Author:
Emmanuel Oladipo Ojo, William Abiodun Duyile
Abstract:
Nigeria and Botswana are famous for their sobriquets – while the former is often regarded as the ‘giant of Africa’; the latter is renowned as ‘Africa’s success story’, ‘African miracle’ and ‘Africa’s bastion of democracy’. This paper examines the fortunes of democracy in both countries with particular reference to the delivery of socio-economic and political goods. We argue that the delivery of socio-economic goods to Nigerians is almost exactly nil and that the country’s hybrid and militician democracy is a tragedy. On the other hand, we argue that although comparatively it still delivers substantial democratic gains, Botswana’s once ‘pure’ democracy is regressing particularly with regard to perpetual one party rule, ‘presidential strongman’ and growing inequality among others. We conclude that demographically and in ‘big brotherliness’, Nigeria qualifies as the ‘giant of Africa’ but with reference to qualitative governance, socio-economic development, functional institutions and delivery of the gains of democracy, Nigeria is a crippled giant and an eminent member of the committee of ‘failed democracies’. Its democratic regression in some core areas notwithstanding, relative to the ‘giant of Africa’ and other African states, Botswana still tolerably qualifies as ‘Africa’s success story’. The study relied on documentary data subjected to internal and external criticisms as well as textual and contextual analysis.
Keywords:
Nigeria, Botswana, development, economy, corruption, resources
DOI:
10.31132/2412-5717-2020-50-2-30-50
References:
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2. Some scholars and commentators have over-estimated the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria. For example, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2000, p. 90 puts the number of Nigeria’s ethnic groups at 374. Also, Otite estimates that Nigeria has a total of 389 ethnic groups while a Federal Government publication puts the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria at between 250 and 400. See Onigu Otite, Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria, Ibadan: SHANESON. C.I. Limited, 2000, pp. 221-231 and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Diversities, Lagos: Government Printer, 1987, pp. 19-20. Indeed, in an article in the Vanguard of 30 March 2017 entitled “full list of all 371 tribes in Nigeria, states where they originate”, Kunle Sowunmi opined that there were 371 ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Whatever the number of Nigeria’s ethnic groups, one incontrovertible fact is that three out of the lot – the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba – are the majorities while the rest, in varying degrees, constitute the minorities.
3. The term ‘national question’ typically refers to issues relating to the composition and configuration of the Nigerian society, particularly the geographical and demographical imbalance amongst its diverse ethnic groups. In a bid to initiate and safeguard its economic and political interests, the British colonial administration fashioned a geographically and demographically imbalanced Nigerian nation and foisted a fractured federation on Nigerian peoples, particularly the minorities. On the eve of independence, the Federation of Nigeria consisted of three regions – North, East and West. Geographically, the Northern Region was three times larger than the Eastern and Western Regions put together as it accounted for 79% of the total geographic area compared with Western Nigeria’s 8.5% and Eastern Nigeria’s 8.3%. Demographically, till date, well over 50% of the country’s population is said to be in Northern Nigeria. See Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Minority Groups: Bridgeheads in Nigerian Politics, 1950s – 1964” in Uyilawa Usuanlele and Bonny Ibhawoh (eds.), Minority Rights and the National Question in Nigeria, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 61–84.
4. Jane Parez, “Is Botswana a Model for Democracies in Africa?”, New York Times, 16 May 1990.
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6. Jerry Sampson, History of Botswana, Abidjan: Sonit Education Academy, 2016, p. 1.
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7. Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Minority Groups: Bridgeheads in Nigerian Politics, 1950s – 1964”, p. 62.
8. Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, Suffolk: James Curry & Jacana Media, 2008, p. 4.
9. For details see, Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, London: Longman, 1967; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies, London: Longman, 1977 and Joseph P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
10. See, among others, U.D. Anyanwu and J.C.U. Aguwa (eds.), The Igbo and Tradition of Politics, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1993; Salome Nnoroviele, The Way People Live – Life Among the Ibo Women of Nigeria, San Diego: Lucent Books, 1998 and John N. Oriji, Political Organization in Nigeria since the Late Stone Age. A History of the Igbo People, New York: Palgrave, 2011.
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12. See, for example, William Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, Illinois: Prospect Heights Inc., 1984.
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15. Ibid.
16. Scott Beaulier, p. 5.
17. “A Longing for Liberty”, Newsweek, Vol. 116, No. 4, 1990, p. 28: quoted from ibid.
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19. The whole body of free born males (citizens) formed the Assembly or Ecclesia, a town meeting which every Athenian who had reached the age of twenty was entitled to attend. The Assembly met ten times annually and in extra-ordinary sessions. See George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson A Theory of Political Thought, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. PVT. Ltd., 1973, pp. 20-21.
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22. Lagos was annexed on 6 August 1861 under the threat of force by Commander Beddingfield of HMS Prometheus who was accompanied by the Acting British Consul, William McCoskry. The Oba {king) of Lagos, Dosunmu (spelled ‘Docemo’ in British documents) resisted the cession for 11 days. He however capitulated and signed the Lagos Treaty of Cession. Lagos was subsequently declared a British Colony on 5 March 1862. See “British Aggressions in Africa: Annexation of Lagos”, The New York Times, 20 October 1861; Antony G. Hopkins, “Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain’s Annexation of Lagos, 1861”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 1980, pp. 777-798 and Preye Adekoya, “The Succession Dispute to the Throne of Lagos and the British Conquest and Occupation of Lagos” African Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016, pp. 207-226. For full texts of the Treaties that ceded Lagos to Britain, see Robert S. Smith, The Lagos Consulate, 1851-1861, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,1979: Appendixes ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ respectively titled ‘Treaty between Great Britain and Lagos, 1 January, 1952’; ‘The Treaty of Epe, 28 September 1854’ and ‘The Treaty of Cession, 6 August 1861’, pp. 135-141.
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25. In addition to Toyin Falola cited above, for a detailed examination of some of the resistance movements to British colonial administration in Nigeria, see Paul E. Lovejoy & J.S. Hogendorn, “Revolutionary Madhism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1990, pp. 217-244 and Obaro Ikime, “Colonial Conquest and Resistance in Southern Nigeria”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1972, pp. 251-270.
26. Quoted from Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1978, p. 4.
27. The three most recent are Richard A. Olaniyan (ed.) The Amalgamation and Its Enemies; Sam Momah Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective, Ibadan: Safari Books Limited, 2013 and Usman Mohammed, “International Political Economy of Nigerian Amalgamation Since 1914”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 29, 2013, pp. 429-457. A fourth – O. A. Akinyeye et. al. (eds.) Contending Issues in Nigeria’s Development Trajectory Since 1914 – is forthcoming.
28. National Archives, Ibadan (NAI): RG/L4 “Report by Sir F.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1912-1919”, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920, p. 45, paragraph 109. The Report was presented to the British Parliament in December 1919.
29. By 1901, there were 104 colonial officials in Nigeria. Robert Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 20.
30. This was at cross-purposes with Britain’s colonial economic policy. Indeed, as Lady Lugard later pointed out, the financial concessions from the Imperial treasury “were reluctantly made rather by respect for the judgement and wishes of Mr. Chamberlain, then Secretary for the Colonies, rather than by any strong conviction on the part of the British Government that Northern Nigeria was likely to prove a very valuable acquisition to the Crown”. Ibid.
31. R. Robinson et. al. Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism, London: Rotberg, 1961, p. 101.
32. Lugard, “Report…”, paragraph 6, p. 6.
33. For a detailed discussion of the ‘importance’ of these factors in Lugard’s own words, see his Report, pp. 7-8.
34. See his The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: Men, Method and Myths, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, particularly Chapter VII ‘Lugard’s Amalgamation of Nigeria, 1912–1918’ pp. 180-215.
35. For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Nigerian Colonial Constitutions and Nigeria’s Political Polarization, Journal of Arts and Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 14-23; “Government-Opposition Hostility: The Bane of the Nigerian First Republic”, Babcock Journal of History & International Studies, 2006/2007, pp. 44-67; “Leadership Crisis and Political Instability in Nigeria, 1964-1966: The Personalities, the Parties and the Policies”, International Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011, pp. 105-132; “The Impact of Ethnic Rivalry and Gulf of Trust on Nigerian Politics: The Case of the Four-Party Alliance, the Progressive Peoples’ Party and the Progressive Parties’ Alliance, 1979-1983”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2014, pp. 119-137 and “Alliance without Ideology – A Case Study of the United Progressive Grand Alliance”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2017, pp. 50-67.
36. Daily Times, 11 December, 1959. In all, the AG fielded the largest number of candidates: 3 in Lagos; 62 in the Western Region; 43 in the Eastern Region and 174 in the Northern Region. The party fielded a total of 282 candidates. The NPC fielded 172 candidates: 1 in Lagos, 1 in the West, none in the Eastern Region and 170 in the North. The NCNC fielded 143 candidates: 3 in Lagos, 62 in the Western Region, 73 in the Eastern Region and 5 in the Northern Region. The Northern Elements Progressive Union fielded 160 candidates in the Northern Region and none in the other regions while the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (a splinter of the NCNC) fielded 24 candidates in the Eastern Region and none in the other regions. Other small parties like the United Middle Belt Congress (an ally of the AG); the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) an ally of the NPC and the National Emancipation League (NEL) also fielded candidates. For the names of candidates fielded by all the parties, see Daily Times, 26 November 1959
37. Daron Acemoglu, Simeon Johnson & James A. Robinson, “An African Success Story: Botswana” in Dani Rodrik (ed.), p. 94.
38. L.H.Gann and P. Duignan, Burden of Empire, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967, p. 203.
39. R. Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995; A. Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999 and Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 27.
40. J. Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1984, p. 22.
41. Kenneth Good, p. 27.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, p. 28.
44. Ronald Manzer, “The Essential Political Goods” in Paul W. Fox & Graham White (eds.) Politics in Canada Toronto: McGraw-Hill & Ryerson Ltd., 1984, p. 3.
45. For a comprehensive conceptual discourse of democracy, see A.T. Ajayi and Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Democracy in Nigeria: Practice, Problems and Prospects”, Developing Country Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2014, pp. 107-110.
46. For the full text of Lincoln’s Address, see http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu or http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Gettysburg_Address. Retrieved on 4 September 2017.
47. Nkolika E. Obianyo “Democracy on Sale: The 2007 Nigerian Elections and the Future of the Democratic Movement in Africa” in Victor Oguejiofor (ed.) Nigeria’s Stumbling Democracy and Its Implications for Africa’s Democratic Movement, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 38.
48. M.P. Torado and C.S. Smith, Economic Development, Boston: Pearson Publication, 2012, p. 16. For a detailed examination of the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as well as their theories, see Dale B. Harris (ed.), The Concept of Develo9ment: An Issue in the Study of Human Behavior. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
49. These were the Federal Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the NPC, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premier of Northern Nigeria and National President of the NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the Sadauna of Sokoto); Western Region Premier, Chief S.L.A. Akintola and the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh.
50. Siyan Oyeweso, “Causal Factors in the Nigerian Civil War: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of Some Nigerian Accounts”, M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile Ife, 1986, p. 92.
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53. Nigeria has had fifteen federal administrations (civilian and military) since independence on 1 October, 1960. While Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the first and only Prime Minister (October 1960-January 1966); President Mohammadu Buhari is the sitting President. In-between them were Lt. Gen. Johnson Thomas Umurakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (16 Jan 1966 – 29 July 1966); Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon (1 Aug 1966 – 29 July 1975); Brigadier-General Murtala Ramat Muhammed (29 July 1975 – 13 Feb 1976); Brigadier-General Olusegun Obasanjo (14 Feb 1976 – 1 Oct 1979); Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (civilian: 1 Oct 1979 – 31 Dec 1983); General Muhammadu Buhari (31 Dec 1983 – 27 Aug 1985); General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (27 Aug 1985 – 4 Jan 1993); Ernest Adekunle Oladeinde Shonekan (interim government: 26 Aug 1993 – 17 Nov 1993); General Sani Abacha (17 Nov 1993 – 8 June 1998); General Abdulsalam Abubakar (9 June 1998 – 29 May 1999); Olusegun Obasanjo (civilian: 29 May 1999 – May 29 2007.); Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (civilian: 29 May 1999 – 5 May 2010); Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (6 May 2010 – 29 May 2015).
54. Scott A. Beaulier and Robert J. Subrick, “The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana” Working Paper, September 2005, p. 1.
55. Apart from the 12 December 1959 ‘independence elections’ conducted by the departing British officials, three general elections were conducted in Nigeria between 1960 and 1999: the 1964 federal elections in which two main political alliances – the Nigerian National Alliance and the United Progressive Grand Alliance – competed led to an unprecedented political stalemate and constitutional crisis that left the country without a valid government for four days; the 1979 federal elections were conducted by the General Olusegun Obasanjo-led military administration; the 1983 general elections held by the Sheu Shagari government produced irresolvable political crisis that led to the 31 December military coup while the 1999 general elections were conducted by the General Abdulsalam Abubakar military administration. Thus, the first successful civilian to civilian transition in 43 years was in 2003.
56. Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”, The Washington Post, 30 September 2016.
a. Aobakwe Mothusi Sekgwa, “Is Democracy in Botswana Real or is it Just a Fong Kong?”, Sunday Standard, 30 October 2016.
57. Jerry Sampson, History of Botswana, p. 1.
58. Daryl S. Balfour & Peter Joyce, This is Botswana, London: Penguin, 2016, p. 80. See also, Abdullateef Salau, “Botswana seeks import of Nigerian tomatoes, garlic”, Daily Trust, 3 October 2016.
59. Abdullateef Salau, ibid.
60. David Sebudubudu, “Corruption and its Control in Botswana”, Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 35, 2013, p. 125.
61. Ibid
62. Quoted in ibid.
63. For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Combating Systemic Corruption in Africa: Altitudinal, Attitudinal, Constitutional or Confrontation”, Humanities & Social Sciences, Vol. 9, 2016, pp. 11-32.
64. The Sun, 15 May 2013. The Nigerian Tribune of 18 May 2013 captioned the report thus “Nigerian leaders stole, laundered $18.2b in 10 years’. According to the report, China occupied the first position with $2.74 trillion; Mexico was second with $476 billion; Malaysia was third with $285 billion; Saudi Arabia was fourth with $210 billion; followed by Russia with $152 billion while Philippines was sixth with $138 billion.
65. See Vanguard or any Nigerian daily of 21 March 2014 for details.
66. The Nation, 29 April 2013
67. Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Nigeria loses $400bn to oil thieves”, Vanguard, 28 August 2012.
68. Seun Opejobi, “Court orders forfeiture of Ikoyi apartment where $43m was found” Daily Post, 9 November 2017
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71. Gbolahan Gbadamosi, “Ethics, Corruption and Economic Prosperity in Africa: Botswana Experiences”, p. 3, retrieved from http://users.clas.ufl.edu/aspring/courses/All%20courses/UF%20courses/corruption.doc on 15 February 2018. For more definite corruption cases and prosecutions in Botswana, see Gabriel Kuris, “Managing Corruption Risks: Botswana Builds an Anti-Graft Agency, 1994 – 2012”, Princeton University, 2013, pp. 1-21.
72. For the Act of Parliament that established the DCEC, see http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/ Corruption%20and%20Economic%20Crime%20Act.pdf
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74. Cited in Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development”, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 3.
75. Quoted from Luminous Jannamike, “Why we can’t deliver on our promises – Osinbajo”, Vanguard, 16 February 2018.
76. Ibid.
77. “Nigeria’s democracy not delivering dividends – Jega”, Vanguard, 9 February 2018. Former President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) was the Head of Nigeria’s Military Government between 13 February 1976 and 1 October 1979 while the incumbent, Mohammadu Buhari, served as Military Head of State between 31 December 1983 and 27 August 1985. Several other retired Generals are now active politicians and power brokers in the country.
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81. Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”, JCAS, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 233-250 and “Local Attitudes towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal of Recent Press Stories”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 755-775
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83. Julie J. Taylor, “Celebrating the San Victory Too Soon? Reflections on the outcome of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve case”, Anthropology Today, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2007, pp.1-5.
84. Nicola de Jager & David Sebudubudu, “Towards understanding Botswana and South Africa’s ambivalence to liberal democracy”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 35, No.14, 2017, pp. 15-33
85. Mpho G. Molomo, “Democracy and Botswana’s Electoral System”, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, pp. 21-40
86. Mokganedi Z. Botlhomilwe, David Sebudubudu & Bugalo Maripe, “Limited freedom and intolerance in Botswana”, JCAS, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 331-348
87. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, Spring 2010, pp. 458-488
88. Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 25
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid, p. 5.
91. Ibid, p. 4.
92. Kebapetse Lotshwao and Kekgaoditse Suping, “The 2010 Split of the Botswana Democratic Party”, PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013, pp. 344-360.
93. Kebapetse Lotshwao, “The weakness of opposition parties in Botswana: A justification for more internal-party democracy in the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, pp. 103-111; Caroline Lancaster, “The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 9, 2014, pp. 1672-1690 and Brian T. Mokopakgosi & Mpho G. Molomo “Democracy in the face of a weak opposition in Botswana”, Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-22.
94. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2015 Report – Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
95. Michael Bratton & Peter Lewis, “The Durability of Political Goods? Evidence from Nigeria’s New Democracy”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007, p. 8.
96. “Freedom in the World 2015 Report – Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/ report/ freedom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
97. Rorisang Lekalake, “Botwsana’s democratic consolidation: what will it take?” Afro Barometer Policy Paper No. 30, January 2016, p. 1.
98. 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Botswana”, retrieved from http://static.moibrahimfoundation. org/u/2015/10/02201308/04_Botswana.pdf on 13 February 2018.
99. Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, “Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance and experience”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, Issue 1, 2007, p. 197.
100. Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”.
101. Geoffrey Chesler, A Quick Guide to Customs and Etiquette in Botswana, London: Kuperand, 2007, p. 8.
102. Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”, p. 233.
103. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa?. Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, pp. 465,455,489.
104. Amy Poteete, “Does Botswana deserve its reputation as a stable democracy?” The Washington Post, 20 October 2014.
105. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017” retrieved from https://www.trans-parency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 on 18 February 2018
106. International Body Rates Nigeria Police Force Worst Globally”, The Punch, 12 November 2017.
107. “Port Harcourt, Lagos Airports Rated Among Worst in the World”, ThisDay, 13 November 2017
108. Keitebe Kgosikebatho, “MPs, Dikgosi get salary increase”, The Patriot, 12 April 2015; Nicholas Mokwena, “MPs’ secret salary hike under wraps”, Botswana Guardian, 15 August 2017 and Jason Ranthatsa, “MPs demand salary raise”, Weekend Post,21 April, 2016.
109. Saxone Akhaine, “Slash legislators’, ministers’ pay by half, Sanusi tells Buhari”, The Guardian, 12 February 2018.
110. Ibid.
111. Itse Sagay, “Nigeria: The Travails of an Animal Kingdom”, Alternative Africa, 1 February 2018.
112. Nike Adebowale, “Over 57 million Nigerians lack access to potable water – UNICEF”, Premium Times, 23 August 2017
113. INDEX MUNDI WATER ACCESS SURVEY, HTTPS://WWW.INDEXMUNDI.COM/FACTS/NIGERIA/INDICATOR/ SH.H2O. SAFE.ZS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, “BOTSWANA: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER, RURAL”, HTTPS://WWW.THEGLOBAL ECONOMY.COM/BOTSWANA/DRINKING_WATER_RURAL/
114. Cebastine Obasi, “80 million Nigerians lack access to electricity – World Bank”, Vanguard, 10 November 2015. See also Punch. 5 December 2017; Vanguard, 6 December 2017 and Obinna F. Muoh, “When 95 million Nigerians are living without electricity something needs to change”, Business Insider, 14 July 2016.
115. ESI Africa: Africa Power Journal, “Statistics: Botswana records a 63.9% decrease in power imports”, 7 July 2017.
116. World Data Atlas “Botswana Adult (15+) literacy rate”, https://knoema.com/atlas/Botswana/topics/ Education/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate retrieved on 20 January 2017.
117. “10.5m children out of school in Nigeria – UNICEF”, Premium Times, 18 August 2015.
118. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty: Why Nations Fail, New York: Crown Publishers, 2012, p. 2.
119. United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2016”, pp. 2&6.
120. John Owen Nwachukwu, “Nigerians are angry with you, admit your government has failed – Cardinal Okogie tells Buhari”, Daily Post, 20 February 2018.
121. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, p. 465.
122. Kenneth Good, Realising Democracy in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1997, p. 3.
123. Tolu Ogunlesi, “South Africa–Nigeria Relations: Games of Throes”, 10 October 2014 retrieved from https://oluogunlesi.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/south-africa-nigeria-relations-a-game-of-throes-2013/ on 10 February 2018.
124. Following the foundation of the University in 2012, Professor Inyang, an Environmental Engineer, was appointed Vice Chancellor in 2013. He however resigned his appointment in February 2014 over what he termed ‘political interference’. See Sheldon G. Weeks, “Facing hard challenges – A tale of two universities”, University World News, No. 154, 27 June 2015 and Alfred Masokola, “BIUST launches ambitious strategy”, Weekend Post, 24 October 2016.
125. Nkomazana Oathokwa et. al., “Human resources for health in Botswana: The results of in-country database and reports analysis”, African Journal of Primary Health Care and Family Medicine, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, p. 33.
126. News Agency of Nigeria, “Gambia Will ‘Collapse’ Without Nigerian Professionals – VP”, Leadership, Premium Times and Punch, 16 March 2018.
127. Johnbobosco Agbakwuru, “Nigeria only oil producing country struggling with importation of refined products”, Vanguard, 28 June, 2017.
8. Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, Suffolk: James Curry & Jacana Media, 2008, p. 4.
9. For details see, Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, London: Longman, 1967; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies, London: Longman, 1977 and Joseph P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
10. See, among others, U.D. Anyanwu and J.C.U. Aguwa (eds.), The Igbo and Tradition of Politics, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1993; Salome Nnoroviele, The Way People Live – Life Among the Ibo Women of Nigeria, San Diego: Lucent Books, 1998 and John N. Oriji, Political Organization in Nigeria since the Late Stone Age. A History of the Igbo People, New York: Palgrave, 2011.
11. Hurst Williamson, “Kingship in the Age of Extraction: How British Deconstruction and Isolation of African Kingship Reshaped Identity and Spurred Nigeria’s North/South Divide, 1885-1937”, Honors Thesis, Rice University, Fall 2014-Spring 2015, p. 7.
12. See, for example, William Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, Illinois: Prospect Heights Inc., 1984.
13. Scott Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy”, Viercatus Center, George Mason University Working Paper 41, n.d., p. 4.
14. ANDREW WADDELL, “KGOTLA (BOTSWANA PUBLIC ASSEMBLY)”, RETRIEVED FROM HTTPS://PARTICIPEDIA.NET/EN/ METHODS/KGOTLA-PUBLIC-ASSEMBLY ON 10 FEBRUARY 2018.
15. Ibid.
16. Scott Beaulier, p. 5.
17. “A Longing for Liberty”, Newsweek, Vol. 116, No. 4, 1990, p. 28: quoted from ibid.
18. Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 6.
19. The whole body of free born males (citizens) formed the Assembly or Ecclesia, a town meeting which every Athenian who had reached the age of twenty was entitled to attend. The Assembly met ten times annually and in extra-ordinary sessions. See George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson A Theory of Political Thought, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. PVT. Ltd., 1973, pp. 20-21.
20. Robert A. Dahl, Participation and Opposition, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 22.
21. Winin Pereira, Inhuman Rights, The Other India Press, The Apex Press & Third World Press, p. 34. George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson. estimate that only a third of the inhabitants of Athens were slaves, p. 20.
22. Lagos was annexed on 6 August 1861 under the threat of force by Commander Beddingfield of HMS Prometheus who was accompanied by the Acting British Consul, William McCoskry. The Oba {king) of Lagos, Dosunmu (spelled ‘Docemo’ in British documents) resisted the cession for 11 days. He however capitulated and signed the Lagos Treaty of Cession. Lagos was subsequently declared a British Colony on 5 March 1862. See “British Aggressions in Africa: Annexation of Lagos”, The New York Times, 20 October 1861; Antony G. Hopkins, “Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain’s Annexation of Lagos, 1861”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 1980, pp. 777-798 and Preye Adekoya, “The Succession Dispute to the Throne of Lagos and the British Conquest and Occupation of Lagos” African Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016, pp. 207-226. For full texts of the Treaties that ceded Lagos to Britain, see Robert S. Smith, The Lagos Consulate, 1851-1861, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,1979: Appendixes ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ respectively titled ‘Treaty between Great Britain and Lagos, 1 January, 1952’; ‘The Treaty of Epe, 28 September 1854’ and ‘The Treaty of Cession, 6 August 1861’, pp. 135-141.
23. See, among others, Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest, London: Heinemann, 1977 and Toyin Falola, Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. For Colonial Blue Books between 1863 and 1940, see “Colonial Africa in official statistics, 1821-1953: Nigeria, 1862-1945” retrieved from https://microform.digital/boa/collections/39/volumes/232/nigeria-1862-1945#paginate on 11 February 2018.
24. Olufemi Oluniyi, Reconciliation in Northern Nigeria. The Space for Public Apology, Lagos: Frontier Press, 2017, p.65; Stephanie Williams, Running theShow. Governors of the British Empire, London: Penguin, pp. 289 & 146; Bruce J. Lockhart, A Sailor in the Sahara: The Life and Travels in Africa of Hugh Clapperton, Commander PN, London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008, p. 269 and Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 83.
25. In addition to Toyin Falola cited above, for a detailed examination of some of the resistance movements to British colonial administration in Nigeria, see Paul E. Lovejoy & J.S. Hogendorn, “Revolutionary Madhism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1990, pp. 217-244 and Obaro Ikime, “Colonial Conquest and Resistance in Southern Nigeria”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1972, pp. 251-270.
26. Quoted from Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1978, p. 4.
27. The three most recent are Richard A. Olaniyan (ed.) The Amalgamation and Its Enemies; Sam Momah Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective, Ibadan: Safari Books Limited, 2013 and Usman Mohammed, “International Political Economy of Nigerian Amalgamation Since 1914”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 29, 2013, pp. 429-457. A fourth – O. A. Akinyeye et. al. (eds.) Contending Issues in Nigeria’s Development Trajectory Since 1914 – is forthcoming.
28. National Archives, Ibadan (NAI): RG/L4 “Report by Sir F.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1912-1919”, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920, p. 45, paragraph 109. The Report was presented to the British Parliament in December 1919.
29. By 1901, there were 104 colonial officials in Nigeria. Robert Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 20.
30. This was at cross-purposes with Britain’s colonial economic policy. Indeed, as Lady Lugard later pointed out, the financial concessions from the Imperial treasury “were reluctantly made rather by respect for the judgement and wishes of Mr. Chamberlain, then Secretary for the Colonies, rather than by any strong conviction on the part of the British Government that Northern Nigeria was likely to prove a very valuable acquisition to the Crown”. Ibid.
31. R. Robinson et. al. Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism, London: Rotberg, 1961, p. 101.
32. Lugard, “Report…”, paragraph 6, p. 6.
33. For a detailed discussion of the ‘importance’ of these factors in Lugard’s own words, see his Report, pp. 7-8.
34. See his The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: Men, Method and Myths, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, particularly Chapter VII ‘Lugard’s Amalgamation of Nigeria, 1912–1918’ pp. 180-215.
35. For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Nigerian Colonial Constitutions and Nigeria’s Political Polarization, Journal of Arts and Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 14-23; “Government-Opposition Hostility: The Bane of the Nigerian First Republic”, Babcock Journal of History & International Studies, 2006/2007, pp. 44-67; “Leadership Crisis and Political Instability in Nigeria, 1964-1966: The Personalities, the Parties and the Policies”, International Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011, pp. 105-132; “The Impact of Ethnic Rivalry and Gulf of Trust on Nigerian Politics: The Case of the Four-Party Alliance, the Progressive Peoples’ Party and the Progressive Parties’ Alliance, 1979-1983”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2014, pp. 119-137 and “Alliance without Ideology – A Case Study of the United Progressive Grand Alliance”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2017, pp. 50-67.
36. Daily Times, 11 December, 1959. In all, the AG fielded the largest number of candidates: 3 in Lagos; 62 in the Western Region; 43 in the Eastern Region and 174 in the Northern Region. The party fielded a total of 282 candidates. The NPC fielded 172 candidates: 1 in Lagos, 1 in the West, none in the Eastern Region and 170 in the North. The NCNC fielded 143 candidates: 3 in Lagos, 62 in the Western Region, 73 in the Eastern Region and 5 in the Northern Region. The Northern Elements Progressive Union fielded 160 candidates in the Northern Region and none in the other regions while the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (a splinter of the NCNC) fielded 24 candidates in the Eastern Region and none in the other regions. Other small parties like the United Middle Belt Congress (an ally of the AG); the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) an ally of the NPC and the National Emancipation League (NEL) also fielded candidates. For the names of candidates fielded by all the parties, see Daily Times, 26 November 1959
37. Daron Acemoglu, Simeon Johnson & James A. Robinson, “An African Success Story: Botswana” in Dani Rodrik (ed.), p. 94.
38. L.H.Gann and P. Duignan, Burden of Empire, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967, p. 203.
39. R. Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995; A. Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999 and Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 27.
40. J. Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1984, p. 22.
41. Kenneth Good, p. 27.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, p. 28.
44. Ronald Manzer, “The Essential Political Goods” in Paul W. Fox & Graham White (eds.) Politics in Canada Toronto: McGraw-Hill & Ryerson Ltd., 1984, p. 3.
45. For a comprehensive conceptual discourse of democracy, see A.T. Ajayi and Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Democracy in Nigeria: Practice, Problems and Prospects”, Developing Country Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2014, pp. 107-110.
46. For the full text of Lincoln’s Address, see http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu or http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Gettysburg_Address. Retrieved on 4 September 2017.
47. Nkolika E. Obianyo “Democracy on Sale: The 2007 Nigerian Elections and the Future of the Democratic Movement in Africa” in Victor Oguejiofor (ed.) Nigeria’s Stumbling Democracy and Its Implications for Africa’s Democratic Movement, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 38.
48. M.P. Torado and C.S. Smith, Economic Development, Boston: Pearson Publication, 2012, p. 16. For a detailed examination of the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as well as their theories, see Dale B. Harris (ed.), The Concept of Develo9ment: An Issue in the Study of Human Behavior. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
49. These were the Federal Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the NPC, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premier of Northern Nigeria and National President of the NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the Sadauna of Sokoto); Western Region Premier, Chief S.L.A. Akintola and the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh.
50. Siyan Oyeweso, “Causal Factors in the Nigerian Civil War: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of Some Nigerian Accounts”, M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile Ife, 1986, p. 92.
51. Eghosa Osaghae “Federal Society and Federal Character: The Politics of Plural Accommodation in Nigeria since Independence” in Uma Eleazu (ed.) Nigeria: The First 25 Years, Lagos & Ibadan: Infodata Ltd. & Heinemann Educational Books, 1988, p. 27.
52. B.J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973, pp. 90-91.
53. Nigeria has had fifteen federal administrations (civilian and military) since independence on 1 October, 1960. While Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the first and only Prime Minister (October 1960-January 1966); President Mohammadu Buhari is the sitting President. In-between them were Lt. Gen. Johnson Thomas Umurakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (16 Jan 1966 – 29 July 1966); Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon (1 Aug 1966 – 29 July 1975); Brigadier-General Murtala Ramat Muhammed (29 July 1975 – 13 Feb 1976); Brigadier-General Olusegun Obasanjo (14 Feb 1976 – 1 Oct 1979); Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (civilian: 1 Oct 1979 – 31 Dec 1983); General Muhammadu Buhari (31 Dec 1983 – 27 Aug 1985); General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (27 Aug 1985 – 4 Jan 1993); Ernest Adekunle Oladeinde Shonekan (interim government: 26 Aug 1993 – 17 Nov 1993); General Sani Abacha (17 Nov 1993 – 8 June 1998); General Abdulsalam Abubakar (9 June 1998 – 29 May 1999); Olusegun Obasanjo (civilian: 29 May 1999 – May 29 2007.); Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (civilian: 29 May 1999 – 5 May 2010); Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (6 May 2010 – 29 May 2015).
54. Scott A. Beaulier and Robert J. Subrick, “The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana” Working Paper, September 2005, p. 1.
55. Apart from the 12 December 1959 ‘independence elections’ conducted by the departing British officials, three general elections were conducted in Nigeria between 1960 and 1999: the 1964 federal elections in which two main political alliances – the Nigerian National Alliance and the United Progressive Grand Alliance – competed led to an unprecedented political stalemate and constitutional crisis that left the country without a valid government for four days; the 1979 federal elections were conducted by the General Olusegun Obasanjo-led military administration; the 1983 general elections held by the Sheu Shagari government produced irresolvable political crisis that led to the 31 December military coup while the 1999 general elections were conducted by the General Abdulsalam Abubakar military administration. Thus, the first successful civilian to civilian transition in 43 years was in 2003.
56. Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”, The Washington Post, 30 September 2016.
a. Aobakwe Mothusi Sekgwa, “Is Democracy in Botswana Real or is it Just a Fong Kong?”, Sunday Standard, 30 October 2016.
57. Jerry Sampson, History of Botswana, p. 1.
58. Daryl S. Balfour & Peter Joyce, This is Botswana, London: Penguin, 2016, p. 80. See also, Abdullateef Salau, “Botswana seeks import of Nigerian tomatoes, garlic”, Daily Trust, 3 October 2016.
59. Abdullateef Salau, ibid.
60. David Sebudubudu, “Corruption and its Control in Botswana”, Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 35, 2013, p. 125.
61. Ibid
62. Quoted in ibid.
63. For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Combating Systemic Corruption in Africa: Altitudinal, Attitudinal, Constitutional or Confrontation”, Humanities & Social Sciences, Vol. 9, 2016, pp. 11-32.
64. The Sun, 15 May 2013. The Nigerian Tribune of 18 May 2013 captioned the report thus “Nigerian leaders stole, laundered $18.2b in 10 years’. According to the report, China occupied the first position with $2.74 trillion; Mexico was second with $476 billion; Malaysia was third with $285 billion; Saudi Arabia was fourth with $210 billion; followed by Russia with $152 billion while Philippines was sixth with $138 billion.
65. See Vanguard or any Nigerian daily of 21 March 2014 for details.
66. The Nation, 29 April 2013
67. Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Nigeria loses $400bn to oil thieves”, Vanguard, 28 August 2012.
68. Seun Opejobi, “Court orders forfeiture of Ikoyi apartment where $43m was found” Daily Post, 9 November 2017
69. See, among others, Suzan Edeh, “IDPs relief materials diverted for commercial purposes in Bauchi”, Vanguard, 17 February 2018; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Diversion of IDP Funds: UNDP, NHRC report indicts Presidency, ex-SGF”, Vanguard, 22 November 2017; Henry Umoru & Joseph Erunke, “Senate probes diversion of N5bn IDPs funds”, Vanguard, 5 October 2016;; News agency of Nigeria, “Those diverting funds meant for IDPs must be punished – Shehu Sani”, The Guardian, 27 November 2016; “Senate calls for Babachir Lawal prosecution for IDP fund diversion”, Punch, 14 December 2016; Abdulkareem Haruna, “How officials steal food meant for people displaced by Boko Haram, IDPs narrate”, Premium Times, 5 October 2016 and Fisayo Soyombo, “How Corruption is Killing Children in IDP Camps”, Daily Trust, 30 December 2016.
70. Tope Alabi, “90% of Nigerians don’t have access to clean water – World Bank”, Information Nigeria, 29 August 2017.
71. Gbolahan Gbadamosi, “Ethics, Corruption and Economic Prosperity in Africa: Botswana Experiences”, p. 3, retrieved from http://users.clas.ufl.edu/aspring/courses/All%20courses/UF%20courses/corruption.doc on 15 February 2018. For more definite corruption cases and prosecutions in Botswana, see Gabriel Kuris, “Managing Corruption Risks: Botswana Builds an Anti-Graft Agency, 1994 – 2012”, Princeton University, 2013, pp. 1-21.
72. For the Act of Parliament that established the DCEC, see http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/ Corruption%20and%20Economic%20Crime%20Act.pdf
73. Centre for Public Impact, “Fighting Corruption in Botswana”, retrieved from https://www.centre-forpublicimpact.org/case-study/fighting-corruption-botswana/ on 10 February 2018.
74. Cited in Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development”, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 3.
75. Quoted from Luminous Jannamike, “Why we can’t deliver on our promises – Osinbajo”, Vanguard, 16 February 2018.
76. Ibid.
77. “Nigeria’s democracy not delivering dividends – Jega”, Vanguard, 9 February 2018. Former President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) was the Head of Nigeria’s Military Government between 13 February 1976 and 1 October 1979 while the incumbent, Mohammadu Buhari, served as Military Head of State between 31 December 1983 and 27 August 1985. Several other retired Generals are now active politicians and power brokers in the country.
78. See, among others, Ihemeje Chidiebere C. Godswealth, Zaid B. Ahmad & Jawan JayumAnak, “Factors Influencing the Executive and Legislative Conflict in Nigeria Political Development”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 21, Issue 8, 2016, pp. 20-25; Jacob O. Fatile & Kehinde D. Adejuwon, “Legislative–Executive Conflicts and Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, International Journal of Innovative Research in Social Sciences and Strategic Management Techniques, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2016, pp. 91-111; Innocent O. Eme, “Addressing Executive-Legislature Conflict in Nigeria”, Journal of Security Studies and Global Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016, pp. 29-37; I. Okechukwu & Andrew Ogbochie, “Executive-Legislature Feud in Nigeria: An Examination of Service Chiefs Confirmation, 1999-2014”, Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, Vol. 3, No. 12, 2014, pp. 1-20 and Jude A. Momodu & Gambo I. Matudi, “The Implications of Executive-Legislative Conflicts on Good Governance in Nigeria”, Public Policy and Administration Research, Vol. 3, No. 8, 2013, pp. 30-42
79. See Mohammed Sabiu, “Constituents threaten to recall Senator Sani over alleged opposition to Buhari”, Nigerian Tribune, 12 February 2018; Yemi Itodo, “I will fight ‘criminals in power’ with my last blood – Melaye tells FG”, Daily Post, 13 February 2018 and Damilola Oyedele & Alex Enumah, “Melaye’s Recall: Court refuses to stop INEC”, This Day, 7 July 2017. Chapter V, Part C, Section 69 p. 55 of the 1999 Constitution makes provision for the recall of members of the National Assembly.
80. Kenneth Good, “Resource dependency and its consequences: The costs of Botswana’s shining gems”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2005, pp. 27-50; “Enduring elite democracy in Botswana”, Democratization, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 50-66; “Authoritarian liberalism: A defining characteristic of Botswana”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 1996, pp. 29-51; “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best-Case Example?”, JCAS, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 1994, pp. 499-521; with Ian Taylor, “Botswana: A Minimalist Democracy”, Democratization, Vol. 15, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 750-765
81. Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”, JCAS, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 233-250 and “Local Attitudes towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal of Recent Press Stories”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 755-775
82. Ian Taylor, “The limits of the ‘African Miracle’: Academic freedom in Botswana and the deportation of Kenneth Good”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2006, pp.101-122 and “As Good as Its Gets? Botswana’s ‘Democratic Development’, JCAS, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 215-231
83. Julie J. Taylor, “Celebrating the San Victory Too Soon? Reflections on the outcome of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve case”, Anthropology Today, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2007, pp.1-5.
84. Nicola de Jager & David Sebudubudu, “Towards understanding Botswana and South Africa’s ambivalence to liberal democracy”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 35, No.14, 2017, pp. 15-33
85. Mpho G. Molomo, “Democracy and Botswana’s Electoral System”, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, pp. 21-40
86. Mokganedi Z. Botlhomilwe, David Sebudubudu & Bugalo Maripe, “Limited freedom and intolerance in Botswana”, JCAS, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 331-348
87. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, Spring 2010, pp. 458-488
88. Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 25
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid, p. 5.
91. Ibid, p. 4.
92. Kebapetse Lotshwao and Kekgaoditse Suping, “The 2010 Split of the Botswana Democratic Party”, PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013, pp. 344-360.
93. Kebapetse Lotshwao, “The weakness of opposition parties in Botswana: A justification for more internal-party democracy in the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, pp. 103-111; Caroline Lancaster, “The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 9, 2014, pp. 1672-1690 and Brian T. Mokopakgosi & Mpho G. Molomo “Democracy in the face of a weak opposition in Botswana”, Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-22.
94. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2015 Report – Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
95. Michael Bratton & Peter Lewis, “The Durability of Political Goods? Evidence from Nigeria’s New Democracy”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007, p. 8.
96. “Freedom in the World 2015 Report – Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/ report/ freedom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
97. Rorisang Lekalake, “Botwsana’s democratic consolidation: what will it take?” Afro Barometer Policy Paper No. 30, January 2016, p. 1.
98. 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Botswana”, retrieved from http://static.moibrahimfoundation. org/u/2015/10/02201308/04_Botswana.pdf on 13 February 2018.
99. Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, “Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance and experience”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, Issue 1, 2007, p. 197.
100. Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”.
101. Geoffrey Chesler, A Quick Guide to Customs and Etiquette in Botswana, London: Kuperand, 2007, p. 8.
102. Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”, p. 233.
103. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa?. Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, pp. 465,455,489.
104. Amy Poteete, “Does Botswana deserve its reputation as a stable democracy?” The Washington Post, 20 October 2014.
105. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017” retrieved from https://www.trans-parency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 on 18 February 2018
106. International Body Rates Nigeria Police Force Worst Globally”, The Punch, 12 November 2017.
107. “Port Harcourt, Lagos Airports Rated Among Worst in the World”, ThisDay, 13 November 2017
108. Keitebe Kgosikebatho, “MPs, Dikgosi get salary increase”, The Patriot, 12 April 2015; Nicholas Mokwena, “MPs’ secret salary hike under wraps”, Botswana Guardian, 15 August 2017 and Jason Ranthatsa, “MPs demand salary raise”, Weekend Post,21 April, 2016.
109. Saxone Akhaine, “Slash legislators’, ministers’ pay by half, Sanusi tells Buhari”, The Guardian, 12 February 2018.
110. Ibid.
111. Itse Sagay, “Nigeria: The Travails of an Animal Kingdom”, Alternative Africa, 1 February 2018.
112. Nike Adebowale, “Over 57 million Nigerians lack access to potable water – UNICEF”, Premium Times, 23 August 2017
113. INDEX MUNDI WATER ACCESS SURVEY, HTTPS://WWW.INDEXMUNDI.COM/FACTS/NIGERIA/INDICATOR/ SH.H2O. SAFE.ZS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, “BOTSWANA: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER, RURAL”, HTTPS://WWW.THEGLOBAL ECONOMY.COM/BOTSWANA/DRINKING_WATER_RURAL/
114. Cebastine Obasi, “80 million Nigerians lack access to electricity – World Bank”, Vanguard, 10 November 2015. See also Punch. 5 December 2017; Vanguard, 6 December 2017 and Obinna F. Muoh, “When 95 million Nigerians are living without electricity something needs to change”, Business Insider, 14 July 2016.
115. ESI Africa: Africa Power Journal, “Statistics: Botswana records a 63.9% decrease in power imports”, 7 July 2017.
116. World Data Atlas “Botswana Adult (15+) literacy rate”, https://knoema.com/atlas/Botswana/topics/ Education/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate retrieved on 20 January 2017.
117. “10.5m children out of school in Nigeria – UNICEF”, Premium Times, 18 August 2015.
118. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty: Why Nations Fail, New York: Crown Publishers, 2012, p. 2.
119. United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2016”, pp. 2&6.
120. John Owen Nwachukwu, “Nigerians are angry with you, admit your government has failed – Cardinal Okogie tells Buhari”, Daily Post, 20 February 2018.
121. Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, p. 465.
122. Kenneth Good, Realising Democracy in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1997, p. 3.
123. Tolu Ogunlesi, “South Africa–Nigeria Relations: Games of Throes”, 10 October 2014 retrieved from https://oluogunlesi.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/south-africa-nigeria-relations-a-game-of-throes-2013/ on 10 February 2018.
124. Following the foundation of the University in 2012, Professor Inyang, an Environmental Engineer, was appointed Vice Chancellor in 2013. He however resigned his appointment in February 2014 over what he termed ‘political interference’. See Sheldon G. Weeks, “Facing hard challenges – A tale of two universities”, University World News, No. 154, 27 June 2015 and Alfred Masokola, “BIUST launches ambitious strategy”, Weekend Post, 24 October 2016.
125. Nkomazana Oathokwa et. al., “Human resources for health in Botswana: The results of in-country database and reports analysis”, African Journal of Primary Health Care and Family Medicine, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, p. 33.
126. News Agency of Nigeria, “Gambia Will ‘Collapse’ Without Nigerian Professionals – VP”, Leadership, Premium Times and Punch, 16 March 2018.
127. Johnbobosco Agbakwuru, “Nigeria only oil producing country struggling with importation of refined products”, Vanguard, 28 June, 2017.