New and not so new strategies in promoting integrity with particular reference to Africa


Barry Rider


This article is focused on exploration not merely proposed developments in and refinements of the law and its administration, but the very significant role that financial intelligence can and should play in protecting our societies. It is the contention of the author that the intelligence community at large and in particular financial intelligence units have an important role to play in protecting our economies and ensuring confidence is maintained in our financial institutions and markets. In this article the author considers a number of issues pertinent to the advancement of integrity and in particular the interdiction of corruption to some degree from the perspective of Africa. The potential for Africa as a player in the world economy is enormous. So far, the ambiguous inheritance of rapacious empires and the turmoil of self-dealing elites in post-colonial times has successfully obscured and undermined this potential. Indeed, such has been the mismanagement, selfishness and importuning that many have grave doubts as to the ability of many states to achieve an ordered transition to what they could and should be. South Africa is perhaps the best example of a society that while avoiding the catastrophe that its recent past predicted, remains racked by corruption and mismanagement. That there is the will in many parts of the continent to further stability and security by addressing the cancer of corruption, the reality is that few have remained or been allowed to remain steadfast in their mission and all have been frustrated by political self-interest and lack of resources. The key might be education and inter-generational change as it has been in other parts of the world, but only an optimist would see this coming any time soon – there is too much vested interest inside and outside Africa in keeping things much as they are! The author focuses not so much on attempting to perfect the letter of the law, but rather on improving the ways in which we administer it.


Africa, fight with corruption, elite, economics, security, law, South Africa




1. See generally B. Rider (ed), International Financial Crime (2016) Elgar. “Most analysts now agree with the findings of the World bank that it is corruption that has been the ‘single greatest obstacle to economic and social development’.” J. Smith, M. Pieth and G. Jorge, U4 Brief (2007) No 2 CM1.
2. See Minutes, Commonwealth law Ministers’ Meeting, Colombo, Sri Lanka, February 1983 and B. Rider and D. Chaikin, Mutual assistance in criminal matters: a Commonwealth perspective (LMM (83) 29 and see also Minutes, Commonwealth law Ministers’Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1986. See also B. Rider, Editorial Comment, 3 Journal of Financial Crime (1995) 126.
3. See generally T. Kaiser and P. Merl (eds), Reputational Risk Management in Financial Institutions (2014) Risk Books and R. Saleuddin, “Reputation risk management on financial firms” 22 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2014) 287 and in particular N. Ryder, The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime – A perfect storm? (2014) Edward Elgar.
4. See B. Rider, C. Abrams and M. Ashe, Guide to Financial Services Regulation (3rd Ed, 1997) CCH, Ch 1.
5. See generally, W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, (2000), Butterworths and H. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (4th Ed), Oxford, K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed) (1998), Oxford, Pt 111, S. Frommel and B. Rider (eds), Conflicting Legal Cultures in Commercial Arbitration (1999), Kluwer, B. Rider, Law at the Centre (1999), Kluwer and B. Rider, Y. Tajima and F. Macmillan (eds) Commercial Law in a Global Context (1998), Kluwer
6. See B. Rider, K. Alexander, S. Bazley and J. Bryant, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing, (2016) Bloomsbury.
7. See generally B. Rider and T.M. Ashe, The Fiduciary, the Insider and the Conflict, (1995), Sweet and Maxwell and from a comparative perspective, C. Nakajima and E. Sheffield, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls (2002), Butterworths.
8. B. Rider (ed), Corruption – The Enemy Within (1997) Kluwer
9. See D. Chaikin and J. Sharman, Corruption and Money Laundering – a Symbiotic Relationship (2009) Palgrave and more generally B. Rider and M. Ashe (eds), Money Laundering Control (1996), Sweet & Maxwell and B. Rider “The wages of sin – taking the profit out of corruption – a British perspective” (1995) Dickinson Journal of International Law 391. It is also worth noting that in many jurisdictions the control of insider dealing is often associated in time and in legislation with money laundering, see B. Rider, “The Control of Insider Trading – smoke and mirrors!” 1 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal (1999) 271. See also B. Rider, “The practical and legal aspects of interdicting the flow of dirty money” 3 Journal of Financial Crime (1996) 234.
10. See for a discussion of differing attitudes to such integrity related issues B. Rider and H.L. Ffrench, The Regulation of Insider Trading (1979) Macmillan and B. Rider, “Policing Corruption and Economic Crime – how can we do it better?” (2015) Frontiers of Law, issue 4. See also S. Press, Rogue Empires, Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s Scramble for Africa, (2017), Harvard University Press.
11. For a discussion of the institutional aspects see B. Rider, The Promotion and Development of International Co-operation to Combat Commercial and Economic Crime(1980) Commonwealth Secretariat, London, B. Rider, “Combating International Commercial Crime,” (1985) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 217; B. Rider, “Policing the City – combating fraud and other abuses in the corporate securities industry” 41 Current Legal Problems (1988) 47 and B. Rider ‘Blindman’s Bluff – A model for securities regulation’ in J. Norton and M. Andenas (eds) Emerging Financial Markets and the Role of International Financial Organisations (1996) Kluwer.
12. A communique setting out a common approach to tackling corruption, as agreed by participating countries and, where appropriate, international organisations. Published: 12 May 2016, UK Cabinet Office as Part of The Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 Government transparency and accountability hosted by Prime Minister David Cameron MP. See generally L. Cockcroft, Global Corruption, money, power and ethics in the Modern World, (2014) Tauris.
13. See B. Rider “Probing Probity; A discourse on the dark side of development’ in S. Schlemmer-Schulte and K. Tung, International Finance and Development Law (2000), Kluwer and in regard to the similar issues that arise in regard to insider abuse, B. Rider and M. Ashe, Insider Crime (1993) Jordans and B. Rider ‘The control of insider trading: smoke and mirrors’ in E. Lederman and R. Shapira, Law, Information and Information Technology (2001) Kluwer.
14. For an excellent discussion of this see M. Levi, The Phantom Capitalists (2008 ed), Ashgate.
15. L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and how the Bankers use it (1914), Harpers, Ch 5.
16. Much has been written on the ‘reaction’ to corruption in Africa not least in the Journal of Financial Crime and Journal of Money Laundering Control of which the present author is general editor, but see in particular W. Adebanwi, A Paradise for Maggots (2010), Wale Abedanwi. See also J. Sharman, The Despot’s Guide to Wealth Management (2017) Cornell and C. Gpredema, “Measuring Money Laundering in Southern Africa” 14 African Security Review (2005) No 4.
17. R. Chan, D. Ho, A. Lau and A Young, “Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China’s company directors: Findings from a empirical research” (2013) 34 The Company Lawyer 146. See also B. Rider, H. Yan and Li Hong Xing, The Prevention and Control of International Financial Crime (2010) China Financial Publishing House, Chs 1 and 2.
18. See B. Rider, “Islamic Financial Law; Back to Basics” in The Changing Landscape of Islamic Finance (2010) IFSB, Ch 5.
19. For a discussion of similar issues in Shar’ah see B. Rider, “Corporate Governance for Institutions offering Islamic Finance” in C. Nethercott and D. Eisenberg (eds) Islamic Finance, Law and Practice (2012) Oxford University Press and B. Rider and C. Nakajima, “Corporate Governance and Supervision” in S. Archer and R. Karim (eds), Islamic Finance – The Regulatory Challenge (2007) Wiley Finance; C. Nakajima, “Responsible business” 20 Journal of Financial Crime (2013) 256 and C. Nakajima, “The importance of legally imbedding corporate social responsibility” 32 The Company Lawyer (2011) 257
20. “Russia ranks first in use of death penalty” Los Angeles Times 5 February 1972. China regularly uses the death penalty for serious cases of economic crime, but see B. Rider “A tale of two cities” 19 Journal of Financial Crime (2012) 4 and B. Rider “When Chinese whispers become shouts” 20 Journal of Financial Crime (2013) 136. See also B. Rider, Organized Economic Crime (In Chinese) (1999), Peking University Law Journal, 1-128
21. See E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1949) Dryden Press; E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime: the Uncut Version (1983) Yale and E. Sutherland, “Is White Collar Crime Crime?” 10 American Sociological Review (1945) 132. See also N. Shover and J. Wright,
Crimes of Privilege (2001) Oxford, in particular Ch 1 and E. Soltes, Why they do it – inside the mind of the white collar criminal (2016), Public Affairs and B. Rider, “The Wages of Sin – Taking the Profit Out of Corruption – A British Perspective,” (1995) 13 Dickinson Journal of International Law, 391 in regard to motive.
22. See for a perspective on this issue, Siti Faridah Abdul Jabbar, “Corruption: delving into the muddy water through the lens of Islam” 20 Journal of Financial Crime 139 and B. Rider “Back to Basics” in The Changing Landscape of Islamic Finance – imminent challenges and future directions (2010), supra, and also in Strategies for the Development of Islamic Capital Markets (2011) Asian Development Bank and IFSB in Ch 3.
23. See B. Rider and H. Ffrench, “Should Insider Trading be Regulated? Some initial considerations” 95 South African Law Journal (1978) 79 and B. Rider “Insider Trading – A crime of our times” in D. Kingsford Smith (ed), Current Developments in Banking and Finance (1989) Stevens
24. See Jamaican Bar Association v. The Attorney General of Jamaica (2017) JMFC 2 and B. Rider, “A privilege or a curse!” Editorial Comment (fourth coming) Journal of Financial Crime (2017).
25. United Nations Convention Against Corruption was adopted by resolution 58/4 of the UN General Assembly 31 October 2003 and came into force on 14 December 2005.
26. See generally L. Thompson, A History of South Africa (4th Ed) Yale University Press. A similar fate has befallen a number of initiatives in South Africa.
27. Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid (1994) 1 All ER 1
28. Report of the Fraud Trial Committee (1986) HMSO para 1. See also B. Rider, “Combatting International Commercial Crime” (1985) Lloyds MCLQ 217 and B. Rider “Policing the International Financial Markets” in C.Lye and R.Lazar (eds) The Regulation of Financial and Capital Markets (1990) Singapore Academy of Law and B. Rider, “Policing the International Financial Markets – an English Perspective” XVl Brooklyn Journal of International Law (1990) 179.
29. It is reported that of some 81,631 reports of suspected fraud by businesses in London in 2013 to 2014 there were only 9 successful convictions. Of some 103,000 suspected cases of business related crime only 758 were considered solvable by the police, H. Warrell, “Police urged to crack down on business crime” Financial Times 23 July 2014. The UK police also fail to identify a suspect in three quarters of property related crimes, R. Ford, Times July 18 2014 albeit the Homes Secretary asserts “criminal gangs are running swathes of Britain” R. Ford, Times 12 June 2014. Perhaps even more disturbingly it is arguable that only 2 per cent of computer related crime is actually reported and less than 0.5 per cent of this figure results in official investigation.
30. See B. Rider “Intelligent investigations: the use and misuse of intelligence – a personal perspective” 20 Journal of Financial Crime (2013) 293. See also S. Keene, Threat Finance, Disconnecting the Lifeline of Organised Crime and Terrorism (2012) Gower. See generally K. Hinterseer, Criminal Finance, the political economy of money laundering in a comparative context, (2002) Kluwer.
31. The Conservative Party in its recent manifesto for the general election in June 2017 proposed the amalgamation of the SFO with the National Crime Authority.
32. See B. Rider “Civilising the Law – the use of civil and administrative proceedings to enforce financial services law” 3 Journal of Financial Crime (1995) 11 and in particular, S. Bazley, Market Abuse Enforcement: Practice and Procedure (2013) Bloomsbury Professional.
33. For example, Nanus Asia Co v. Standard Chartered Bank (1990) 1 HKLR 396. However, the Hong Kong courts, as have most common law jurisdictions, have been prepared to recognise and support in rem orders by US courts in regard to proceeds of crime and see in particular in regard to freezing orders USA v. Abacha (2014) All ER (D) 56. In this case Field J. stated “corruption, like other types of fraud, is a global problem and it and its consequences are only going to be dealt with effectively if there is co-operation and assistance not only between the governments of states but also between the courts of different national jurisdictions.” See also Republic of Hati v. Duvalier (1989) 1 ALL ER 456 where Staughton LJ observed – “this case demands international co-operation between all nations”. Another important example is Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan (2003) All ER (D) 150.
34. See K. Stephenson et al, Barriers to Asset Recovery, Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (2011) World Bank and UNODC and B. Rider “Pursing Corruption – civil weapons: old law in new bottles!” in Legal Studies in the Global Era, Legal Issues beyond the Boarders (2010) Chuo University Press.
35. See B. Rider, “The limits of the law: An analysis of the inter-relationship of the criminal and civil law in the control of money laundering” 25 Journal of Juridical Science (2000) 1.
36.See supra at n. 7, and in particular Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver (1967) 2 AC 134, and generally R. Pearce, J. Stevens and W. Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th Ed) Oxford University Press, Pt V and A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2011) Oxford University Press, Ch 26.
37. See for example of B. Rider “The regulation of insider trading in the Republic of the Philippines” 19 Malaya Law Review (1977) 355; B. Rider, “The regulation of Insider trading in the Republic of South Africa,” (1977) 94 South African Law Journal 437 and see also in the context of China, B. Rider, Y. Haiting and Li Hong Xing, The Prevention and Control of International Crime (2010), China Finance.
38. Sumitomo Bank Ltd v. Karitika Ratna Thahir (1993) 1 SLR 735. See also M. Ashe and B. Rider, The International Tracing of Assets (2000) FT Law and Tax.
39. See FHR European Ventures LLP v. Cedar Capital Partners (2014) UKSC 45, noted B. Rider, “A simple approach to justice” 21 Journal of Financial Crime (2014) 379 and Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Reid (1994) 1 All ER 1 contra Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v. Versailles Trade and Finance Ltd (2011) 3 WLR 1153. See also B. Rider, Old Weapons for New Battles, (2009) Centre of Anti-Corruption Studies, ICAC, Hong Kong and B. Rider, “Corruption –The Sharp end of Governance” in S.Ali (ed), Risky Business, Perspectives on Corporate Misconduct (2010), Caribbean Law Publishing Co. for these developments in context.
40. See Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v. Craddock (No 3) (1968) 1 WLR 1555, Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v. A (2001) 3 All ER 58 and Armstrong DLW Gmbh v. Winnington Networks Ltd (2012) 3 All ER 425.
41. Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson (1992) 2 All ER 451
42. Finers v. Miro (1991) 1 WLR 35. Of course, this has implications for those who handle and advise on the handling of other people’s wealth in the ordinary course of their business, see for example, the Bank of Scotland case cited at n.31, Shah v. HSBC (2010) All ER 477 and B. Rider, “When risk becomes reality” 13 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2010) 313 and on the dilemmas faced by financial institutions B. Rider Compliance, An International Perspective on some of the challenges facing global compliance today (2014) Occasional Paper 72, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
43. Another issue relevant to the discussion is the standard of culpability that is considered acceptable for the imposition of responsibility in the criminal law. An example of this is the discussion that has surrounded the creation of a new offence for senior managers of relevant financial institutions in the UK whose reckless decisions result in the failure of the institution, section 36 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. Similar concerns have manifested themselves in the law relating to directors duties in the civil law, see B. Rider “Amiable Lunatics and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle” 37 Cambridge Law Journal (1978) 270. On the issue of attribution of responsibility see Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No2) (1995) 1AC 456 and Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v. Securities Commission (1995) 2 AC 500 and Labour’s Policy Review: Tackling Serious Fraud and White Collar Crime (2013), Labour. It is also important to note the wide range of provisions in law and regulatory systems that may be more or less relevant on the facts of a particular case – see generally, C. King and C. Walker (eds), Dirty Assets, emerging issues in the regulation of criminal and terrorist assets, (2014), Palgrave and W. Blair, R. Brent and T. Grant, Banks and Financial Crime – the international law of tainted money, (2017) Oxford.
44. The UK National Audit Office estimated in the UK confiscation of criminal assets was no more than 26 pence in every £ 100 of criminal property and that in only two per cent of cases is the fill amount of the confiscation order actually collected, NAO Confiscation Orders, 17 December 2013. See also Report of the House of Common’s Committee of Public Accounts, Confiscation Orders, 21 March 2014, SO and Proceeds of Crime, Home Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2016-2017, House of Commons. See also B. Rider “Taking the Profit out of Crime” in B. Rider and M. Ashe (eds), Money Laundering Control (1996) Sweet & Maxwell and B. Rider, “Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption” 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2007) 5 particularly p 26 et seq and A. Kennedy, “An evaluation of the recovery of criminal proceeds in the UK” 10 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2007) 33. Perhaps even more alarming is that not with standing over 350,000 suspicion based reports to the authorities in the UK in 2015 only 7 bank accounts were actually blocked. See generally UK National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance (2015), UK Treasury and Home Office. See also P. Alldridge, What went wrong with money laundering law? (2016) Palgrave andM. Levi, P. Reuter and T. Halliday, “Can the AML system be evaluated without better data” (fourth coming) Crime, Law and Social Change (2018).
45. See A. Leong, The Disruption of International Organised Crime (2007) Ashgate and supra at n 18. See also B. Rider “The Enterprise of Crime” in B. Rider and M. Ashe (eds), Money Laundering Control (1996) Sweet & Maxwell.
46. Bribery Act 2010 section 13. See also on this R (on the application of Corner House Research) v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office (BAE Systems plc, interested party) (2008) EWHC 714 and (2008) UKHL 60 in regard to the legality of halting corruption related investigations and proceedings on the basis of national security, and see R. Norton-Taylor and R. Evans, ‘No national security issue says agency’, the Guardian 16 January 2007 and M. Evans et al in the Times 17 January 2007.
47. In R. v. Innospec Ltd, 26th March 2010, Southwark Crown Court) Lord Justice Thomas censured the SFO for failing to adhere to the rule of law. In his remarks on sentencing the learned judge stated ‘it is clear that the SFO cannot enter into an agreement under the laws of England with an offender as to the penalty in respect of the offence charged’. He emphasized that such deals had no effect and, indeed, in a subsequent case Bean J. specifically rejected the recommendation of the SFO for a suspended sentence on the basis that the accused had co-operated fully and had done a ‘deal’ with the UK and US authorities. Thomas LJ considered that a traditional fine was the appropriate financial penalty and emphasized that there should be no difference, given the seriousness of the offence of corruption, between the UK and USA. In previous cases the SFO had settled a much smaller financial penalty than the millions imposed, albeit also by settlement, in the USA. Thomas LJ thought that ‘if the penalties in one state are lower than in another, businesses in the state with lower penalties will not be deterred so effectively from engaging in corruption in foreign states whilst businesses in states where the penalties are higher may complain that they are disadvantaged in foreign states’. He also noted the very considerable fines that were imposed for in cases involving allegations of wrongdoing under competition law and made the point that corruption could have an even more serious impact on trade and business. He was not impressed by the argument that the SFO and US has brokered their deal because they did not want to put the business out of business. In his opinion if the business was corrupt it should be sanctioned. Indeed, Thomas LJ stated that it was improper for the SFO to try and do deals with the American authorities. See C.Nakajima, “Maybey may be the bridge we need,” 19 Journal of Financial Crime (2012) 124.
48. Deferred Prosecution Agreements are now authorized pursuant to Schedule 17, Crime and Courts Act 2013 and See Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice, 2013, Serious Fraud Office and Crown Prosecution Service. A recent example of the efficacy of this ‘device’ is the prosecution agreement relating to Tesco Stores in the UK, under which the company ‘agreed’ to pay a fine of £ 129 million (Southwark Crown Court, Monday 10th April 2017)
49. The practical importance of whistle blowing in South Africa was emphasized by Corruption Watch in its Annual Report 2016, Issue 1. Note also the importance of this topic, 35th Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime (2017) University of Cambridge, Jesus College, September 2017.
50. The present author has long advocated this as a potentially important strategy, see for example, B. Rider, “Commercial Crime Co-operation in the Commonwealth” (1983) in the published papers of the 7th Commonwealth Law Conference (Hong Kong) at 433 and in particular, B. Rider and M. Ashe (Eds), Money Laundering Control (1996) Sweet & Maxwell. As an investigative tool in combating insider abuse see B.Rider, The Unacceptable Insider (1987) Legal Research Foundation (New Zealand) and B. Rider, “Policing the City – Combating Fraud and other Abuses in the Corporate Securities Industry,” (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 47
51. Article 20 provides “subject to its constitution …each state party shall consider adopting such legislation and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is a significant increase in the asserts of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.” There are of course different issues here. There is the ability to use intelligence to identify unexplained and possibly suspicious wealth. Then the ability of those with a legitimate interest to demand, under penalty, details of ownership and control. Finally, there is the issue of interdiction – which might involve separate offence based on unjust enrichment or confiscation and taxing.
52. See for example J. Boles, “Criminalising the Problem of Unexplained Wealth: Illicit Enrichment Offences and Human Rights Violations,” 17 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy (2014) No 4. See also for various perspectives, Unexplained Wealth Orders: thoughts on scope and effect in the UK, Briefing Papers (January 2017), The White Collar Crime Centre (UK).
53. The UK’s Criminal Finances Act 2017 also seeks, among other things, to improve the operation of seizure and forfeiture laws particularly in regard to cash; reform the regime for suspicious activity reports and information sharing.
54. See B. Rider “Intelligent Investigations: The use and misuse of intelligence – a personal perspective,” 20 Journal of Financial Crime (2013) 293 and see also B. Rider, “Financial Crime – a thoroughly modern crime,” 1 Financial Crime Review (2000) 2 and
“Policing the international financial markets: An English Perspective,” (1990) XVI Brooklyn Journal of International Law 179
55. See R. Blum and M. Ricks, “ Political Intelligence Agencies acting against Organised International Economic Crime,” 4 Journal of Financial Crime (1996) 17 and B. Rider, The role of ICPO-Interpol in promoting international cooperation in combating serious international crime (1980) pp. 80, Report to Commonwealth Law Ministers. But see also
B. Rider “The war on Terror and Crime and the Offshore Centres: The New Perspective” in D. Masciandaro (ed), Global Financial Crime (2004) Ashgate.
56. See B. Rider, Report on Commercial Crime in Hong Kong with recommendations for the establishment of a Commercial Crime Unit within the Legal Department of the Hong Kong Government and the creation of a specialised unit within the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (1980), pp. 320; B. Rider, Report to the Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and Central Intelligence Organisation of Zimbabwe, on the destabilisation and the establishment of a specialised agency (1986), pp.210, Overseas Development Administration UK; B. Rider and D. Phillips, Report to the President of Ghana on economic destabilisation and the establishment of a Public Conduct Inspectorate (1988), pp. 112; B. Rider, Report to the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago on destabilisation, economic and political security (1988), pp. 260; B. Rider,The Prevention and Control of Corruption, Report to the Government of Mozambique and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) (1994), pp. 130 and B. Rider, Report on Organised Crime in the U.K., Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons (1993 and 1994), pp. 220.
57. See also in regard to ‘chop’ and other systems B. Rider, “Fei Ch’ien Laundries – The Pursuit of Flying Money,” 1 Journal of International Planning (1992) August and December and B. Rider, Organized Crime in Hong Kong, Focus on Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture (1993) and B. Rider, “The Financial World at Risk,” (1993) Managerial Auditing Journal No. 7.
58. See generally F. Schneider, The Economics of the Hidden Economy (Vols 1 and 11) (2008) Elgar. See also N. Shaxson, Treasure Islands (2012) Vintage and R. Murphy, Dirty Secrets (2017) Verso.
59. See generally S. Platt, Criminal Capital, (2015) Palgrave.
60. See G20 High Principles on beneficial ownership (16 November 2014), but see B. Rider, “The end of havens?” 12 Journal of Money Laundering Control (2009) 213. English judges have also done their bit – see B. Rider, “Exposing the modesty of companies” 34 The Company Lawyer (2013) 263. See also B. Rider, “Rumblings in the Corporate Jungle” 36 The Company Lawyer (2015) 33.
61. The UK Government in the context of implementing the EU Fourth Money Laundering Directive 2015/849EU promulgated the People with Significant Control (Amendment) Regulations 2017. This instituted a public register of beneficial ownership and in collaboration with UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies has established a network of agreements which require effective disclosure and recording of beneficial ownership of companies, by the end of 2017, and the UK’s authorities will have access to this on a real time basis. In Europe the ‘systematic exchange’ of beneficial ownership established by the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain now extends to over 50 jurisdictions and covers trusts and other entities as well as companies.
62. See n 61, supra.
63. For an interesting panorama see M. Meredith, The State of Africa (2013) Simon & Schuster, particularly Pt 1V.
64. See S.C. Wanjala, Fighting Corruption in Africa: Mission Impossible? (2012) IACS and see BBC, No progress on African corruption says watchdog (27 January 2016). However, also note CGD (2015), Unintended consequences of anti-money laundering policies for poor countries,