economic growth” [2016: 28–48].

Many African countries receiving OECD-DAC development assistance are among the fastest growing economies in the world in 2024, including Niger (11.2%), Senegal (8.2%), Libya (7.9%), Rwanda (7.2%), Côte d’Ivoire (6.8%), Ethiopia (6.7%), Benin (6.4%), Djibouti (6.2%), Tanzania (6.1%), Togo (6%), and Uganda (6%)<sup>2</sup>. While it can be assumed that foreign aid has played a role, there is no evidence that the economic performance of these countries is the result of development assistance from OECD-DAC donor countries. The question then arises: does it make sense for Africa to remain stuck in the DAC OECD “dead aid” conundrum [Moyo 2009] when alternative development cooperation schemes could be explored?

In responding to this question, it was decided to structure the article as follows. *The part II* presents the international dimension of the right to development and the implications for development cooperation. *The part III* analyzes the DAC OECD Development Assistance Mechanism, which has been the main source of financing for Africa’s development for more than six decades, but has failed to provide substantial assistance to recipient countries. *Part IV* then examines the rules of international law governing development cooperation, which are committed to the principles of self-determination and sovereign equality, and which have been deliberately abandoned by the DAC OECD donor countries. With a focus on alternative frameworks for development cooperation and financing, the article argues for the need to consider one’s own options for development cooperation if the right to development is to be realized on the continent.

## GUARANTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, after the abolition of colonialism on the African continent, the idea of the human right to development was vigorously promoted by

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<sup>1</sup> Official development assistance (ODA). *OECD*, 2024. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm> (accessed: 19.05.2024)

<sup>2</sup> See: African countries to dominate the world’s top 10 growing economies. ECA report. *UNECA*, 2024. <https://uneca.org/stories/african-countries-to-dominate-the-world%E2%80%99s-top-10-growing-economies%2C-eca-report> (accessed: 28.05.2024); Africa dominates list of the world’s 20 fastest-growing economies in 2024: African Development Bank says in macroeconomic report. *African Development Bank Group*. 16.02.2024. <https://afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/africa-dominates-list-worlds-20-fastest-growing-economies-2024-african-development-bank-says-macroeconomic-report-68751> (accessed: 28.05.2024)

eminent personalities such as Doudou Thiam, Cardinal Etienne Duval, Keba M'baye, Leopold Cedar Senghor and others, who fervently advocated for its proclamation as a human right to be recognized for the peoples of Africa [Ngang 2021a: 44–45; Ouguergouz 2003: 298]. They justified their demands by arguing that in addition to material dispossession and deprivation of development opportunities under colonial rule, the post-colonial dispensation was shaped by backdoor colonialism (neo-colonialism) [Bulhan 2015: 243], which effectively denied African peoples right to development. Despite independence from colonial rule, the economic and political systems established by the former European colonizers, such as the Commonwealth, the Francophonie/ *Francophonie*, and economic globalization, which deviated from standards of self-determination in pursuit of neo-legalism and a unilateral global agenda, have not allowed for meaningful development in Africa [Ngang 2019: 368–377]. The right to development emerged from this context and has been universally recognized as a fundamental human right, and is therefore an integral part of international human rights law<sup>3</sup>.

The right to development therefore imposes obligations for its realization, especially in Africa, where it is guaranteed legal protection in Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights<sup>4</sup>. Designed as a remedial mechanism, the right to development is intended to progressively address the continent's many development challenges without breeding new ones [Ngang 2021a: 56; Ewanfoh 2014: 140; Sengupta 2004: 180–183]. Considering that the development space in Africa has long been disrupted by external interventions, such as the NATO attack on Libya in 2011 and the US sanctions on eight sub-Saharan African countries<sup>5</sup>, the right to development ultimately aims at two main objectives: achieving development justice, on the one hand, and providing functional responses to persistent development challenges, on the other. Realizing the international dimension of the right to development, as envisioned in the Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD), involves development cooperation<sup>6</sup>, including addressing global development injustices that have heavily affected Africa.

The history of Africa has for centuries been characterised by development injustices, dating back to the periods of slavery and colonialism, including under the present-day dispensation of globalisation and neocolonial domination [Ngang 2021a: 22–29]. The right to development was conceptualised to redress these injustices. Hence, development cooperation for the realisation of the right to development implies, and entails a context that allows for the imbalances that impact on Africa to be remedied, for redistributive justice in the allocation of development gains to be upheld, for Africa's sovereign ownership rights over its natural resources to be respected, and for Africa to have the liberty to assert the right to self-determination in making development choices that are suited to the realities on the ground. Development justice obligates a recognition that the peoples of Africa, are like all other peoples around the world, entitled to the right to

<sup>3</sup> Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. A/CONF.157/24, 25 June 1993, para I (10). *UN*. [https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl\\_conv/declarations/viendec93.shtml](https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/viendec93.shtml) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>4</sup> African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted in Banjul, the Gambia on 27 June 1981 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5 (1981), Art. 22. *AU*. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011\\_-\\_african\\_charter\\_on\\_human\\_and\\_peoples\\_rights\\_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>5</sup> US Sanctions Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. *U.S. Government Publishing Office*, 2018. <https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg28431/html/CHRG-114shrg28431.htm> (accessed: 12.06.2024).

<sup>6</sup> Declaration on the Right to Development, Resolution A/RES/41/128 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986, Art. 4 (3) and Art. 3 (3). *UN*. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/41/128> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

development, which they ought to enjoy without external influences. It is enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights that:

1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind<sup>7</sup>.

The Declaration on the Right to Development adds that:

The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources<sup>8</sup>.

Accordingly, Article 3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development requires states to create the necessary conditions for the realization of the right to development at the national level, but also, and importantly, at the international level. The international dimension of the right to development entails an obligation to cooperate, which requires respect for the principles of international law with regard to the realization of development goals and, accordingly, the duty to remove obstacles that may impede development, in a manner conducive to the establishment of a new international economic order. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974, set out a vision for a radical restructuring of global economic relations between states<sup>9</sup>. The idea of the NIEO was prompted by the fact that the expansionist growth ambitions of Western capitalist countries threatened progress in the developing world, necessitating a campaign led by the G77 member states, mostly African countries, whose aspirations for global balance resonated with the right to development [Ngang 2017: 265–288; Nagan 2013: 29].

Noting that states are required to cooperate for development, as envisaged in Articles 1(3) and more fully in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter (cited in full below)<sup>10</sup>, international law establishes the rule that such development cooperation must be consistent with the principles of self-determination and sovereign equality. These principles give each state the right to make its own development choices and, of course, the freedom to choose its development partners. With regard to the duty to cooperate in the realization of the right to development, Article 4 (2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development states that “[s]ustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, *effective international co-operation* is essential in providing these countries with *appropriate means and facilities* to foster their comprehensive development” (emphasis added)<sup>11</sup>. The emphasis illustrates that in addition to removing obstacles to development as set out in Articles 3(3), 5 and 6(3), the development cooperation mechanism should contribute to efforts to realize the right to development and should not be harmful

<sup>7</sup> African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted in Banjul, the Gambia on 27 June 1981. OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5 (1981), Art. 22 (1). AU. [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011\\_-\\_african\\_charter\\_on\\_human\\_and\\_peoples\\_rights\\_e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>8</sup> Declaration on the Right to Development, Resolution A/RES/41/128 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986, Art. 1 (2). UN. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/41/128> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>9</sup> Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Resolution A/RES/3201(S-VI) Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 May 1974. UN. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>10</sup> The United Nations Charter (full text). UN. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text> (accessed: 15.05.2024)

<sup>11</sup> Declaration on the Right to Development, Resolution A/RES/41/128 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986, Art. 4 (2). UN. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/41/128> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

or regressive. Effective international cooperation, as envisaged in the Declaration on the Right to Development, should ensure development justice for Africa. In the spirit of Article 2(3), which guarantees “the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals”, it is argued that regression in well-being amounts to a violation of the right to development [Ngang 2021a: 283–287; Sengupta 2004: 184].

Although the DAC OECD mechanism is the oldest and probably the largest foreign aid system for Africa and other developing countries, I strongly believe that its *modus operandi* does not guarantee development justice in terms of ensuring equality of development opportunities in recipient countries. Foreign aid is an important, but not exclusive, component of development cooperation and is therefore necessary to advance the right to development in Africa. The problem with the paternalistic mechanisms and arrangements that underpin the DAC OECD model of foreign aid is that they perpetuate development injustices in the form of disregard for the right to self-determination, imperial domination, and the ills of globalization that undermine and even contradict the right to development in Africa.




Fig. 1. **Reversal of Libya’s development gains after the 2011 NATO intervention**

Source: Statista 2024.

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1292068/gross-national-income-in-libya/> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Despite their commitment to provide 0.7% of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually in foreign aid to developing countries<sup>12</sup>, many DAC OECD donor countries have not only been reluctant to recognize the right to development, but in many cases have disrupted and reversed development gains in Africa. For example, Libya’s gross national income stood at USD 76.75 billion in 2010, just before the NATO invasion in 2011. The GNI figure fell sharply to USD 29.32 in 2011 and declined further to USD 34.1 billion in 2020, as shown in *Figure 1*.

<sup>12</sup> See: Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey Mexico. *United Nations*, 2002. Para. 42. [https://un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_CONF.198\\_11.pdf](https://un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.198_11.pdf) (accessed: 12.06.2024); UN Resolution 2626 (1970) The International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. *UN*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/214828?ln=ru&v=pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024)



## DAC OECD ODA TO AFRICA

As noted above, DAC OECD development assistance has been the main source of foreign aid to Africa [OECD 2024] and therefore needs scrutiny in determining the extent to which it contributes to the continent's development. Development assistance from DAC OECD donor countries is financial support provided to developing countries, sometimes in the form of grants (non-refundable) and/or concessional loans (refundable)<sup>13</sup>. Concessional loans are loans granted on softer terms, with interest rates below normal market rates, or with a long grace period, or a combination of both. Unlike other sources of foreign aid, DAC OECD aid to Africa has traditionally been characterized by the imposition of certain donor conditions, including economic liberalization, reduction of public spending on social security, privatization of public enterprises, institutional and policy reforms in the public sector, downsizing of the civil service, etc. The recipient countries are required to comply with any conditions imposed.




Fig. 2. Net ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2022

Source: The World Bank Data, 1960–2022.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Statistics provided by the World Bank and derived from the DAC OECD databases show that net development assistance to 48 sub-Saharan African countries since 1960 peaked at USD 66.97 billion in 2020 and has since declined to USD 59.73 billion in

<sup>13</sup> Development finance standards: Official development assistance (ODA). *OECD*, 2024. <https://oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/> (accessed: May 2024)

2022<sup>14</sup>. Over the 63 years of the DAC OECD Development Assistance Initiative from 1960 to 2022, cumulative disbursements to the 48 countries amounted to USD 1.23 trillion, as shown in *Table 1*.

**Table 1. Cumulative total of development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2022**

Year	Total ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in Millions of USD	Year	Total ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in Millions of USD
1960	597.35	1992	19,024.00
1961	798.08	1993	17,035.00
1962	911.70	1994	19,019.00
1963	904.99	1995	18,064.00
1964	1,001.00	1996	16,035.00
1965	1,009.00	1997	14,009.00
1966	1,017.00	1998	14,048.00
1967	1,028.00	1999	13,023.00
1968	1,015.00	2000	13,006.00
1969	1,013.00	2001	14,029.00
1970	1,017.00	2002	19,005.00
1971	1,036.00	2003	24,088.00
1972	1,045.00	2004	26,049.00
1973	1,008.00	2005	32,084.00
1974	2,006.00	2006	41,002.00
1975	3,005.00	2007	31,028.00
1976	3,023.00	2008	36,017.00
1977	3,085.00	2009	39,015.00
1978	5,021.00	2010	44,036.00
1979	6,066.00	2011	47,033.00
1980	7,072.00	2012	46,076.00
1981	7,049.00	2013	47,007.00
1982	7,086.00	2014	46,047.00
1983	7,058.00	2015	44,077.00
1984	8,038.00	2016	44,031.00
1985	9,022.00	2017	49,057.00
1986	11,002.00	2018	50,089.00
1987	12,081.00	2019	53,008.00
1988	14,005.00	2020	66,097.00
1989	15,005.00	2021	63,021.00
1990	17,084.00	2022	59,073.00
1991	17,082.00	<b>Bcero</b>	<b>1,231,423.12</b>


Source: The World Bank Data, 1960–2022. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>14</sup> Net official development assistance received (current US\$) - Sub-Saharan Africa. *The World Bank*, 2024. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Table 2. **Largest recipients of Sub-Saharan ODA in 2022**

Recipient Countries	ODA Value in 2022, (Millions of USD)	Total ODA Value 1960–2022 (Millions of USD)
Ethiopia	4,925.60	86,641.47
Nigeria	4,443.26	64,345.16
Democratic Republic of Congo	3,249.77	67,388.74
Tanzania	2,661.90	70,935.19
Kenya	2,652.01	58,265.19
Mozambique	2,558.69	56,247.29
Uganda	2,113.84	46,842.31
South Sudan	2,077.15	19,703.77
Niger	2,035.04	26,757.73

Source: The World Bank Data, 1960–2022. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Fig. 3. **Net ODA for the top three recipient countries in Africa, 1960–2022.**

Source: The World Bank Data, 1960–2022.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG> (accessed: 12.06.2024)



Aid to Africa begins a slow decline in 2020, as illustrated in *Figure 2*, likely influenced by a number of factors, including the *COVID-19* pandemic, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and likely as a result of the decoupling of a number of African countries from Western imperial domination. Assuming that the results of foreign aid contributions take time to manifest, it is worth noting that with USD 1.23 trillion pumped into the economies of 48 countries, 63 years is more than enough time for the results of development assistance to become visible and measurable in the recipient countries. Nevertheless, as Smith points out [2018: 1–2], Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the least developed regions in the world and, among other factors, the region has extremely low poverty rates, while growth rates are relatively sluggish. Sahn and Younger [2010: 372–426] also argue that sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest and least developed region in the world, stressing that overall “Africa is poor, and poverty in Africa is not declining”.

OECD statistics are further broken down for each of the 48 African countries, which provides an interesting basis for country-by-country analysis of the value added of DAC OECD aid to the development of recipient countries. The figures for 2022 are provided, as well as the total aid allocated to each of the recipient countries for over the 60 years of the assessment. Nine countries stand out as having received the largest flows of foreign aid allocations of more than USD 2 billion each, as shown in *Table 2*.

As shown in *Figure 3*, Ethiopia tops the list, followed by Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in second and third place, respectively. Further follows an assessment of these countries in terms of the amount of foreign aid they reportedly received and the prevailing realities in these countries.

### A. Assessing the Value-Add of ODA

As noted above, Ethiopia topped the list of largest recipients of DAC OECD development aid in 2022 with USD 4.93 billion, as well as the list of largest recipients since 1960 with USD 87.5 billion, as shown in *Figure 3* and in *Table 2*. These amounts suggest that the country would have experienced sustained economic development and consequently improved social welfare. On the contrary, the results of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in March 2024 show deteriorating conditions and increasing poverty in Ethiopia: about 65% of Ethiopians described the country’s economic situation as “fairly bad” or “very bad”, and the share of citizens satisfied with their personal living conditions declined by 13 percentage points from 2020, from 51% to 38%<sup>15</sup>. The UNDP Multidimensional Poverty Index for 2023 indicates that 68.7% of the Ethiopian population is multidimensionally poor while an additional 18.4% is classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty<sup>16</sup>. Vulnerability to multidimensional poverty means that in the event of an unexpected shock, the 18.4% are at risk of being absorbed into the 68.7% multidimensional poverty group.

The situation is no better in Nigeria, which ranks second on the list of largest aid recipients with USD 4.44 billion in aid in 2022. In 2006, foreign aid to Nigeria rose to a record USD 11.43 billion, the highest ever received by any country in Africa (see *Figure 3*). Despite the fact that Nigeria is one of Africa’s largest economies with

<sup>15</sup> Ethiopians report worsening economic conditions, increased poverty levels, Afrobarometer survey shows. *Afro Barometer News Release*. 27.03.2024. <https://afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/News-release-Ethiopians-report-worsening-economic-conditions-Afrobarometer.pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>16</sup> Briefing note for countries on the 2023 Multidimensional Poverty Index: Ethiopia’ Multidimensional Poverty Index. UNDP, 2023. <https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/ETH.pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

huge reserves of natural resources such as oil and natural gas, the World Bank notes that Nigeria “offers limited opportunities to most of its citizens”<sup>17</sup>. As a result, more than 87 million people in Nigeria live in extreme poverty, the second most impoverished population in the world after India. It has been reported that Nigeria’s standard of living has fallen by 8% in the last five years, and the country’s economic potential has been largely stifled by poverty and poor governance<sup>18</sup>. One would think that the net USD 67.35 billion in ODA from DAC OECD donors between 1960 and 2022 to Africa’s largest and steadily growing economies (see *Figure 3*) would have helped sustain this growth. But it has not. In a study of whether Nigeria’s growth performance has contributed to poverty reduction, Olasode *et al* [2022: 242–243] found that the country’s poverty rate has remained high over the past two decades. As Odejide and Agboola [2023: 1] note, Nigeria had less poverty in 1960 than it does today.

The DRC is the third largest recipient of development assistance from the DAC–OECD, amounting to USD 3.25 billion in 2022 and USD 67.03 billion since 1960 (see *Figure 3*). It is therefore reasonable to assume that this aid has made a significant difference to the complexities and contradictions in which the country finds itself. Despite the potential of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, the World Bank reports that the DRC was among the five poorest countries in the world by 2023, with an estimated 74.6% of the population living in extreme poverty.<sup>19</sup> While Smith’s [2018: 3] arguments in favor of continued foreign aid to the DRC appear compelling, especially given the volatile and precarious situation in the war-torn country, the concern is whether any additional aid to the country from DAC OECD donors will be able to make a difference that has never been made in the past 60 years. It is reported that “more than USD 5 billion in aid allegedly provided to the DRC in 2011 was never transferred to the country. Instead, most of that amount was debt forgiveness”<sup>20</sup>.

The analysis shows that the discrepancy between the amount of development aid and the level of economic development and well-being is common to other aid-receiving countries in the rest of Africa. Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, in an April 2019 TED Talk presentation outlining his strategy and approach to Sierra Leone’s development, noted that his country has received development aid for 58 years but remains poor.<sup>21</sup> There is no denying that some recipient countries have achieved a certain level of economic development, and that aid does alleviate suffering in humanitarian situations. However, it seems that the level of economic development that could have been achieved has unfortunately not been translated into increased prosperity, leaving the continent relatively poor and underdeveloped, especially in terms of natural resources that do not bring the expected benefits to the people. My argument also does not discount evidence to the effect that systemic corruption contributes to aid ineffectiveness in

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<sup>17</sup> The World Bank in Nigeria: Overview. *World Bank*, 2024. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview> (accessed: 24 May 2024)

<sup>18</sup> The real standard of living in Nigeria plummets by 8% in Five Years: Economic potential is held back by poverty and poor governance. *World Economics*. 12.06.2024. <https://www.world-economics.com/Thoughts/The-Real-Standard-of-Living-in-Nigeria-Plummets-by-11-Percent-in-Five-Years.aspx> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>19</sup> The World Bank in the DRC: Overview. *World Bank*, 2024. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>20</sup> Provost C. Researchers find one-fifth of foreign aid never leaves donor countries. *The Guardian*. 24.09.2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/24/foreign-aid-never-reaches-intended-recipients> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>21</sup> Bio J.M. A vision for the future of Sierra Leone. *TED*. 03.07.2019. [https://www.ted.com/talks/julius\\_maada\\_bio\\_a\\_vision\\_for\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_sierra\\_leone?language=en](https://www.ted.com/talks/julius_maada_bio_a_vision_for_the_future_of_sierra_leone?language=en) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Africa. The evidence that foreign aid feeds corruption and bloats state bureaucracies in Africa is overwhelming, with much of the aid received – an estimated USD700 to USD800 billion – is simply looted by corrupt political leaders and siphoned into private bank accounts in the donor countries [Ayodele *et al* 2005: 2].

In interrogating the role of foreign aid to development in Africa, I start from the premise that development is about eradicating poverty and creating the conditions for improving the well-being and living standards of Africa's people. Both the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000 and 2015 respectively, outline a global commitment to poverty eradication as a priority concern for the international community, which translates to the affirmation that poverty eradication is achievable. By uplifting 800 million Chinese out of poverty within a period of 30 to 40 years, China has practically demonstrated that poverty eradication is achievable anywhere around the world<sup>22</sup>. China did not depend on foreign aid to get its people out of poverty. Without foreign aid, Africa would perform much better. With minimal foreign aid, Africa recorded greater socio-economic expansion and industrialisation in the early 1960s [Fentahun 2023: 7], than in recent years where foreign aid has multiplied exponentially. Moyo [2009: 48–68] is uncompromising in qualifying foreign aid as a silent killer to economic growth and prospects for development in Africa. If net DAC OECD development assistance to the value of USD 1.23 trillion reportedly, disbursed to the continent has not lifted the peoples of Africa out of impoverishment and raise standards of living for them, I contend that development has not taken place.

### **B. Intricacies of the ODA DAC OECD Mechanism**

The pitfalls of ODA to Africa have extensively been chronicled in academic literature [Davis 2024; Fentahun 2023; Ilorah, Ngwakwe 2021; Alemu, Lee 2015; Carlsson, Somolekae, van de Walle 1997], which points to a combination of constraining factors, including political conditions designed to “clip the wings” of recipient countries in favor of the foreign policy interests of DAC OECD donor countries. Otherwise, it makes no economic sense for donor countries to continue and even increase aid packages to recipient countries, knowing full well that this money is not producing results. There is an ample evidence that, in line with the DAC OECD framework, aid to Africa has not been, is not now, and will not be beneficial to Africa's economic development or well-being, and should therefore be discontinued, as African leaders have stated<sup>23</sup>. However, it seems almost unattainable that African countries can unilaterally stop foreign aid flows as they do not have the sovereignty to do so. In this regard, Moyo has modeled that a phone call from foreign aid donors to recipient countries is all that is needed to end aid dependency and “Africa's growth engine would start chugging” [Moyo 2009: 144–145].

Unfortunately, an end to foreign aid from DAC OECD donor countries to Africa is not likely to happen anytime soon for political reasons. ODA mechanism is designed to serve the interest of the donor countries in maintaining their global hegemony, which requires keeping the recipient countries in perpetual subjugation and dependency. For donor countries these concerns are much more important than genuine preoccupations

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<sup>22</sup> Lifting 800 million people out of poverty: New report looks at lessons from China's Experience. *World Bank*. 01.04.2022. <https://worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-new-report-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>23</sup> Former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, former President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo have made public statements calling for an end to foreign aid and late Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso fervently opposed foreign aid to Africa.

that the aid they provide will contribute to development on the African continent [Todaro, Smith 2006: 115–118; Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen 2005: 2–24]. Not surprisingly, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was transformed into the DAC OECD in 1960 and became fully operational in 1961<sup>24</sup>, coinciding with the decolonization that led to the independence of colonized territories in Africa and other parts of the world. Deprived of an effective presence and control over their territorial possessions in the colonies, the colonizers developed an alternative in the form of foreign aid that would allow them to maintain firm control over their former colonies.

Following the independence of sovereign statehood under international law, African countries were free to choose their development partners in the context of the Cold War rivalry for world hegemony between the capitalist Western bloc and the communist Eastern bloc. Accordingly, the formation of the DAC OECD was influenced by Cold War politics: the capitalist DAC OECD member countries sought to use aid offers to encourage and deter decolonized African countries from joining the communist Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union<sup>25</sup>. Thus, the DAC OECD aid mechanism was established for geopolitical purposes to support capitalist hegemony rather than to benefit developing countries. This continues to this day. For example, following the geostrategic shift of African countries toward Russia in recent years, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 2022 to counter what it called “the malign influence and activities of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Africa”<sup>26</sup>. The passage of the Act to Counter Russia’s Malign Activities in Africa was preceded by the December 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit, where the US (a DAC OECD member country) announced a \$55 billion aid package to Africa over three years<sup>27</sup>. There is nothing unacceptable about the US giving aid to Africa. However, it is unacceptable to intimidate and threaten recipient countries for not demonstrating loyalty to the West, Western values, and interests. For example, the U.S. constantly bullies and threatens South Africa for its close ties with Russia<sup>28</sup>.

Apart from the policy conditionalities, bullying, and democratic dictatorships that accompany foreign aid originating from DAC OECD donor countries, the reason why there is little evidence of its contribution to Africa’s development is that most aid simply does not reach recipient countries. Less than one-third of foreign aid is reported to actually reach recipient countries, while more than two-thirds remains in the donor or recipient country, supposedly managed by the designated “first implementing partner” – consulting organizations with exorbitant salaries<sup>29</sup>. The findings of a study published in

<sup>24</sup> OECD 60th anniversary. *OECD*, 2024. <https://www.oecd.org/60-years/> (accessed: 12.06.2024). OECD was established by the OECD Convention that transformed the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) into the OECD at the Chateau de la Muette in Paris on 14 December 1960. It entered into force on 30 September 1961.

<sup>25</sup> Thata N. Why foreign aid to Africa is counter-productive. *DiEM25*. 29.09.2023. <https://diem25.org/why-foreign-aid-africa-counter-productive/> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>26</sup> Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act, Act H.R. 7311 - 117th Congress (2021–2022), 2nd Session of April 28, 2022.

<sup>27</sup> U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. *U.S. Department of State*, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/africasummit/> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>28</sup> Peckert J. US threatens South Africa with loss of trade privileges over Russia ties. *The Africa Report*. 14.06.2023. <https://theafricareport.com/312564/us-threatens-south-africa-with-loss-of-trade-privileges-over-russia-ties/> (accessed: 15.06.2024)

<sup>29</sup> Richie E., Kenny Ch., Dissanayake R., Sandefur J. How much foreign aid reaches foreign governments? *Center for Global Development*, 2022. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/how-much-foreign-aid-reaches-foreign-governments> (accessed: 12.06.2024)



*The Guardian* in 2013 confirmed that “[a]t least 20% of the aid money rich countries say they give to developing countries never actually leaves their shores”.<sup>30</sup> Some details of the findings reveal the following:

Researchers at the Bristol-based group Development Initiatives estimate that at least USD 22 billion (£13.7 billion) of the more than USD 100 billion reported by donors as bilateral official development assistance (ODA) in 2011 was never transferred to developing countries. The money was instead spent on activities in donor countries, or put towards the cancellation or rescheduling of debts. [...]

The researchers found that while Italy reported giving about USD 2 billion in bilateral (country-to-country) aid in 2011, less than USD 300 million was transferred to developing countries. [...]

Less than 70% of French bilateral aid – and less than 50% of Austrian aid – was transferred to developing countries in 2011. Of the five countries that have met the UN target to spend 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) on aid, three – Sweden, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – transferred less than three-quarters of their aid money to developing countries in 2011.

At least 8% of British bilateral aid was not transferred to developing countries – a relatively low proportion compared with other donors<sup>31</sup>.

Given these data, it is correctly to state that of the USD 1.23 trillion in net OECD DAC aid reported to have gone to Africa between 1960 and 2022, only USD 246.28 billion (or 20% of the net ODA reported in *Table 1*) may have reached the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This explains why there is no development and prosperity in Africa as a result of OECD DAC aid. As to why only 20% of the aid offered is effectively used, it is a calculated scheme to finance (through capital flight) the capitalist economies of the donor countries at the expense of the recipient countries. A report on 30 African countries over a 49-year period from 1970 to 2018 shows that this group of countries lost a total of USD 2 trillion to capital flight [Ndikumana, Boyce 2021: 1], which, as the UN Conference on Trade and Development notes, “[...] exceeds the annual inflows of development assistance and foreign direct investment received by African countries. Including the interest income that would have been generated by these outflows, total private wealth held offshore in 2018 amounted to USD 2.4 trillion. This represents more than three times the amount the continent owed that year, ironically making Africa a ‘net creditor’ to the rest of the world”.<sup>32</sup>

It is even interesting to note that much of the ODA supposedly going to recipient countries remains in the donor countries in the form of loan debt forgiveness and/or in the form of spending on migrants/refugees from recipient countries received by donor countries<sup>33</sup>. It has been observed that the contribution of foreign aid to Africa's development is not only very minimal [Fentahun 2023: 1–15; Resnick 2016: 421], but also contributes to Africa's underdevelopment as much as colonialism did. Chigudu

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<sup>30</sup> Provost C. Researchers find one-fifth of foreign aid never leaves donor countries. *The Guardian*. 24.09.2013. <https://theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/24/foreign-aid-never-reaches-intended-recipients> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Debate: On the trail of capital flight from Africa. *UNCTAD Key Issues*. 10.03.2022. <https://unctad.org/meeting/debate-trail-capital-flight-africa> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>33</sup> Ravenscroft J., Craviotto N. Rich countries increasingly the recipients of their own aid, according to OECD DAC data. *EuroDad*, 2023. [https://www.eurodad.org/oecd\\_aid\\_statistics\\_april\\_2023?utm\\_campaign=newsletter\\_20\\_04\\_2023&utm\\_medium=E-mail&utm\\_source=eurodad](https://www.eurodad.org/oecd_aid_statistics_april_2023?utm_campaign=newsletter_20_04_2023&utm_medium=E-mail&utm_source=eurodad) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

argues that colonialism never really ended<sup>34</sup> but continues to this day through foreign aid, which Fentahun [2023: 12] argues is a “systematic tool of imperialism and domination” in exchange for African sovereignty. Sasha Alyson states quite bluntly that foreign aid is “colonialism by other means”<sup>35</sup> and therefore violates the rules of international law on development cooperation.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESCRIPTIONS ON DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

International law provides that states should cooperate to achieve development goals at the national, regional and global levels. In this regard, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states that one of the Organization’s principal purposes is “[t]o achieve international cooperation in resolving international problems of an economic, social and cultural or humanitarian character [...]”<sup>36</sup>. This means that development cooperation efforts and initiatives should be established within the institutional framework of the UN as an impartial regulatory body authorized to establish the rules and operational modalities to be applied in defining the parameters of development cooperation. This is not the case with the DAC OECD mechanism, which is established outside the UN system, with rules and operational modalities unilaterally determined by donor countries, while recipient countries are only required to comply with them. International cooperation for development is further defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, which provide that:

### *Article 55*

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
- c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

### *Article 56*

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55<sup>37</sup>.

Common Articles 1(1) and (2) of the twin international Covenants on human rights incorporate the components of self-determination and international cooperation in view of giving effect to the broad range of rights and freedoms enshrined therein<sup>38</sup>. Both

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<sup>34</sup> Chigudu S. ‘Colonialism had never really ended’: My life in the shadow of Cecil Rhodes. *The Guardian*. 14.01.2021. <https://theguardian.com/news/2021/jan/14/rhodes-must-fall-oxford-colonialism-zimbabwe-si-mukai-chigudu> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>35</sup> Alyson S. Development Aid: A continuation of colonialism by other means. *The Africa Report*. 03.06.2022. <https://theafricareport.com/209146/development-aid-a-continuation-of-colonialism-by-other-means/> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>36</sup> United Nations Charter (full text). *UN*. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text> (accessed: 15.05.2024)

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> See: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 UN Doc A/6316 (1966).



Covenants provide that international cooperation must be based on the principles of “mutual benefits, and international law”. The twin Covenants have been said to provide the legal basis on the right to development as noted in the preamble to the DRTD [Subedi 2021: 3] As stated in both Covenants, the DRTD reiterates the point on full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter. The latter as Subedi [2021: 3] notes, imposes a “duty on the part of all Members of the United Nations to create international conditions favourable to the realisation of the right to development, to co-operate to eliminate ‘obstacles’ to development and to take steps to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the right to development”.

The principles of self-determination and sovereign equality that underpin the framework for international cooperation are not determined by the degree of influence that developed countries can exert over developing countries, but rather by the recognition that all states have full legal capacity and therefore equal status and the full range of powers, rights and obligations that qualify them as subjects of international law. Consequently, international cooperation for development, as set out in Articles 1(3), 55, and 56 of UN Charter, must be mutually beneficial, while respecting the principles of sovereign equality and self-determination. Contrary to these provisions of international law on development cooperation, the DAC OECD approach is rather based on a display of paternalistic benevolence that tends to portray donor countries, in their condescending imperialistic attitude towards the provision of development assistance, as having exclusive sovereignty in deciding and choosing development paths for recipient countries in Africa, which are thereby deprived of their sovereignty and right to self-determination.

The DAC OECD mechanism, established outside the UN system, cleverly circumvents international legal obligations to respect state sovereignty and the rules of self-determination in international cooperation, as stipulated in Article 55 of UN Charter. As explained above, DAC OECD donor countries do not perceive recipient countries in Africa as sovereign states with the right to self-determination and to determine the fate of their development. Some bilateral aid agreements are based on ex-colonial ties. For example, Belgium’s bilateral ODA is highest in the Democratic Republic of Congo (a former Belgian colony), and Portugal’s bilateral ODA is highest in Mozambique (a former Portuguese colony).<sup>39</sup> DAC OECD donor countries view recipient countries in Africa as their colonial possessions rather than as equal development partners. A prime example is the cooperation between France and its former colonies in Africa, which never gained full independence under a secret pact to continue colonial activities [Wanki 2023: 229–233]. With the exception of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which recently severed their colonial ties with France, the remaining former French colonies remain under French control.

The living standards and conditions of economic and social progress and development in the former French colonies remain dismal for the obvious reason that subjection to French neocolonial influence deprives them of their sovereignty and self-determination to formulate appropriate national development policies to ensure the continuous improvement of the living standards of their peoples, as stipulated in Article 2(3) of the

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<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 UN Doc A/6316 (1966). *UN*. [https://un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_2200A\(XXI\)\\_civil.pdf](https://un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_2200A(XXI)_civil.pdf) (accessed: 12.06.2024)

<sup>39</sup> 2023 DCR donor profiles/maps: Bilateral ODA by recipient. *OECD*, 2023. <https://www1.compareyour-country.org/dev-coop-profiles-maps-23/en/0/2/all/default> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

Declaration on the Right to Development. The situation is no better for other African countries in terms of being perceived by DAC OECD donor countries as fully sovereign, with equal rights and capacity to engage in development cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis in shaping policy preferences, especially on development issues that exclusively concern Africa.

Donor-recipient cooperation arrangements between DAC OECD member countries and Africa not only violate the principles of international law on development cooperation but also constitute obstacles to development that must be eliminated in accordance with Article 5 of the Declaration on the Right to Development. In addition to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Right to Development, among other instruments governing development cooperation, the draft International Covenant on the Right to Development, which is currently under discussion in the UN General Assembly, emphasizes as one of its basic principles that “the realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” and goes further to elaborate on the duty to cooperate and what that duty entails<sup>40</sup>. When the Covenant on the Right to Development is adopted and becomes an integral part of the International Bill of Rights, it will impose binding obligations on how development cooperation should be implemented.

Development cooperation for the realisation of the right to development does not imply a solicitation for foreign aid but rather an assertion of the right to self-determination in development decision-making and an enabling environment in which developing countries can thrive in their efforts to achieve comprehensive sustainable development [Ngang 2018: 112; Boon 2009: 3]. Foreign aid is only one component of development cooperation; the main component is respect for international law, which must be honored in the search for mutually beneficial development alternatives in the pursuit of a new international economic order that opens pathways to multipolarity and thus ensures global balance and development justice. For Africa, the hope is that a multipolar world is coming with emerging frameworks for cooperation such as the BRICS and the Arab donors who, as Degterev [2016: 43] points out, “have sided with the developing countries”. Beyond the BRICS and Arab donor cooperation frameworks, China, Russia, and India are emerging as suitable alternatives in terms of a genuine win-win development partnership, which should be actively explored as it guarantees more prospects for the realization of the right to development in Africa than the DAC OECD framework.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), although a free market structure, also provides a great opportunity to build an African continental framework for development cooperation that will be more contextually relevant in facilitating the right to development across the continent. The establishment of the AfCFTA is in line with the obligation of States Parties as enshrined in Article 22(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which provides that

2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.

The commitment to collective action to realize the right to development implies the establishment of functional mechanisms such as the AfCFTA, which is widely acknow-

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<sup>40</sup> Draft International Covenant on the Right to Development, Human Rights Council A/HRC/54/50 Fifty-fourth session, 6 October 2023, Art. 3(e) and Art. 13. *UN*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4018149?ln=ru&v=pdf> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

ledged to have the potential to accelerate development on the continent [Ngang 2021b: 154; Cofelice 2018: 32–33]. However, as Odijie [2023] stresses, this will require a robust and integrated pan-African industrial policy to attract development finance from AfCFTA member states, so as not to create a favorable environment for powerful external actors such as the European Union, the United States, and China to dominate the market. The African continental framework for development cooperation will not only go a long way in transforming the development landscape on the continent, but will also provide a competitive advantage in building strong cooperative arrangements with other countries and regions of the world that have already been able to establish such robust cooperation frameworks.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to show that, contrary to the statistics on aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, there is evidence to the contrary: only a smaller part of foreign aid from DAC OECD donor countries reaches recipient countries. Moreover, since DAC OECD aid tends to be non-development aid, not aimed at stimulating production and growth, eradicating poverty and ensuring the well-being of African peoples, the article justifies the conclusion that foreign aid flows have not contributed to the development of any of the recipient countries. It appears that the projected economic growth in many African countries, as outlined in the introduction, is rather the result of a combination of factors, including remittances from the African diaspora and, for the most part, a changing dynamic characterized by a growing awakening and resentment across the continent about Africa's sterile dependence on the paternalistic kindness of DAC OECD donor countries.

Awakening and discontent resonate with the right to development in Africa, which embodies the right to liberation and the right to determine the continent's own development path. This implies liberation from all forms of imperial domination, including its covert manifestation through the DAC OECD development aid mechanism, which for decades has kept recipient countries perpetually subordinate to donor countries. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, advocates of the right to development argued that Africa should have the freedom to choose alternative development paths to those imposed by former colonial masters. Article 6(3) of the DRTD provides that "States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as economic social and cultural rights"<sup>41</sup>. By failing to respect the sovereignty and self-determination of African countries, DAC OECD donor countries implicitly fail to respect civil and political rights as well as socio-economic and cultural rights in these countries, and therefore their offers of development assistance are supposedly obstacles to development that should be removed.

Cutting out the DAC OECD development assistance obstacle guarantees that Africa can realize its right to development in accordance with international law, which, according to Article 1(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development and Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, includes the full realization of the right to self-determination and the right to full sovereignty over the continent's vast natural resources and development potential. As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, there is no reason for Africa to remain stuck in the neocolonial-type and the

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<sup>41</sup> Declaration on the Right to Development, Resolution A/RES/41/128 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986, Art. 6(3). *UN*. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/41/128> (accessed: 12.06.2024)

lopsided paternalistic and dependency-driven DAC OECD cooperation framework that offers no hope. Alternative models of development cooperation, based on international law and capable of fostering mutually beneficial partnerships, could be explored. Africa must seriously consider its development cooperation options if the right to development is to be achieved on the continent.

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## ПРАВО НА РАЗВИТИЕ И РОЛЬ ИНОСТРАННОЙ ПОМОЩИ КСР ОЭСР В РАЗВИТИИ АФРИКИ

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**Аннотация.** Когда в конце 1960-х – начале 1970-х гг. в Африке была сформулирована концепция права человека на развитие, идея заключалась не в том, чтобы просить помощи в целях развития, а в том, чтобы заявить о своем праве на самоопределение, или даже о праве на подлинное освобождение от продолжающегося внешнего господства, с тем, чтобы взять на себя суверенный контроль и самостоятельно определять судьбу развития континента. Однако в ходе эволюции идея права на развитие была в некоторой степени искажена и стала как раз подразумевать обращение к помощи в целях развития для ее реализации. От развитых стран требовалось выделять 0,7% своего годового валового внутреннего продукта в качестве иностранной помощи для содействия развивающимся странам, включая страны Африки. За более чем шесть десятилетий, с 1960 по 2022 г., страны-доноры Комитета содействии развитию Организации экономического сотрудничества и развития (КСР ОЭСР) предоставили 48 странам-получателям в Африке помощь в целях развития на общую сумму \$1,23 трлн. В данной статье рассматривается вопрос о том, в какой степени иностранная помощь способствовала развитию стран-получателей в Африке. В ходе прове-



денного анализа удалось установить, что, несмотря на непрерывные поставки иностранной помощи в Африку, обнищание и отставание в развитии на всем континенте усугубились, что заставляет задаться вопросом, почему Африка должна оставаться в ловушке «мертвой помощи» КСР ОЭСР, когда можно опереться на альтернативные, взаимовыгодные механизмы сотрудничества в целях развития.

**Ключевые слова:** право на развитие, иностранная помощь, содействие развитию, сотрудничество в целях развития, КСР ОЭСР, справедливость развития, альтернативные рамки сотрудничества, Африка

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