Research article

UN AND REGIONAL ACTORS IN SOMALIA: A QUEST FOR NEW MODES OF INTERACTION

© 2025 S.A. Tishkov, I.K. Kharichkin

TISHKOV Sergey Aleksandrovich, PhD (Politics), Assistant Professor, Deputy Head, Department of Criminalistics and Preliminary Investigation in the Departments of Internal Affairs, Oryol Law Institute of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation named after V.V. Lukyanov, Oryol, Russian Federation. ORCID: 0000-0003-0406-0900. E-mail: stishkov@list.ru

KHARICHKIN Igor Konstantinovich, DrSc (Philosophy), Professor, Department of Political Science, Institute of International Relations and Social and Political Sciences, Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russian Federation. ORCID: 0000-0003-4478-0865. E-mail: igorkharichkin@yandex.ru

Abstract. Over the past decades, the security situation in Somalia has been a matter of global concern. Since 1991, Somalia has remained a virtually fragmented country with de facto no proper governance. A significant part of the country's territory, with the exception of, perhaps, only the northern regions, is subject to attacks by terrorist groups, while clan-militia groups are engaged in an armed confrontation for establishing their local control. Additional security threats are related to the "culture of violence" that has formed in the country over several decades, the massive proliferation of small arms, and border conflicts over territories and access to agricultural resources. The UN, AU, and sub-regional actors have taken a number of practical actions to resolve the internal conflict in the country and establish the national institutions that the people of Somalia need so urgently. The joint work of different peacekeeping actors in Somalia has taken the form of a "partner deployment." This made it possible to use the potential of regional organizations comprehensively, by separating the ground-based "forceful" actions of the AU peacekeepers, the EU's educational missions, and financial assistance from the UN and international donors. In these processes, the UN retained overall political leadership in the conflict settlement. The joint participation of the EU's and the AU's peacekeepers in solving problems with the local security forces' capacity increasing with the support of the UN may indicate an expanded model of "partner deployment" of UN peacekeepers with the two most significant regional actors. With the rise in the number of peacekeeping actors, it seems advisable to introduce a universal system for coordinating efforts within a single operation in order to adapt peacekeeping practices to the conditions of modern internal conflicts.

Keywords: UN, AU, EU, peacekeeping, partner deployment, parallel operations

Authors' contribution: Authors contributed equally both to the conduct of the study and the preparation of the paper.

Conflict of interest: The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2025-73-4-83-98

For citation: Tishkov S.A., Kharichkin I.K. (2025). UN and Regional Actors in Somalia: A Quest for New Modes of Interaction. *Journal of the Institute for African Studies*. Vol. 11. № 4. Pp. 83–98. https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2025-73-4-83-98

INTRODUCTION

The complex and interrelated problems of the 21st century's internal conflicts' resolution significantly exceed the individual capabilities of any peacekeeping actors—from individual states to the United Nations (UN) as the global international institution. Therefore, to make the peace efforts more effective, more thoughtful and coordinated actions are needed, which would make it possible to mobilize the full range of the multilateral peacekeeping system methods.

Analysis of international peacekeeping practices shows that, along with the UN, regional (continental) organizations, sub-regional communities, and coalitions of states (for example, stabilization forces with security mandates) are increasingly involved in the resolving of internal conflicts, as well as UN member states or other actors invited on a bilateral basis (for example, private military or security companies).

We agree with the Russian military expert V.N. Pivovar, who posits that "development of cooperation and joining the efforts of the UN with these actors can lead to more sustainable results, since their role in the modern world is becoming more and more noticeable" [Pivovar 2023: 408].

At the same time, we also share the point of view of the Russian researcher of peacekeeping N.N. Dimitrov, that "the system of methods of modern peacekeeping should have complexity, i.e., the expediency of combining various means and methods in the course of a single operation; sufficient compatibility, i.e., the possibility of parallel application of various methods; a certain logical sequence involving the use of methods depending on their hierarchy or the stage of the conflict" [Dimitrov 2008: 47]. In this case, we assume that a similar universality should be applied to the peacekeeping operations subjects.

This thesis can be illustrated by the example of Africa. The development of the resource and economic potential of the continent requires the achievement of complete security, resolution and prevention of armed conflicts, and neutralization of terrorist groups along with the causes for their emergence.

Creating comprehensive models of African security capable of adapting to the terrorism-related threats and to the emergence of new "instability zones" cannot be an easy task. In some cases (for example, in Somalia), the UN has been searching for many years for new forms of cooperation with regional and sub-regional partners in order to increase the effectiveness of stabilization efforts on the ground.

Currently, the academic literature describes several forms of joint activities of the UN peacekeepers with other international actors. The most frequently noted are *sequential deployment*, in which, as a rule, the operations of regional or coalition forces are reassigned to the UN[1], and *parallel deployment*, which involves the simultaneous

[1] According to the Russian expert in international relations A.A. Rubtsova, a positive example of this form of deployment is the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi, which "brought positive changes to the dire situation in the country" [Rubtsova 2016: 49].

operation in a country (region) of several peacekeeping actors performing similar, but not always identical, tasks.

Thus, the relevance of this article is conditioned by the necessity to analyze the forms of joint activities of peacekeeping actors in Africa, based on the needs of both individual countries, including Russia, and international organizations interested in the peaceful development of the region's states, the elimination of terrorist groups, and free access to the continent's resources and communications. This analysis can be carried out meaningfully on the example of the long-term process of the Somalia internal conflict resolution. The paper uses the method of comparative analysis and historical and system-functional approaches, which allowed us to come to reasonable conclusions.

A CRITICAL VIEW ON THE PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP IN AFRICA

Currently, some UN member states do not show initiative to resolve internal conflicts in unstable states due to the emergence of new security challenges connected with countering terrorism and violent extremism and to the fear of the loss of their peacekeeping personnel. This circumstance significantly weakens the potential of the UN peacekeeping response and requires a change in the formats of field operations.

In recent years, the activities of peacekeepers have increasingly been criticized by host states' elites, public and religious leaders. The host states' authorities indicate a low effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. In some cases, it is related to a lack of local population awareness about the mandate and duration of UN missions, the capabilities of peacekeepers, the limits of intervention, and the Rules of Engagement (RoE). Misunderstanding is intensified in cases where other regional or sub-regional operations, deployed both under the UN mandate and without it or attracted on a bilateral basis, operate simultaneously with UN peacekeepers on the host state territory.

It is important to note that the development of robust peacekeeping methods increases the likelihood of blurring the boundaries between mandates for the UN peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement operations. The emergence of new complex problems of peacekeeping has actualized the improvement of interaction forms and the development of new types of missions for various situations, including military action in support of peace and stability.

These problems have become an imperative for the search for new forms of UN interaction with national and international peacekeeping actors. For example, UN Secretary-General A. Guterres, in his report "Overall Effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," notes that "better coordination is also required with national or regional military operations, given that over the past decade, peacekeeping operations have often operated alongside regional, subregional or ad hoc security deployments with enforcement mandates."[2].

In addition, the UN Secretary General in the concept paper "A New Agenda for Peace" notes that in cases where peace enforcement is required, the UN Security Council (SC) should authorize the creation of a multinational force or allow coercive actions by

[2] Report by the Secretary-General on the overall performance of UN peacekeeping operations. S/2023/646. *UN*. 01.09.2023. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/248/31/pdf/n2324831.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2025)

regional and sub-regional organizations. He also called for the creation of "a new generation of peace enforcement missions and counter-terrorism operations, led by African partners with a Security Council mandate under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, with guaranteed funding from through contributions"[3].

It should be noted that in each region—and especially in Africa—the UN is trying to establish proactive partnerships outside the UN system and find the optimal form of peacekeeping intervention and force configuration, taking into account the potential of regional actors. As rightly noted by the Russian researcher of international relations S.A. Bokeria, the partnership with the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations provides the UN with opportunities to achieve this goal on the territory of the African continent [Bokeria 2022: 193].

UN-AU ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA: LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES

The traditional threats to Somalia's stability are weak governance, lack of social harmony due to low "culture of dialogue," a high terrorist threat related to the radicalization of the population, and the large-scale spread of various types of weapons, as well as border conflicts over territories and access to agricultural resources [Kabandula, Shaw 2018: 3].

In 1992–1995, the UN attempted to stabilize the situation in Somalia and consistently conducted two peacekeeping operations (UNSOM-I[4] and UNSOM-II[5]), which were curtailed and did not achieve the intended results in either the military or the humanitarian sphere [Shagalov 2005, Urnov 2022].

As a part of the internal conflict political settlement process, multilateral meetings and consultations were held to arrange a conference on national reconciliation. Even after the bloody attack by the armed formations of warlord M.F. Aidid on Pakistani peacekeepers, the staff of the small political group of the UN mission tried to establish peace through lengthy negotiations with the opposition, religious leaders, and elders [Tishkov 2011: 108]. Those efforts, unfortunately, did not lead to significant positive results. But even after the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, the UN demonstrated

[3] Our Common Agenda. Policy Brief 9. A New Agenda for Peace. *UN*. 2003. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf (accessed: 11.12.2025)

[4] United Nations Operation in Somalia-I (UNOSOM I, April 1992 – March 1993) was established by the UN SC Resolution № 751 (1992) to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers in the city. The approved strength of the "power" block of the mission was 4,269 military and security personnel, but in fact only 947 peacekeepers were deployed. The mission faced a number of challenges related to communication, coordination, and national contingent management. UN losses amounted to 6 soldiers. See: UNOSOM I. *UN*. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosomi.htm (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[5] United Nations Operation in Somalia-II (UNOSOM II, March 1993 – March 1995) was approved by UN SC Resolution No. 814 (1993) to take measures, including the necessary forceful actions, in order to create a safe environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. To this end, UNOSOM II was mandated to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the work to restore peace, stability, law and order initiated by the *Unified Task Force* (UNITAF). The maximum approved number of military and police personnel was 28 thousand people. UN casualties amounted to 154 people, including 149 military personnel, three civilian peacekeepers and two local employees. UNOSOM II. *UN*. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2facts.html (accessed: 07.11.2025)

political will and decided to maintain its presence in the country in the form of a special political mission.

In order to achieve progress in the political process, the UN SC authorized the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)[6], together with regional and international donors and other stakeholders, to implement measures to support the Djibouti Peace Agreement[7] to facilitate the coordination of international support for the reconstruction and training of the Somali Security Forces (SSF), including the armed forces, police, and justice institutions[8].

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General held the authority to coordinate all activities of the UN System in Somalia, to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to establish lasting peace and stability in Somalia, and to mobilize resources and support from the international community for both immediate recovery and long-term economic development[9]. Along with the political process support, the UN worked with different partners to develop new approaches to stabilizing the situation in Somalia, based on the division of responsibilities.

In this context, the initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to conduct a sub-regional peacekeeping mission in Somalia (IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia, IGASOM)[10] deserves some positive assessment. The mission was aimed at creating the conditions for the normal functioning of the national government, supporting large-scale political dialogue, and assisting Somali parties in the reform of the security forces and in demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants, as well as humanitarian operations.

Somali Islamists viewed the participation of IGAD in conflict resolution as an external intervention in support of one of the parties. This situation required political decisions at the level of the AU and the UN. In December 2006, the UN SC authorized IGAD and AU member states to establish a Protection and Training Mission in Somalia and partially lifted the embargo on arms, military equipment, technical training, and assistance intended solely to support peacekeeping forces[11].

In January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), given the high level of threats from Islamists, decided to deploy the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with a mandate to support the holding of a national reconciliation congress[12]. And in February

[6] The United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) functioned from 15.04.1995 until the expiration of its mandate on 03.06.2013.

[7] Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (*TFG*) and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (*ARS*). 19.08.2008. *UN Political Office for Somalia.* https://unpos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/080818%20-%20Djibouti%20Agreement.pdf (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[8] Political and Civil Affairs. *UN*. 09.01.2025. https://unpos.unmissions.org/political-and-civil-affairs-work-unpos (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[9] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1863. 16.01.2009. *UN*. https://docs.un.org/ru/S/RES/1863(2009) (accessed: 07.11.2024).

[10] Intergovernmental Organization for Development (IGAD). *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation* 15.06.2009. (In Russ.). https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/afrikanskie-organizacii/1733714/ (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[11] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1725. 06.12.2006. *UN*. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/588110?ln=en (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[12] Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council. 19.01.2007. PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX). *AU*. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf (accessed: 07.11.2025)

2007, the UN Security Council supported the AU's decision and requested to submit "a report to the Security Council within sixty (60) days of the adoption of this resolution with recommendations covering the UN's further engagement in support of peace and security in Somalia, as well as further recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction"[13].

Thus, we can talk about the UN plan to implement in Somalia a model of consistent deployment of AU and UN forces, giving regional forces a "temporary role" to halt the active conflict stage (as, for example, in the Burundi case[14]). The advantages of this model include the operational deployment of peacekeeping forces to stabilize the situation even in conditions when peace agreements have not been reached yet, as well as the possibility of a dialogue between regional peacekeepers and most of the conflicting parties [Khudaykulova 2023: 355].

Following the approval of the mandate of the African Union mission, the UN provided technical and operational guidance in the planning and deployment of the regional peacekeeping force [Shagalov 2011: 212]. However, international experts noted that Somalia lacks the security conditions necessary to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation [Blyth 2019: 3]. The UN's rejection to deploy its peacekeeping operation for security reasons can be seen as an attempt to transfer responsibility for the "coercive peace enforcement" and counter-terrorism operations to a regional actor. At the same time, the UN has assumed obligations to provide logistical support for the activities of African peacekeepers [Shagalov 2011: 12].

The mandate of AMISOM, in addition to maintaining internal security, contained functions of monitoring compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law, conducting investigations and informing the UN Security Council about violations committed against vulnerable groups of the population[15].

In 2020, the UN SC, noting certain positive results of African peacekeepers in countering terrorist groups, proposed to "present options to the Security Council on international support to the whole security environment in Somalia post 2021, including the role of the UN, AU and international partners"[16].

RECONFIGURATION OF THE AU PRESENCE IN SOMALIA

In 2022, the UN SC and the AU PSC supported the reconfiguration of AMISOM into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)[17]. It is appropriate to assume

[13] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1744. 20.02.2007. *UN*. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1744%20(2007) (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[14] When considering the lessons of UN-AU cooperation, it is possible to highlight the rather successful transformation of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB, April 2003 – May 2004) into the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, June 2004 – December 2006), authorized by the UN SC Resolution No. 1545 (2004). In this case, the African peacekeepers created a relatively favorable environment for the deployment and conduct of ONUB, which in UN circles is considered as one of the most successful missions of the XXI century [Rubtsova 2016: 49]

[15] Mandate: 2006 – 2007. *AMISOM*. 2022. https://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/ (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[16] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2520. 29.05.2020. UN. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2520(2020) (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[17] See: UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2628. 31.03.2022. *UN*. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2628(2022) (accessed: 07.11.2025); Communiqué of the 1068th Peace and Security Council meeting. PSC/PR/COMM.1068

that the transformation of AMISOM into ATMIS can be considered as an attempt to move towards a phased handover of security functions to national authorities. However, a critical analysis of AMISOM's results leads to the conclusion that the reconfiguration of the operation was also associated with the need to address a number of operational issues, including the difficulties of managing national contingents and implementing non-military mandate objectives, as well as undermining "internal legitimacy" due to unfounded expectations of the local population [Li 2025: 44].

ATMIS had quite large military and police contingents, and in January 2023, there was an increase in the staff of the mission's civilian component. The new strategic goals of ATMIS determined a few additional operational tasks, such as:

– development of the SSF potential with priority to their staffing and the development of operational skills (of the personnel – *Authors' Note*), provision of operational, material, and technical support (*military component*),

– development of the Somali police capacity to perform core functions throughout the country and assisting in countering violent extremism and social unrest through the development of community-based policing and other crime prevention strategies (*police component*),

– assistance in coordinating stabilization, reconciliation, and state-building activities (*civilian component*).

But even after the deployment of ATMIS, the UN retained its leading role in addressing key issues of political settlement and peacebuilding. Since 2013, the successor to UNPOS, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)[18], has been operating in Somalia. This mission was authorized to provide the Federal Government of Somalia and African peacekeepers with political recommendations on the revision of the constitutional framework; the reformation of public administration, military, and security sectors; the development of the federal system of Somalia; and the coordination of international donor support[19].

Through UNSOM, the UN moved to provide the AU mission and the local government with strategic-level political and expert advice in order to resolve the internal conflict and build a federal state. Thus, the UN emphasizes the role the regional actor and the responsibility of the national government for the situation in the country [Tishkov 2024: 138].

Additionally, the UN provides logistical support to African peacekeepers through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which has been operating since 2015. This mission replaced the UN Support Office for the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), established by UN SC Resolution No. 1863 (2009) to provide logistical

(2022). 08.03.2022. *AU Transition Mission in Somali*. https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/communique-for-the-1068th-meeting-on-atmis-mandate-8-march-2022.pdf (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[18] The UNSOM is a special political mission of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Its main goal was to help the Somali government achieve peace, stability and reconciliation. It worked closely with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union Transitional Force in Somalia and supported African partners.

[19] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2102. 02.05.2013. *UN*. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2102(2013) (accessed: 07.11.2025)

support for the full deployment of the AU mission and improve its operational efficiency[20].

The areas of the UN support to SSF were strictly limited. Funding was provided exclusively through voluntary contributions from Member States to the UNSOS-managed Trust Fund (the SSF Trust Fund). In the process of phasing out ATMIS, UNSOS participated in procedures for the handover of UN-owned Forward Operating Base (FOB)[21] equipment and infrastructure to the Federal Ministry of Defense of Somalia and facilitated the internal movement of African peacekeepers' troops and equipment.

UNSOS also provides administrative and logistical support to UNSOM, including office and accommodation facilities, food, water, transport, and medical services, as well as financial and personnel support.

Thus, we can talk about the emergence in Somalia of a new approach to interaction along the UN-AU axis, which can be called "partnership deployment," to "combine parallel international, national, and regional operations" [Nikitin 2016:24] to achieve a common goal.

We consider this term more fitting than that of "parallel deployment" proposed by a number of authors [Sherman, Sarfate, Dahir 2021], since in this case, it is the joint work and the UN support for the AU actions that make it possible for the actors of the peacebuilding process to make progress in restoring peace and stability in Somalia. At the same time, the partnership presupposes the existence of specific institutional formats (both at the level of permanent missions and at the level of field missions) and the formalization of relations. The institutionalization became possible due to the signing of the framework document on deepening partnership for peace and security in 2014, as well as mutual agreements at the level of the UN SC and the AU PSC [Zagorsky 2015:73].

According to S.A. Bokeria, the UN and AU structures are becoming increasingly interdependent [Bokeria 2022:193], and this model allows the partners to divide the tasks between themselves, to make use of the strengths, and neutralize the institutional weaknesses of the AU through projected funding and UN advice.

At the same time, it is undoubtedly too early to talk about an equal partnership between the UN and the AU, since the institutional and resource capabilities of these actors differ significantly. But the implementation of this approach allows us to take into account the initiatives of African countries to build new models of regional security, taking into account the specifics of African problems and the resources of African states in accordance with the principles of "African solutions to African problems." The implementation of this principle will ensure "a more nuanced understanding of the complex and shifting relationships between criminal, religious, terrorist and other formal and informal networks" and prevent "developing misguided policies based on a simplistic understanding of these fluid relationships and the reasons for people taking up arms against international interveners." [Karlsrud 2018: 15].

[20] UNSOS was established by the UN SC Resolution № 2245 of 09.11.2015. At present, the UNSOS activities are regulated by the UN SC Resolutions № 2628 (2022), № 2670 (2022) and № 2687 (2023).

[21] Situation in Somalia. Report of the Secretary-General S/2023/758. 13.10.2023. *UN Assistance Mission in Somalia*. https://unsom.unmissions.org/secretary-generals-reports (accessed: 08.11.2025)

It can be assumed that the UN will attempt to keep leadership in the political sphere and will increasingly be included in resource support for the regional forces' operations. An illustration of this thesis is the role of the UN in the transition process at the request of the Somali government from ATMIS to a new AU-led mission.

In August 2024, the AU PSC approved a new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and submitted to the UN Security Council a general concept of this mission. UN SC Resolution No. 2748 (2024) included the UN in the processes of planning the new mission; identifying mechanisms for its coordination with potential international donors; establishing benchmarks for measuring the progress on the ground; indicating the expected role of international actors in supporting Somalia, including the AU and the UN; and the formation of a comprehensive exit strategy in the future, which will be carried out by the UN in consultation with the AU[22].

In December 2024, the UN Security Council, noting that Somalia was "assuming progressively greater responsibility for its national security, including the Somali security forces taking over responsibilities from 7,000 drawn-down ATMIS forces since 2022 and taking over responsibility for over 24 Forward Operating Bases from ATMIS"[23], endorsed the decision of the AU PSC to establish the AUSSOM, which replaced ATMIS on 1 January 2025.

The UN Security Council authorized the AU member states participating in the operation "to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international law <…> and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to:

(a) support the FGS[24] to degrade Al-Shabaab[25] and affiliates linked to ISIL[26]/Da'esh, prioritise the protection of civilians in Somalia and provide protection to African Union and United Nations personnel, installations and assets;

(b) support further stabilisation in Somalia and enable state-building priorities, including through capacity building of the Somali security and police forces and the orderly transfer of security responsibilities to Somalia;

and, (c) contribute, in close coordination with humanitarian actors, to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance"[27].

EU PARTICIPATION IN THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESS

The African continent, with its population exceeding one and a half billion people and its mineral resources covering almost the entire "Mendeleev's periodic table" of elements, has been long attracting the attention of the European Union (EU), which is trying to establish itself as a global actor. That is why, within the framework of the

[22] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2748. 15.08.2024. *UN Assistance Mission in Somalia.* https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/resolution_2748_2024.pdf (accessed 14.12.2025)
[23] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2767. 27.12.2024. *UN.* https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2767(2024) (accessed: 07.11.2025)
[24] Federal Government of Somalia
[25] Somali terrorist group founded in 2004. Banned in Russia.
[26] Banned in Russia.
[27] Ibid.

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU conducts field operations to support international efforts to stabilize the situation in the crisis states of Africa, including Somalia.

"Swelling migration flows and the threats of terrorism and violent extremism have sharpened the attention of European policy makers to the potential role of UN peacekeeping operations and regional ad hoc coalitions as potential proxies that can help shore up European security" [Karlsrud 2018: 15].

According to the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa adopted by the European Parliament, the EU declares participation in regional peace processes in five priority areas: the creation of robust and accountable political structures in all countries of the region; assistance to the resolution and prevention of conflicts in cooperation with the states of the region and international organizations, especially the UN and AU; reducing regional security threats, including terrorism, piracy and irregular migration; promoting the economic growth of all countries and people in the region; supporting regional political and economic cooperation while bolstering the role of regional economic communities[28].

The mutual interest of the UN and the EU in cooperation in resolving internal conflicts in Africa is understandable. The EU's institutional capabilities allow it to provide a predictable and stable financial base for regional peacekeeping operations, as well as technologies and qualified military and civilian personnel, which the UN often lacks. Joint work with the UN allows to ensure the political and legal legitimacy of the presence of EU forces and specialists outside traditional area of responsibility (AoR). At the same time, the EU considers the UN as "the centrepiece of a norm-based world order anchored in multilateralism" [Major 2008].

The legal framework for the UN and the EU cooperation in crisis management was founded in September 2003 – June 2007. A mechanism for ongoing consultations in the form of a coordinating committee was formed for joint assessment of cooperation opportunities in planning, personnel training, and information exchange. Since 2013, a high-level political dialogue has been organized along the UN-EU axis, annual meetings of the UN Security Council and the EU Committee on Politics and Security; and regular meetings of the UN Secretary General with the EU High Representative for Security and Defense Policy were held [Zagorsky 2015:73]. The Russian researcher of European security problems D.O. Novikova notes that interaction along the UN-EU axis confirms the degree of development of the EU as "a subject of international security, including in such parameters as coherence, effectiveness and legitimacy of actions" [Novikova 2009: 88].

Considering the role of the EU in new formats of peacekeeping operations involving various institutional actors and international organizations, it should be noted that its participation can help reduce the shortage of financial and organizational resources that significantly limit the activity of African peacekeepers. At the same time, EU financial assistance increases the dependence of AU peacekeeping initiatives on an external donor, which has limited ability to control the efficiency of provided funds spending.

[28] Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, Council Conclusion. *Council of the EU.* 11.11.2011. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16858-2011-INIT/en/pdf (accessed: 21.01.2025)

For example, the EU's African Peace Facility (APF)[29] has been one of the main sponsors of the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia since its deployment in March 2007. In March 2021, the APF and the Athens Mechanism for support of the EU peacekeeping and training missions in Africa and the Mediterranean region were transformed into the European Peace Facility (EPF). The total budget of the fund for the period 2021–2027 is more than 17 billion Euros[30].

The establishment of the European Peace Fund allows the EU to fund sub-regional or EU member state operations in Africa directly. Thus, removing the AU from financial assistance distribution allows the EU to promote its own interests more effectively and use its strategic resources of influence in Africa in possible competition with the United States and China[31].

At the same time, A.V. Zagorsky correctly notes that expressing "readiness to continue supporting the formation of the Architecture of Peace and Security in Africa, the EU is simultaneously pushing the AU to search for alternative sources of financing and, above all, to increase the participation of African states in financing its peacekeeping activities" to the level of 5-10% of the total costs of a particular operation [Zagorsky 2015:75].

The EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia), in collaboration with federal and local governments, works in three directions: strengthening maritime police units in and around the four main Somali ports (Mogadishu, Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo); supporting the Somali coast guard and maritime security to develop the ocean economy; supporting, strengthening and reorganizing Somali police forces in coordination with EU-funded activities.

At the same time, a few researchers note that the EU mission in Somalia can be considered as a tool not only to counter pirates, Islamist groups, and illegal armed groups, but also—perhaps, to a greater extent—as a means of limiting unwanted Somali immigration to Europe [Skeppström, Hull Wiklund, Jonsson 2015]. Supporting this point of view, we would like to note that EU measures are mainly aimed at blocking illegal migration routes. They do not provide or create open and safe migration routes for the Somali population as recommended in the Valetta Action Plan. OXFAM analysts note

[29] European Peace Facility. *European Commission.* https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en (accessed: 08.12.2025)

[30] "In 2007, AMISOM had an authorized strength of 8,000 troops but only some 1,600 Ugandan troops actually deployed. The level of EU financial support to AMISOM at this stage therefore amounted to approximately €700,000 per month. By 2016, AMISOM had over 22,000 personnel and the cost to the EU was about €20 million per month. Most of this financial support was spent on troop allowances, but it was also used for other issues including death and disability compensation for AMISOM peacekeepers killed or wounded in action and indirect support costs such as supporting some AU personnel working on peace support operations in Addis Ababa and AMISOM offices in Nairobi and Mogadishu as well as with training". See: Williams P.D. Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation? *International Peace Institute Global Observatory.* 11.01.2017. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/ (accessed: 08.12.2025)

[31] Fabricius P. EU peace and security funds can now bypass the African Union. *Institute for Security Studies.* 05.02.2021. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eu-peace-and-security-funds-can-now-bypass-the-african-union (accessed: 08.10.2025)

that such restraining and restrictive measures can have negative consequences associated with the search and choice of migrants for more life-threatening routes[32].

The joint participation of the EU and AU in increasing the capacity of local SSF with the support of the UN may indicate an expanded model of "partnership deployment" of UN peacekeepers with the two most significant regional actors, in which an educational component plays an important role along with financial and logistical support.

The dynamics of the conflict and the high threat of piracy in the coastal waters of Somalia have actualized maritime security activities. Maritime piracy has become a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that poses a serious threat to Somalia's national security and has negative consequences for regional stability and international logistics routes. Among the factors that contributed to the growth of piracy, African researchers highlight geographical features (concentration of ships along a narrow trade route; features of the coastline that provide shelters for pirates), problems of public administration and socio-economic development of the country [Ehiane, Uwizeyimana 2023: 3128].

Given the lack of effectiveness of national security mechanisms, the EU, as an actor external to the UN system, was involved in fulfilling tasks in this area. According to the UN SC Resolution No. 1816 (2008)[33], since September 2008 the European Union has been conducting military coordination activities known as EU Naval Cooperation (EU NAVCO), which was later transformed into EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR). The EU provides personnel, ships, and technology[34] to carry out maritime security tasks in a wide geographical area that includes not only Somalia's coastal territory and its territorial and inland waters but also the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros.

A special report by the House of Lords noted that EU Operation "Atalanta" contributed to the fight against piracy, in particular in the protection of World Food Program vessels and ships supplying AU peacekeepers, as well as coordination with other maritime forces in the area. But it was noted that solving the problem of piracy is impossible without eliminating the root causes of the conflict in Somalia, building the capacity of national security forces, and providing humanitarian relief[35]. Eliminating piracy in the region requires addressing a range of challenges, including political instability and lack of good governance, extreme poverty, and lack of equal opportunities for economic growth [Karawita 2019: 23]. Additional efforts should be aimed at

[32] Kervyn E., Shilhav R. An emergency for whom? The EU emergency trust fund for Africa – migratory routes and development aid in Africa. *Oxfam International*. 15.11.2017. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/emergency-whom-eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa-migratory-routes-and-development-aid-africa (accessed: 08.10.2025)

[33] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1816. 02.06.2008. *UN*. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1816(2008) (accessed: 07.11.2025)

[34] Naval Force "Atalanta" typically comprises 1-2 Surface Combat Vessels, 1-2 Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircrafts, 1-2 Rotary Wings Aircrafts, 1 Unmanned Aerial System and 1 Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment. See: European Union Naval Force Somalia. Military Operation Atalanta. *EEAS*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-navfor-somalia/european-union-naval-force-somalia-military-operation-atalanta_und_en (accessed: 08.12.2025)

[35] Combating Somali Piracy: the EU's Naval Operation Atalanta. European Union Committee. *UK Parliament*. 2010. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/10304.htm (accessed: 08.12.2025)

synchronizing national legal frameworks with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to create models for effective law enforcement and combating piracy.

Performing specific security tasks in the declared AoR by the EU Naval Forces allows us to talk about a “parallel model” of the deployment of the EU navy with UN and AU operations in Somalia.

CONCLUSION

In the 21st century, international actors attempted to implement an integrated approach to utilize the peacekeeping potential of various actors in the long-standing internal conflict in Somalia resolution. In the face of criticism of the Western liberal-oriented model of internal conflict management, the UN is trying to adapt its practices to difficult conditions in Somalia to preserve and realize the benefits of a global organization, including the universality of mandates and expanded peacekeeping membership, many years of experience in cooperation with various types of missions and operations of other actors. Having suffered at the end of the 20th century failures to conduct its peacekeeping operations UNOSOM-I and UNOSOM-II in Somalia, the UN changed its form of presence in the country to a special field-based political mission.

The activities of global and regional (continental) peacekeeping actors in Somalia took the form of a “partnership deployment”, dividing the ground-based “enforcement” powers of the AU, the EU educational missions, and financial assistance from the UN and international donors under the common political leadership of the UN in the conflict resolution process. The fulfillment by the EU Naval Forces “Atalanta” of specific security tasks in the declared AoR allows us to speak of a “parallel” deployment of the EU navy with the UN and AU operations in Somalia.

In this situation, the UN must continue to adapt to the future changes in Somalia in order to maintain its comparative advantages, allowing it to reduce the political rivalry of various peacekeeping actors and the struggle for their own geopolitical interests of various international organizations, national states, as well as non-state actors. There is a gradual change in the format of UN operations for special political missions. At the same time, more and more emphasis is being placed on the regional organizations and regional economic communities, whose actions reinforce the efforts of the UN.

In cases similar to Somalia, when the military or paramilitary actions against terrorism or violent extremism are considered as a priority for the operations of regional, sub-regional, or coalition forces, the establishment of a peacekeeping mandate by a UN Security Council resolution or a regional security organization is a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force [Tishkov, Tishkova 2023: 445]. Under these conditions, new formats of interaction may make it possible to neutralize the growing dissatisfaction of African countries with UN peacekeeping approaches, which are largely perceived as a tool influenced by the West [Adu et al. 2023: 419]. Loss of authority and paralysis of UN actions narrows the range of peacekeeping tools [Richmond, Pogodda 2024]. The legitimization of the operations of the African Union by the decision of the UN Security Council makes it possible to solve the problem of adequate and systematic financing of AU missions from the funds of UN peace operations.

At the same time, this mechanism may have a number of unforeseen negative consequences associated with the loss of initiative and independence of the AU as a regional (continental) actor in decision-making when determining the mandate, scale, and timing of the operation, as well as a decrease in the efficiency of the deployment of peacekeeping forces in active phases of conflicts due to the use of UN bureaucratic procedures.

Therefore, in the context of the expansion of the number of actors in peacekeeping, it is advisable for the UN Security Council to introduce a universal system of coordination of efforts within a single operation in order to adapt peacekeeping practices to the conditions of long-term and often fragmented internal conflicts.

REFERENCES

Adu Ya.N., Bokeriya S.A., Degterev D.A., Mezyaev A.B., Shamarov P.V. (2022). Non-Western Peacekeeping as a Factor of a Multipolar World: Outlines of Research Program. *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations.* Vol. 23. № 3. Pp. 415–434. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2023-23-3-415-434

Blyth F. (2019). *Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM*. International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/2019/04/transitioning-to-national-forces-in-somalia (accessed: 15.11.2025)

Bøås M. (2015). Crime, Coping, and Resistance in the Mali-Sahel Periphery. *African Security.* Vol. 8. № 4. Pp. 299–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1100506

Bokeriya S.A. (2022). The UN - AU Partnership in Peacekeeping: Tendencies and Problems. *International Organisations Research Journal.* Vol. 17. № 2. Pp. 189–207. https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-08

Dimitrov N.N. (2008). International legal nature and essence of modern peacemaking. *State and Law.* № 8. Pp. 47–55. (In Russ.)

Ehiane S., Uwizeyimana D. (2023). Exploring Maritime Piracy and Somalia National Security. *International Journal of Membrane Science and Technology.* Vol. 10. № 2. Pp. 3128–3137. https://doi.org/10.15379/ijmst.v10i2.3068

Kabandula A., Shaw T. (2018). Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa: Conflicting Regionalisms. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 39. № 12. Pp. 2315–2333. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1527684

Karawita A.K. (2019). Piracy in Somalia: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by the International Community. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*. Vol. 23. № 2. Pp. 102–119. https://doi.org/ 10.22146/jsp.37855

Karlsrud J. (2018). From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. International Peacekeeping. *International peacekeeping.* Vol. 26. № 1. Pp. 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040

Khudaykulova A.V. (2023). Regionalization of Peacekeeping in Africa: The Case of the African Union. *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations.* Vol. 23. № 2. Pp. 339–357. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2023-23-2-339-357

Li L. (2025). Why Peacekeeping Operations Failed: Taking AMISOM as an Example. *Social Security and Administration Management.* Vol. 6. Pp. 41–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/socsam.2025.060106

Major C. (2008). *EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*. EU Institute for Security Studies. Occasional Paper № 72. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op-72.pdf (accessed: 15.11.2025)

Nikitin A.I. (2016). United Nations Peace Operations: Reconsidering the Principles, Reforming the Practice. *World Economy and International Relations.* Vol. 60. № 3. Pp. 16–26. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-3-16-26

Novikova D.O. (2009). *New tools for international crisis management: the experience of the European Union.* Moscow: MGIMO-University. (In Russ.)

Pivovar V.N. (2023). Regionalization of Modern Peacekeeping. *Megatrends of world politics: globalization, polarization, extremism.* Proceedings of the international conference. Moscow: MSLU. Pp. 404–411. (In Russ.)

Richmond O., Pogodda S. (2024). *Peacemaking and the Maintenance of International Order: Alignment under hegemony versus multipolar misalignment.* SSRN. http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4818749

Rubtsova A.A. (2016). UN Peacekeeping Campaigns: Successes and Failures. *European Science.* № 7(17). Pp. 48–50. (In Russ.)

Shagalov V.A. (2005). The Peace-Making Operation of the UN in Somalia in 1992-1995. *Proceedings of Kazan University. Humanities Series.* Vol. 147. № 1. Pp. 157–177. (In Russ.)

Shagalov V.A. (2011). The Civil War in Somalia and the Peacekeeping operation of African Union. *Proceedings of Kazan University. Humanities Series.* Vol. 153. № 1. Pp. 207–216. (In Russ.)

Sherman J., Sarfate A., Dahir I. (2021). The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Parallel Operations. *International Peace Institute.* https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Future-of-Peace-Operations-and-Parallel-Forces-js.pdf (accessed: 15.11.2025)

Skeppström E., Hull Wiklund C., Jonsson M. (2015). European Union Training Missions: Security Sector Reform or Counter-Insurgency by Proxy? *European Security.* Vol. 24. № 2. Pp. 353–367. https:// doi.org/10.1080/ 09662839.2014.972382

Tishkov S.A. (2011). *The Activities of UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions: Modern Paradigm, Imperatives of Improvement*. PhD (Politics) dissertation. Oryol. (In Russ.)

Tishkov S.A. (2024). Prospects for a New Somalia National Security Architecture. *Vostok (Oriens).* № 4. Pp. 135–146. (In Russ.). https://10.31696/S086919080029916-4

Tishkov S.A., Tishkova D.S. (2023). Parallel Operations as Realities of Modern Peacekeeping. *Megatrends of world politics: globalization, polarization, extremism.* Proceedings of the international conference. Moscow: MSLU. Pp. 443–449. (In Russ.)

Urnov A.Yu. (2022). USA Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of the Institute for African studies.* № 3(60). Pp. 6–25. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2022-60-3-6-25

Zagorsky A.V. (2015). *Peacekeeping and International Governance of Regional Security.* Moscow: IMEMO RAS. (In Russ.)

Научная статья

ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЕ ООН И РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ АКТОРОВ В СОМАЛИ: В ПОИСКЕ НОВЫХ МОДЕЛЕЙ

© 2025 С.А. Тишков, И.К. Харичкин

ТИШКОВ Сергей Александрович, кандидат политических наук, доцент, заместитель начальника кафедры, кафедра криминалистики и предварительного расследования в отделах внутренних дел, Орловский юридический институт Министерства внутренних дел России имени В.В. Лукьянова, Орел, Российская Федерация. ORCID: 0000-0003-0406-0900. E-mail: stishkov@list.ru

ХАРИЧКИН Игорь Константинович, доктор философских наук, профессор, кафедра политологии, Институт международных отношений и социально-политических наук, Московский государственный лингвистический университет, Москва, Российская Федерация. ORCID: 0000-0003-4478-0865. E-mail: igorkharichkin@yandex.ru

Аннотация. На протяжении последних десятилетий ситуация в сфере безопасности в Сомали вызывает озабоченность мирового сообщества. С 1991 г. Сомали остается практически фрагментированной страной, в которой фактически отсутствует должное государственное управление. Значительная часть национальной территории, за исключением северных районов, подвержена атакам террористических группировок, а военно-клановые организации ведут вооруженное противоборство за обеспечение своего контроля. Дополнительными угрозами в сфере безопасности являются сложившаяся десятилетиями «культура насилия», массовое распространение оружия, приграничные конфликты за территории и доступ к сельскохозяйственным ресурсам. Организация Объединенных Наций, Африканский союз, а также субрегиональные акторы предприняли ряд практических действий для урегулирования внутреннего конфликта и создания национальных институтов, в которых остро нуждался народ Сомали. Совместная работа акторов миротворчества приобрела форму «партнерского развертывания», что позволило комплексно использовать потенциал региональных организаций, разделив наземные «силовые» полномочия миротворцев Африканского союза (АС), образовательные миссии Европейского союза (ЕС) и финансовую помощь ООН и международных доноров, при сохранении за ООН общего политического лидерства в процессе урегулирования конфликта. Совместное участие миротворческих сил АС и ЕС в решении задач по повышению потенциала местных сил безопасности при поддержке ООН может говорить о расширенной модели «партнерского развертывания» миротворцев ООН с двумя наиболее весомыми региональными акторами. В условиях расширения количества акторов миротворчества представляется целесообразным ввести универсальную систему координации усилий в рамках одной операции, чтобы адаптировать миротворческие практики к условиям современных внутренних конфликтов.

Ключевые слова: ООН, АС, ЕС, миротворчество, партнерское развертывание, параллельные операции

Персональный вклад авторов: авторы внесли равнозначный вклад в разработку дизайна, проведение исследования и подготовку текста статьи.

Конфликт интересов: авторы заявляют об отсутствии конфликта интересов.

DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2025-73-4-83-98

Для цитирования: Тишков С.А., Харичкин И.К. Взаимодействие ООН и региональных акторов в Сомали: в поиске новых моделей. *Ученые записки Института Африки РАН*. 2025. Том 11. № 4. С. 83–98. https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2025-73-4-83-98