Research article

TOWARDS POST-NEOCOLONIAL INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY OF THE AFRICAN NATIONS

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Abstract. This article explores the strategic necessity of sovereign industrialization as a means for African states to overcome the structural legacies of neocolonial exploitation and break the cycle of chronic underdevelopment. The African experience demonstrates that imported models based solely on deregulation and liberalization fail to address the root causes of underdevelopment and instead reproduce the colonial economic architecture under new ideological banners. By analyzing the intersection of development theory, exploitative neocolonial heritage, and the extractive effect of the contemporary global value chains, contrasted to the earlier Soviet-led approach successes, it argues that industrialization, grounded in the sovereign economic development doctrine, national independence, and self-determination, is essential for resisting Western economic domination and achieving long-term development beneficial to African people.

The article, based on the identified barriers to industrial development and inherited weakness of the neoliberal governance, advocates for a new, sovereign economic developmental model and industrial policies. Without a deliberate strategy of industrialization rooted in sovereign control over national resources and production systems, African states will remain trapped in a neocolonial matrix of dependency. Industrialization is not merely a path to higher GDP; rather, it is the foundation for reclaiming political and economic sovereignty in Africa. With such a revival of the industrial policy approach to sovereign economic development, with a new wave of development thinking imbuing their governments, and with the help of the key nations and institutions of the multipolar order, the African states will be able to exit the vicious cycle of external domination and internal stagnation.

Keywords: industrialization, Africa, economic development, sovereign doctrine, neocolonialism, industrialization, industrial policy

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THE TWO HISTORICALLY COMPETING DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS IN AFRICA

The persistent underdevelopment of African states is deeply rooted in the structural legacies of colonialism that brought about externally imposed boundaries and monocultural economies. European imperial powers left a LEGACY AND HISTORY OF IMPOSED UNDERDEVELOPMENT THAT designed African economies for extraction only[1], imposing systems that disrupted local governance and forcibly integrated African territories into the global capitalist system as exporters of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods [Degterev 2023].

Colonial extraction, the dismantling of indigenous production structures, and deliberate suppression of the development of local industry rendered African states dependent on external markets and technologies [Rodney 1972]. Furthermore, the imposition of arbitrary borders, drawn without regard for ethnic, linguistic, or economic continuities, exacerbated fragmentation, undermining the foundation for integrated national economies and coherent development planning [Amin 1976]. The result was a continent of monocultural economies tied to extractive industries or agriculture (minerals, cotton, cocoa, oil, etc.) and trapped in a neocolonial matrix of dependency[2].

This is in contrast to the Soviet-aided era of industrialization in Africa implemented in the immediate post-independence era, where a large number of African states sought to reverse these structural constraints through industrialization, often turning to the Soviet Union for support [Kobishchanov, Kubbel, Sledzevskiy 1974]. The USSR, motivated by ideological solidarity and geopolitical competition during the Cold War, became a crucial actor in the industrial and technological development of countries like Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Ethiopia, and Angola [Davidchuk, Degterev, Korendyasov 2022].

This support was marked by the construction of infrastructure, factories, and educational institutions, as well as the provision of technical training for thousands of African specialists in Soviet universities [Iandolo 2022]. For example, in Guinea and Mali, Soviet engineers assisted in building hydroelectric power plants, mining sites, and textile mills, while in Angola and Ethiopia, they supported metallurgical and military-industrial complexes. Unlike Western donors, Soviet development assistance often avoided the conditionalities of the Bretton Woods institutions and emphasized state-led planning, nationalization, and industrial self-reliance [Mkandawire 2001].

In the neocolonial model of the post-Soviet period as of the 1990s, despite nominal GDP growth, the industrial sector started to decline, marked by weak diversification and export dependence on raw materials. The revived and now neocolonial dependence reinforced the structural mono-economies of the earlier direct colonialism, once again

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[1] St. Louis M., Philipson K. Unmasking the IMF: The Post-Financial Crisis Imperative for Reform. *Jubilee USA*. 2010. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/jubileeusa/legacy_url/340/IMF_Report.pdf?1501806096 (accessed: 23.07.2025)

[2] Van de Walle N., Titlow K.S., Pengl Y., Philip R., Robert M. Extractive colonial economies and legacies of spatial inequality: Evidence from Africa. *CEPR/VoxEU*. 02.12.2020. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/extractive-colonial-economies-and-legacies-spatial-inequality-evidence-africa (accessed: 23.07.2025)

limiting opportunities for technological leaps and sustainable industrialization. The data in *Table* 1 demonstrate how the Soviet-supported industrialization (the 1960s and 1970s) enabled many African countries to break free from the pre-independence colonial cycle of raw material dependency and increase the added value by moving into manufacturing sectors, compared to the later outcomes of the liberal-oriented and purely extractive structural adjustment programs (the 1990s).

Table 1. **Industry Share in GDP. Industry, value-added (% of GDP) for the "Soviet-era" (~1975) period and the neocolonial/post-1990 benchmark (~2000), approximate**

Country	Soviet-era (~1965–75) Industry, value-added %	Post-Soviet/Neocolonial (~1990–96) Industry, value-added %
Ghana	~19% (1970)	~14% (1990–95)
Zambia	~50–62% (late 1960s peak)	~24–36% (1990–97 average ~29%)
Kenya	~20% (1970)	~20% (1990)
Mauritius	~28% (mid-1960s)	~33% (1997)
Zimbabwe	~34% (1975)	~28% (1997)
Tanzania	~23% (1990)	~21% (1997)
Gabon	high (~50 – 60 %) in 1970s	~50 % by 2000

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from: IMF, World Bank, UN, Index Mundi

During the 1970s, countries like Zambia or Gabon had significantly higher industry shares in national economies (~60%), often boosted by state-led resource extraction and industrial projects under the Soviet-aligned model. By 2000, most of these countries saw either declining or only modestly increased industry shares, with manufacturing weakened and the sector overtaken by mining, construction, and extractives in many cases. Exceptions like Kenya and Mauritius are rare in the broader African context. Overall, the neocolonial Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) era failed to replicate the higher structural industrial integration seen in the Soviet-supported periods [Mkandawire 2015; Akyüz 2017].

Soviet industrialization models demonstrated how industrial policy, strategic planning, infrastructure investment, and sovereign resource processing could foster industrial sector growth in particular and economic development in general [Degterev 2023]. This confirms the need for industrial policies and strategies tailored to African realities rather than adherence to Western neoliberal market orthodoxy in which Africans did not have any say[3]. While not without limitations, this cooperation had laid important foundations for national capacity-building and symbolized a model of development outside the Western neoliberal paradigm [Sumkoski 2016].

The Soviet-African partnership demonstrated that industrialization rooted in national sovereignty, regional cooperation, and alternative development models could offer

[3] Calling for Global Financial Reforms, Urgent Climate Action, Secretary-General Tells Meeting of Ministers for Group of 77 and China 'We Are Moving Backwards'. *United Nations*. 23.09.2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21486.doc.htm (accessed: 23.07.2025)

African nations a partial escape from the structural traps of colonial capitalism. Beyond the years of the direct comparison of the Soviet 1970s and the neoliberal 1990s in *Table* 1, the recent boom of the 2010s and early 2020s in the extractive industries is mostly based on the Chinese Belt and Road program, and it still brings less than needed value added or additional input and linkages with national economies.

Revisiting this history is essential today, as contemporary African states confront similar challenges under new forms of global dependency and search for pathways to authentic economic liberation[4]. The new multipolar world now offers, through the BRICS+ and the New Development Bank (NDB), both a new development paradigm and practical aid in achieving sovereign development outcomes[5].

CONTEMPORARY NEOCOLONIALISM: UNEQUAL INTEGRATION IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND THE TRAP OF DEPENDENCY IN AFRICA

Despite gaining political independence from their colonizers after World War II, the structure of African economies remains deeply embedded in neocolonial patterns of dependency, shaped by the global organization of trade, production, and finance [Wengraf 2016]. Neocolonialism today operates not through direct political control but through economic mechanisms such as trade dependency, debt regimes, and foreign direct investment (FDI), which tie African states into unequal global value chains (GVC) [Nkrumah 1965]. The GVCs position the African countries overwhelmingly as providers of raw materials and low-value-added goods[6], while high-value-added production and technological innovation remain concentrated in the Global North [Reinert 2007].

This unequal integration of African economies into the global capitalist system reinforces the historical asymmetries created under colonialism and reifies the division of labor where Africa exports commodities and imports manufactured goods. For instance, over 80% of Africa’s exports are still primary goods such as oil, minerals, and agricultural products, subject to volatile prices and external demand [Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2020]. Such integration into the global capitalist system is not neutral, and it rather structurally disadvantages African economies, as it denies them opportunities for industrial upgrading and technological learning [Kaplinsky 2005].

FDI, widely promoted as a development solution[7], often perpetuates these patterns, introducing dependence on primary exports and investments without technology transfer. In the absence of indigenous, legitimate national institutions and policy coordination, foreign investment flows into resource extraction or low-wage assembly

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[4] D’Ouezzan H.C. Africa’s economic sovereignty: The time is now for African-led solutions. *UN. Africa Renewal*. 05.06.2024. https://africarenewal.un.org/en/magazine/africas-economic-sovereignty-time-now-african-led-solutions-0 (accessed 01.09.2025)

[5] Annual Report: Expanding Our Reach and Impact. *New Development Bank*. https://www.ndb.int/annual-report-2021/pdf/NDB_AR_2021_complete.pdf (accessed: 23.07.2025)

[6] African Economic Outlook 2014: Global Value Chains and Africa’s Industrialization. *OECD*. 19.05.2014. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/african-economic-outlook-2014_aeo-2014-en.html (accessed: 23.07.2025)

[7] FDI Flows to Developing Economies Drop to Lowest Level Since 2005. *World Bank*. 16.06.202. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/16/foreign-direct-investment-in-retreat (accessed: 23.07.2025)

sectors, with limited linkages to domestic firms or innovation systems [Cheru, Obi 2011]. Technology transfer, a key promise of globalization, rarely materializes in African contexts, where patents, know-how, and high-skill jobs remain concentrated in the investor countries. Consequently, economic growth in many African states remains externally driven and unsustainable, reproducing the dependency cycle of the earlier decades [Amin 1976].

Table 2. **Negative and Positive Impacts Comparison Table**

Country	Neocolonial Era (~2000)	Soviet Era (~1975)
Ghana	High dependency on gold & cocoa exports; limited technology spillover from FDI focused on extractives; weak local value chains	Soviet aid funded Volta projects and Valco aluminium plant, expanding industrial capacity and some know-how transfer
Zambia	Dominated by copper exports; FDI in mining brought limited tech transfer; lack of downstream processing	Under nationalization/state-led industry with Soviet technical support, Zambia developed refineries and rail infrastructure
Mali	Export dependence on gold and cotton; agro-processing minimal; almost no local industrial linkages	Soviet-aligned planning envisioned steel and agro-industrial facilities (Kalana, Gouina), though many remained unrealized
Kenya	Tea and horticulture export driven; FDI concentrated in resource and low value-added agriculture; minimal industrial tech spillovers (~9.5% FDI–GDP)	Some limited industrial capacity in textiles and agro-processing via intra-Africa trade, though under private/colonial remit, not Soviet-led
Tanzania	Export of raw minerals and agricultural goods; poor integration in GVCs; limited technology transfer; weak domestic linkages	Early socialist-led Ujamaa period had state-led development and cooperation with socialist bloc; infrastructure and industrial attempts albeit small-scale
Ethiopia	Continued commodity export dependence; FDI in extractives and infrastructure with low technological transfer	Under Soviet-aligned Derg era, Ethiopia pursued state industrial and agro projects; some technology-direct support in sugar and industrial plants
Guinea	Heavily reliant on bauxite and minerals export; extractive FDI predominant; limited local industry growth	Post-independence Soviet-aligned Guinea pursued mining infrastructure with limited industrial base
Gabon	Oil dependency (~97% exports); FDI from multinationals with near-zero technology transfer; domestic value-adding largely absent	Relatively small, nascent industrial diversification; Soviet involvement minimal but state-led resource management existed

Country	Neocolonial Era (~2000)	Soviet Era (~1975)
Botswana	Diamond-based economy; FDI-driven extraction with some value-added in cutting/polishing; modest linkage policies	Soviet ties were limited; industry built with strong state policy and domestic reform, less neocolonial dependency
Mauritius	Moved toward export-oriented textiles & services with local value-add; still reliant on GVCs but more diversified	Postcolonial era minimal Soviet support; industrialization came later with state planning, not directly comparable
Nigeria	Dominated by petroleum exports (~70% of exports by 2019); FDI in oil with minimal tech spillover; manufacturing stagnated	Some state-owned industrial efforts post-independence, Soviet assistance modest; heavy reliance on agriculture before oil boom

Source: Compiled by the author, based on data from: ACET, UNCTAD, IMF, World Bank, Africa Monitor, UNIDO

The comparison in *Table* 2 summarizes the negative impacts across 10 African countries on the industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities, from the three interrelated factors: neocolonialism/global value chains, unequal integration into the global capitalist system, and dependency on primary exports and FDI without technology transfer, contrasting the Soviet-era industrial projects and policies (circa 1975) with those of the neocolonial era (circa 2000). *Table* 2 illustrates the broad pattern of deindustrialization as economies became more FDI- and export-driven, especially in raw commodities, while failing to develop resilient domestic manufacturing capacity.

In the neocolonial era, most countries are deeply embedded in global value chains as raw-material exporters, with minimal technology transfer and weak domestic industrial linkages, reinforcing dependency and underdevelopment. The Soviet-supported periods in the 1960–1970s generally featured planned industrial projects, nationalization in resource sectors, and infrastructure development with technology transfer, though often limited in scale and sustainability.

The contrast underscores how neocolonial integration into global capitalism deepened dependency on extractive exports and multinational FDI, with low absorptive capacity and limited value capture, compared to earlier models of sovereign industrialization. Manufacturing value added (MVA) across the entire Africa dropped from over 16 % of GDP in the early 1980s to around 11 % by the late 2000s and early 2020s[8].

For the West, manufacturing's share has also declined over recent decades, even though from a higher starting point than in Africa (the US manufacturing share was

[8] Share of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP), 2023. *Our World in Data*. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/manufacturing-value-added-to-gdp (accessed: 26.08.2025)

approximately 10–11% of GDP in 2023), with global averages also showing a modest fall of MVA, from around 19% in the late 1990s to around 16% by 2022[9]. The limited manufacturing recovery in certain countries was overwhelmed by the rise of extractive industries, global value chain marginalization, and weak industrial policy frameworks.

Table 3. **Current status of the Soviet-assisted industrial projects in Africa**

Country	Industry / Sector	Established with USSR Help	Current Status (Privatized / Collapsed / Other)
Algeria	Metallurgical plant in Annaba	Built with Soviet technical aid, design/assistance in the 1960s	Privatized (2001, 70% to Ispat/ArcelorMittal). Renationalized (2016)
Angola	Capanda hydropower dam on the Kwanza River	Construction with Soviet Tekhnopromexport, started in 1987	State/public, operating (520 MW by 2004–2007)
Egypt	Egyptian Iron & Steel Company plant in Helwan	Soviet technical/equipment links in the 1960s	Liquidated in 2021
Somalia	Fishing cooperatives; sugar factory; petroleum refinery	Established early 1970s during M.S. Barre government with Soviet-supplied technology	Collapsed after fall of Barre; many are no longer operational
Nigeria	Ajaokuta Steel Company	Started construction in 1979 by Soviet contractor Tyazhpromexport	Multiple privatization attempts; $496m settlement with Global Steel in 2022
Guinea	Kindia Bauxite Mine (Compagnie des bauxites de Kindia, CBK); machinery projects; coal plants, refining	Industry constructed in Kindia in 1974 with Soviet assistance; state SBK (Société des Bauxites de Kindia) legacy	Transferred as a concession to RUSAL (2001) → private operation (CBK, Compagnie des Bauxites de Kindia), others projects collapsed

Source: Compiled by the author

Most Soviet-era industrial projects in Africa ended up collapsed or abandoned due to political instability. *Table* 3 presents a set of representative case studies (Guinea, Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Somalia), showing state-owned industries and their

[9] Gowder C. The US lags behind other top countries in its proportion of manufacturing value added to GDP, World Bank data reveals. *The State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI)*. 26.10.2023. https://ssti.org/blog/us-lags-behind-other-top-countries-its-proportion-manufacturing-value-added-gdp-world-bank (accessed: 26.08.2025)

previous, circa the late-1980s, and current situation, after the broad IMF/WB-induced reforms.

By the 1980s, the IMF/World Bank country diagnostics repeatedly flagged poor SOE (state-owned enterprises) performance as a "drag on budgets and macro stability," and the Bretton Woods institutions sought SOE reform via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) [Begga, Merghit 2014]. SAPs pushed privatization/commercialization and fiscal tightening. Successful partial privatizations/restructurings involved mainly cash cows such as telecoms and banking, while real industry was forced into failures. Large, capital-intensive projects could not be privatized easily; some remained stalled or collapsed [Ugorji 1995]. Resource-rich sectors (oil and gas) often remained under state control (e.g., Sonatrach in Algeria) or were partially reasserted by states later on.

To break out of this pattern, African states must not only reform their positions within global value chains and seek alternative GVCs and Regional Value Chains (RVCs) but also actively restructure their economies through industrial policy, regional cooperation, and the building of sovereign capacities. This requires a paradigm shift, from passive acceptance of their insertion into global markets to independent strategies for sovereign economic development.

SOVEREIGN INDUSTRIALIZATION CONCEPT: THE CORNERSTONE OF ECONOMIC EMANCIPATION AND SOVEREIGNTY IN AFRICA

The persistent structural weaknesses of African economies and the failure of externally imposed development models have renewed interest in dependency and postcolonial development theories [Gebremariam 2025]. These frameworks exposed how Africa's integration into the global economy has consistently favored core capitalist countries at the expense of peripheral, postcolonial societies [Amin 1976]. According to these scholars, development was never merely a matter of capital accumulation or market efficiency but a deeply political process rooted in global power asymmetries [Amin 1976; Rodney 1972].

This critique remains relevant in light of the continued failure of neoliberal policies promoted under the Washington Consensus. Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s dismantled state institutions, liberalized trade prematurely, and privatized strategic sectors, often resulting in deindustrialization, higher inequality, and weakened domestic production [Mkandawire 2005]. Far from generating self-sustaining growth, these reforms left many African economies more exposed to external shocks, dependent on aid, and trapped in low-value segments of the global economy [Stiglitz 2002].

In parallel with these critiques, sovereign economic development models and doctrines produced by governments, practitioners, and scientists in countries and institutions of the Global South offer a contemporary alternative rooted in sovereigntist and decolonial thinking. According to it, African states will reassert sovereignty over their development pathways by rejecting externally dictated reforms, emphasizing sovereign development, and rebuilding the institutions necessary for long-term industrial transformation, exercising strategic control over key industries, and restoring national planning and implementing capacities. This vision advances a 21st-century doctrine that incorporates economic sovereignty, industrial policy, technological sovereignty, regional cooperation, and protection against extractive foreign capital practices [Sumkoski 2022].

The case for sovereign industrialization as both economic and political emancipation represents more than a pathway to economic growth, as it is a means of asserting national sovereignty and achieving political and economic emancipation. For post-colonial African states, the imperative to industrialize is rooted in the need to break free from a century-long pattern of externally dictated development.

Sovereign industrialization allows states to reclaim control over production, employment, and value creation, liberating them from commodity dependence and the volatility of global markets [Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2020]. More fundamentally, it underpins national autonomy by enabling countries to build strong internal capacities in strategic sectors, such as energy, agriculture, manufacturing, information and communication technologies (ICT), which form the backbone of resilient indigenous, sovereign, and socio-politically sustainable economies.

Within this industrialization drive, energy sovereignty is particularly vital, as it ensures that industrial and technological ambitions are not constrained by unreliable, expensive, or externally controlled power sources. Agriculture and agro-processing, likewise, serve both as a base for food security and as a springboard for broader industrial development, especially in rural areas. ICT, AI, digital infrastructure, meanwhile, provide tools for leapfrogging traditional development barriers, expanding access to markets, finance, and education. These sectors, if protected and supported through coherent policies, can act as transformative growth poles in Africa's structural transformation.

Historical experience from East Asia reinforces the case for state-led industrialization. Economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and later mainland China achieved rapid industrial growth not through free-market liberalization, but through carefully sequenced policies of strategic protectionism, technology absorption, and institutional coherence [Amsden 2001; Chang 2002]. These nations and regions protected infant industries, developed industrial policies, nurtured domestic firms, and demanded technology transfer from foreign investors. Crucially, their states possessed high-capacity bureaucracies and clear development visions.

These lessons are particularly relevant for African countries seeking to escape neoliberal policy traps. Such a Sovereign Economic Development model for resisting global economic coercion and advocating for Africa-specific industrial strategies, rooted in national planning, sovereign control over resources, endogenous technological capacity, and country-specific tailored industrialization, aligns closely with these lessons and principles from East Asia[10].

[10] Sumkoski G. Multipolar World Needs an "Economic Wagner". *Katehon.* 07.11.2023. https://katehon.com/en/article/ multipolar-world-needs-economic-wagner (accessed: 26.08.2025)

While industrialization remains a strategic imperative for African states, its realization is consistently obstructed by a constellation of entrenched barriers. Chief among these is debt dependency, reinforced by conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and World Bank. In exchange for financial support, these institutions have historically demanded austerity, privatization, and trade liberalization, which have weakened state capacity, undermined national industries, and constrained public investment in infrastructure and innovation [Stiglitz 2002; Mkandawire 2005]. The prioritization of fiscal discipline over development has, in many cases, delayed or reversed industrial progress, locking countries into low-value commodity export models.

Another structural constraint is intra-African fragmentation, both economic and political[11]. The postcolonial legacy of arbitrary borders and externally imposed national frameworks has left African states isolated from each other economically, leading to small domestic markets, duplicative industrial policies, and weak cross-border infrastructure. This fragmentation hampers the formation of regional value chains (RVC) and limits the scalability needed for competitive industrial growth.

Equally problematic is political capture by domestic elites who are often aligned with external interests of Western neocolonial globalism. Many African political and business elites have historically served as intermediaries for foreign capital and influence, facilitating resource extraction and rent-seeking at the expense of national development strategies [Burgis 2015]. This alliance between comprador elites and multinational actors distorts policy agendas, undermines democratic accountability, and blocks structural transformation.

In such environments, industrialization is sidelined in favor of short-term gains tied to raw material exports and offshore finance. Overcoming these barriers requires a deliberate rejection of externally imposed models and the building of autonomous national development institutions. Only by reclaiming control over fiscal space, infrastructure investment, and strategic policymaking can African nations escape the institutional traps of underdevelopment and chart sovereign paths to industrial transformation.

POLICIES FOR RECLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INDUSTIALIZATION

Based on the analysis of barriers to industrial development and on identified weaknesses brought by the neoliberal governance in the last 30 years, in order to achieve sovereign industrialization, African states should adopt a decisive policy framework that prioritizes structural transformation, endogenous capacity-building, and insulation from exploitative external dependencies. *First and foremost*, fiscal and

[11] Mumbere D. Why African nations close borders: Nigeria, Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya, Eritrea. *AfricaNews*, 09.12.2019. https://africanews.com/2019/10/18/why-african-nations-close-borders-nigeria-sudan-rwanda-kenya-eritrea// (accessed: 22.07.2025)

monetary policy autonomy must be re-established[12]. African governments need to renegotiate debt structures, reject conditionalities that undermine domestic priorities, and mobilize domestic resources, through progressive taxation, public banking, and national savings schemes, to finance infrastructure, innovation, and industrial upgrading [Akyüz 2017].

Second, states must develop coherent national industrial policies and strategies that identify and support strategic sectors such as agro-processing, energy, pharmaceuticals, digital infrastructure, and light manufacturing. These strategies should be backed by targeted subsidies, public procurement, import substitution, and protective tariffs where appropriate. Lessons from East Asia highlight the importance of policy coherence, institutional capacity, and political will in implementing such long-term visions [Wade 2018; Chang 2002].

Third, technology transfer and local capacity-building must become central policy goals. This requires designing investment laws and trade agreements that mandate joint ventures, domestic content requirements, and compulsory licensing in key technologies. African universities, technical institutes, and research centers must be aligned with industrial policy objectives to generate a skilled workforce and innovation ecosystem [Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2020].

Fourth, alternative sovereign global and regional networks must be deepened and operationalized, going beyond tariff reductions to include industrial coordination, shared infrastructure projects, and new multipolar and regional development banks. Mobilizing domestic capital and South-South cooperation through BRICS+, NDB, and other alternative global and regional organizations offers a unique opportunity to create economies of scale and alternative GVCs and RVCs if implemented alongside synchronized investment in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure.

Finally, rebuilding state capacity and planning institutions, political accountability, and insulation from comprador elite capture are essential. Governments must reform a system of state financing, increase transparency, and empower domestic civil society to oversee industrial policy implementation. Applying Sovereign Economic Doctrine in strategic and operational plans and sovereign industrialization requires not only economic but also political transformation to ensure that development serves national interests rather than external or comprador elites [Burgis 2015; Degterev 2024]. *Table* 4 gives some examples of such policy levers:

The benefits of such transformation can be approximated by the forecast of job creation and quality of life increase (2025–2035) of up to a 1% annual rise in industrial output, by the author's estimates based on previous research. Beyond country-specific data, the cumulative projections for all 11 countries from *Table 2* combined show ~8.3–10.7 million total new jobs (direct + indirect) created and an additional ~35–45 million

[12] Escobar P. Russia's Sergey Glazyev Introduces the New Global Financial System. *Janata Weekly*. 24.04.2022. https://www.janataweekly.org/russias-sergey-glazyev-introduces-the-new-global-financial-system (accessed 26.08.2025)

people lifted out of poverty by 2035. Not only in jobs and productivity but also in dignity and equality, such as improved access to electricity by 20–30%[13] in rural areas and extended average life expectancy gains across countries[14].

Table 4. **Strategic Policy Levers Enhancing Impact**

Transformation Area	Policy Action
Monetary Sovereignty	Reform central banks, decouple from inflation-targeting orthodoxy, set up bilateral agreements for national currency trade [Akyüz 2017; Gadha et al. 2022]
National Industry Plans	Invest in industry, agro-tech, pharma, energy [Wade 2018; Chang 2002]
Technology and Skills	Enforce local R&D, vocational partnerships [Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2020]
Trade Sovereignty	Reorient from current GVC dependency to alternative RVC and GVC [Sumkoski 2024]
Sovereign Economic Development Doctrine	Sovereign economic & policy and strategy design and implementation [Ramose 2003; Chasi 2014]

Source: Compiled by the author

Now, the multipolar world and its key states provide real models and opportunities for such sovereign development [Dugin 2015]. Countries such as China and Russia provide to governments of African countries practical elements, models, and concrete support in the implementation of such sovereign economic models based on mutual economic benefits. Based on this vision and strategy, institutions such as BRICS+ and the New Development Bank (NDB) can help diagnose, analyze, and support practical operational areas of intervention and implementation of the structural elements of a nation's sovereign development. Unlike the World Bank and IMF, which are dominated by Western powers, BRICS+ members advocate multipolarity and respect for national sovereignty in global affairs and emphasize mutual cooperation, solidarity, and respect for different and varied development paths [Sumkoski 2022]. Hence, the assistance of BRICS+ and the NDB is of paramount importance to provide to existing and future states in order to meet their expectations and needs. It falls into several broad areas: diagnostics, recommendations, financing, transfer of best practices, and training provision.

[13] Africa Energy Outlook 2022. *IEA*. https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2022 (accessed 05.08.2025)

[14] Several long-term health studies (e.g., [Pritchett, Summers 1996; Renton, Wall, Lintott 2012; Bloom, Canning, Fink 2005; WHO/Europe 2019], show a "compound effect" multiplier of ~2x to 4x over 10–15 years in developing countries from sustained +1% annual industrial output growth.The basic elasticity underestimates the nonlinear, cumulative effects of industrial growth: it boosts tax revenues, enables infrastructure and healthcare spending, and improves access to care, sanitation, and education. Female employment increases child survival and family health investments.

For such an industrialization campaign to be successful, there is a need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to it, embedded in countries' National Development Strategies and other key development documents and visions encompassing cross-cutting and specific areas of the sovereign economic development. There is a need for capable institutions for the governance and administration of Sovereign Economic Development, that will design it and then implement it.

Then the focus will be on implementing through public and private investment policy and generation; developing sectoral economic policy; sovereign financial system for development; infrastructure development—transport, energy, communications; skills, know-how, and knowledge development; increasing productive and service capacity; micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) development; natural and mineral resources; trade and export promotion; marketing and branding; technology, innovations, digitalization, e-governance, blockchain, AI.

Outcomes of implementing a sovereign economic development for industrialization and development of a real economy in Africa depend heavily on designing and implementing fiscal sovereignty, effective industrial strategies, technology transfer, and regional integration to overcome historical structural limitations and neocolonial dependencies [Sumkoski 2024]. The risks are that without insulation from external conditionalities and elite capture, as well as without political accountability, benefits may be uneven, exacerbating inequalities despite GDP growth. Ultimately, historical and contemporary development theories and models agree on one fact: that without sovereign control over economic levers, resources, finance, and production, no genuine development is possible.

CONCLUSION

The post-independence era in Africa has largely failed to deliver on its promises of economic autonomy and industrial development. Despite formal sovereignty, most African economies remain structurally dependent on commodity exports, foreign aid, and Western-led development frameworks. While the decades of post-independence Soviet-assisted industrialization had shown significant results, the 1990s reintroduced the same exploitative Western neoliberal policies, this time under the banner of neocolonialism. This brought again about the straitjacket of cheap raw materials exports and lack of real economic development that would bring the countries on the continent into the category of developed nations.

However, now, in the current multipolar world, there are alternative paths to development, and all countries in Africa that suffered the most from the imposed underdevelopment by the globalist neoliberal institutions now have a possibility to engage in real sovereign economic development, industrialization, and development of real economic sectors, bringing benefit and welfare to their nations. The theoretical doctrines, practical strategies, and operational plans are now becoming available, and governments and institutions of the multipolar world could provide help towards achieving such development that will break the chains of the exploitative neoliberal globalist model.

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Научная статья

НА ПУТИ К ПОСТНЕОКОЛОНИАЛЬНОЙ ИНДУСТРИАЛИЗАЦИИ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОМУ СУВЕРЕНИТЕТУ АФРИКАНСКИХ СТРАН

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Аннотация. В данной статье исследуется стратегическая значимость суверенной индустриализации как инструмента преодоления структурного наследия неоколониальной эксплуатации и выхода африканских стран из состояния постоянно догоняющего развития. Африканский опыт показывает, что импортированные модели, основанные исключительно на дерегулировании и либерализации экономических отношений, не способны устранить коренные причины, лежащие в основе хозяйственной отсталости. Вместо этого они зачастую воспроизводят колониальную экономическую архитектуру, но уже под новыми идеологическими лозунгами. Анализируя взаимосвязь между теориями развития, эксплуататорским наследием неоколониализма и современными глобальными цепочками создания стоимости, ориентированными на экстракцию природных ресурсов, автор противопоставляет современное положение дел успехам прежнего подхода к экономическому развитию, реализовывавшегося при поддержке СССР, и приходит к выводу, что индустриализация, основанная на принципах суверенного экономического развития, национальной независимости и самоопределения, имеет решающее значение для реализации долгосрочного развития, выгодного для африканских народов, и противодействия западному экономическому доминированию.

В статье анализируются унаследованные от неолиберальной модели управления проблемы и способы преодоления препятствий на пути к промышленному росту. Предлагается новая, более суверенная модель экономической и промышленной политики. Утверждается, что без продуманной стратегии индустриализации, основанной на суверенном контроле над национальными ресурсами и производственными системами, африканские государства останутся в ловушке неоколониальной матрицы зависимости. Индустриализация – это не просто путь к росту ВВП; это основа для укрепления политического и экономического суверенитета государств Африки. Обновление подхода к суверенному экономическому росту, принятие новых идей развития правительствами африканских стран, а также поддержка ключевых стран и институтов многополярного миропорядка помогут африканским государствам вырваться из замкнутого круга внешнего господства и внутренней стагнации.

Ключевые слова: индустриализация, Африка, экономическое развитие, суверенная доктрина, неоколониализм, индустриализация, промышленная политика

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